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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Cody Jones for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Environmental Sciences and Resources presented July 10, 2008.

Title: What's Regulation Got To Do With It? Examining the Impact of Regulatory
Intensity on Facility Environmental Management and Performance

Understanding the influence of regulation on environmental management is
important—studies typically find regulation to be a significant influence on
environmental activity. However, studies typically assess regulation together with a
suite of other influences such as investors and customers, which are often also found
to be significant influences on environmental management. This research, on the
other hand, suggests that regulatory constraints form a framework within which
organizations operate, and therefore are associated with organizations' views of other
motivating factors, as well as environmental management and performance.
Additionally, this study assesses the influence of management attitudes toward
environmental protection and attitudes toward regulation on motivations,
environmental management practices, and performance.

This study uses two-step cluster analysis to classify facilities according to the level of
regulatory constraints affecting the facility, thereby representing the regulatory
framework. Facilities are classified based on the industry sector, the number of

environmental permits the facility holds, and the number of different environmental
media the facility holds permits for. This study finds that highly regulated facilities
are larger manufacturers, while moderately and lightly regulated facilities are
primarily nonmanufacturers and smaller facilities, which may assist policymakers in
targeting voluntary environmental management policies to specific types of facilities.

Next, differences in motivations for environmental management, environmental
management practices, and environmental performance among these groups are
examined using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression. This
study finds that moderately and highly regulated facilities rated customer influences
and the ability to achieve competitive advantage as less important motivations for
environmental management than lightly regulated facilities. This study also finds that
facilities in the highly regulated group exhibit more intense environmental
management practice implementation and greater pollution prevention activity than
lightly regulated facilities. In addition, moderately and highly regulated facilities
engage in significantly fewer voluntary environmental management activities than
lightly regulated facilities. Management attitudes toward regulation and toward
environmental protection are significantly positively associated with other external
motivations for environmental management (customer, environmental interest group,
competitive, and investor pressures), and are also significantly positively associated
with greater pollution prevention activity.
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Introduction
A burgeoning literature examines environmental management and performance at
for-profit organizations, particularly with respect to voluntary or "beyond

compliance" efforts. For the purposes of this discussion, voluntary environmental
management will be defined as "environmentally friendly actions not required by
law", which is the definition proffered by Lyon and Maxwell (2004) under the
moniker "corporate environmentalism".

Studies of voluntary environmental management have addressed a wide variety of
topics including:
•

The increasing shift from a reactive to a strategic approach to environmental
management (Esty and Winston, 2006; Preuss, 2005; Reinhardt, 2005)

•

Stakeholder groups that influence firm environmental behavior (Esty and
Winston, 2006; Reinhardt, 2005; Reinhardt, 2000; Henriques and Sadorsky,
1996)

•

Characteristics of firms that adopt environmental management systems, and
motivations for adoption (Nakamura, Takahashi and Vertinsky, 2001)

•

Characteristics of firms that participate in voluntary programs, and motivations
for participation (Khanna, 2001; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Arora and Cason,
1995,1996)
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•

The effect of environmental performance on financial performance and vice versa
(Darnall, Jolley, and Ytterhus, 2007; Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Khanna, 2001;
Khanna and Damon, 1999)

•

Theoretical frameworks explaining voluntary environmental management (Ervin
et al, 2008; Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Carpentier and Ervin, 2002; Nakamura,
Takahashi and Vertinsky, 2001; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Arora and
Gangopadhyay, 1995)

In general, this literature has shown that traditional models of profit-maximizing
firms do not fully explain voluntary environmental behavior. In the traditional view,
profit-maximizing firms take prices and regulations as given, and have no incentives
to reduce environmental impacts or exceed regulatory compliance because these
actions impose non-productive costs (Khanna, 2001). In the emerging literature,
firms are assumed to undertake voluntary environmental management out of selfinterest, both to appeal to stakeholders beyond the regulatory agency, and to achieve
competitive and other benefits (Esty and Winston, 2006). Studies have identified
several factors and stakeholder groups that influence voluntary environmental
management: consumer desire for environmentally friendly products and services,
and to a lesser degree, willingness to pay for environmentally friendly characteristics
(Khanna and Anton, 2002a; Teisl, Roe and Hicks, 2002; Henriques and Sadorsky,
1996); environmental interest groups (Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000; Henriques
and Sadorsky, 1996; McClelland and Horowitz, 1999); competitive advantage
2

(Khanna and Damon, 1999; Arora and Cason, 1995); regulations (Alberini and
Segerson, 2002; Khanna, 2001), and others.

Knowledge of how these factors influence environmental management decisions
informs both public and private (e.g., nongovernmental organization [NGO]) policy
makers who seek to foster greater voluntary environmental efforts among firms, as
well as firms themselves who seek to appeal to a broad array of stakeholders.
Moreover, this knowledge is increasingly important as regulatory agencies become
more involved in voluntary environmental management initiatives, either as sponsors
or partners with industries or firms; and as agencies revise existing regulations and
consider new regulations for previously unregulated impacts.

Despite the variety and high quality of available literature, for the most part, studies
of voluntary environmental management exhibit some common limitations. First,
samples tend to include predominantly large, publicly traded manufacturing firms.
Second, many studies rely on limited secondary data on environmental performance
that is available publicly. Third, research has typically assumed that regulatory
pressures are equal across firms and impacts. Studies tend to assess overall
environmental management and performance, without distinguishing between firms'
efforts to exceed regulatory requirements on "regulated" impacts (e.g. toxic releases)
and voluntary reductions in unregulated impacts (e.g. carbon dioxide emissions).
Regulatory pressures bear more in-depth scrutiny because studies that examine
3

motivations for environmental management have frequently identified regulatory
pressures as a significant determinant of environmental management effort (Khanna
etal, 2007; Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Khanna, 2001). However, regulatory
pressures are typically assessed with a single measure such as the number of
inspections or penalties to which a firm was subject, or with a single indicator of
perceived regulatory pressure (Ervin et al, 2008; Jones, 2007). Regulatory influences
have not typically been measured using composite indices composed of multiple
elements (e.g., the number and type of regulatory permits a firm holds, the number of
inspections, the number of penalties), or parsed out according to media or impact
(e.g., wastewater treatment, hazardous air emissions, toxic wastes). A separate
analysis of the data used in this research indicates that firm behavior differs with
respect to differing regulatory pressures. Among other findings, that analysis found
that facilities subject to solid waste regulations were more likely to participate in
formal voluntary environmental management programs—such as ENERGY STAR®,
WasteWise, and others—while facilities subject to hazardous waste and wastewater
regulations were more likely to implement a greater number of environmental
management practices (Khanna et al, 2007).

This study proposes to extend previous research in two ways. First, this study
examines overall environmental management, which may include compliance efforts
and voluntary efforts both, and voluntary environmental management, which includes
only those activities not required by regulation, such as participation in voluntary
4

environmental management programs, separately. This study also examines
environmental performance outcomes with respect to regulated impacts (e.g.,
hazardous waste) and unregulated impacts (e.g., carbon dioxide) separately. By doing
so, the model proposed in this research may more comprehensively capture the role
regulation plays in supporting or restricting voluntary environmental management
than previous studies, which have typically focused on either voluntary activities or
overcompliance with regulations, but not both.

Second, this study includes facilities of varying sizes, operating in a variety of
industrial sectors, and comprising both publicly traded and privately held facilities.
This is important because smaller facilities, and facilities operating in certain sectors
such as accommodations, are typically subject to fewer environmental regulations
than large manufacturing facilities. In addition, smaller facilities may face fewer
threats of sanctions by environmental interest groups. Meanwhile, privately held
facilities may face fewer investor pressures in the absence of requirements to provide
public shareholder information, but may enjoy more flexibility in environmental
management decisions. Other differences are likely to exist among dissimilar firms as
well. Therefore, environmental management efforts and performance could be
expected to differ across firms due to the differing motivations and constraints. A
primary benefit to examining a sample of small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) is that such a sample is more representative of the business market than
samples comprised solely of large manufacturing firms. According to the U.S.
5

Census Bureau, over 80% of U.S. firms employ fewer than 100 individuals (USBC,
2003), yet these firms have rarely been explicitly addressed in previous research. The
findings of this study are intended to inform the design of environmental
management policies to appeal to a broad spectrum of firms which comprise a
substantial portion of the marketplace.

Background and Context
As noted above, the majority of environmental management studies describe samples
consisting predominantly of large production facilities (Anton, Deltas and Khanna,
2004; McClelland and Horowitz, 1999; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). There are
several reasons for this emphasis on larger firms, primarily related to the availability
of information. First, large facilities dominate most stock exchanges, and information
on financial performance and corporate governance is typically easier to obtain for
publicly traded firms than privately held organizations. Second, production facilities,
as a general rule, use more processes that generate hazardous emissions and wastes in
quantities that exceed thresholds for regulatory exemptions than nonmanufacturing
facilities. Third, public sources of environmental performance information are
limited, and the sources that are available—such as the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)—contain data primarily
for large production facilities exceeding certain emissions thresholds.

The emphasis on large production facilities in the economic literature creates an
underlying assumption that firms are subject to some form of environmental
regulatory framework which would be expected to affect environmental management
decisions. This is a legitimate assumption—large production facilities tend to be
subject to environmental regulatory requirements, the majority of which are
traditional prescriptive or "command-and-control" style regulations (Freeman and
Kolstad, 2007; EPA, 1997, 1995a, 1995b). Prescriptive regulations are widely
7

considered to be inefficient and costly, despite having achieved effective reductions
in air and water pollution (Freeman and Kolstad, 2007; Baldwin and Cave, 1999).
These criticisms originate from several characteristics of prescriptive regulation.
First, prescriptive regulation typically mandates specific technologies or practices for
an industry, and lacks a mechanism for equalizing marginal abatement costs among
firms. Second, the administrative costs of promulgation, implementation, and
enforcement are substantial, in part because much information about processes
resides with the target industry, which has little incentive to supply data to regulators.
Third, prescriptive regulation provides a disincentive to innovation, and the
inflexibility prevents timely response to technological or industry developments
(Freeman and Kolstad, 2007).

Finally, despite being designed to achieve consistent emission targets, specific
standards can vary dramatically across industries and firm types, in part because
individual standards are often considered as distinct conditions, rather than
components of larger regulatory programs. This individuation of standards is a result
of the rulemaking process. First, regulatory agencies examine the potential impacts of
a specific substance and determine standards for that substance. Second, agencies
then decide how to apply the standard across heterogeneous firms that face different
compliance costs, often with input from facilities that participate in the public
comment process. Resulting standards often do not apply uniformly across all
regulated facilities. For example, the EPA standards for biological oxygen demand
8

(BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS) in wastewater effluent vary depending on
the type of facility (Magat, Krupnick and Harrington, 1986).

Given that firms face compliance costs and have the ability to control information,
theories have been developed to demonstrate ways in which regulatory constraints
can induce voluntary environmental management beyond what is required to comply
with requirements. Some theories describe how firms and regulators can behave
strategically within a prescriptive framework, while others posit that alternative
schemes, such as performance-based regulations, can induce voluntary environmental
management.

According to the capture theory of regulation, firms or industries may engage in
behavior designed to totally or partially "capture" a regulatory agency in an effort to
gain competitive advantage. Capture refers to the situation where the agency begins
to identify its mission and goals with the needs of a particular firm or industry, or
where a firm or industry collaborates with regulatory agencies to obtain beneficial
regulation (Reinhardt, 2000; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Maloney and McCormick,
1982; Stigler, 1971). Competitive advantage may be obtained through cash subsidies,
regulatory requirements that create barriers to entry by new firms, requirements that
impose disproportionate costs on competitors of the firm engaging in capture
strategies, or other mechanisms (Reinhardt 2000). Under capture theory, firms prefer
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barriers to entry to cash subsidies because unless entry is limited, the firm will share
the subsidy with an increasing number of rivals (Stigler, 1971).
Firms may influence advantageous regulation through a variety of mechanisms, such
as developing a new technology or process that reduces impacts below current
standards, and persuading the regulatory agency to implement the new technology or
set a new standard. To obtain a benefit, the firm originating the new technology
should be able to implement the technology more inexpensively and easily than
competitors (Reinhardt, 2000). In effect, the originating firm raises costs for
competitors, creating competitive advantage for itself. Case studies show that
organizations have effectively used public regulatory frameworks strategically to
gain competitive advantage. One well-known example is the case where E. I. DuPont
de Nemours and Company (DuPont) proactively developed substitutes for
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in light of scientific findings implicating CFCs in ozone
layer damage. DuPont, well-positioned to produce substitute products for which it
held patents, led industry support for the Montreal Protocol, which stipulated a 50%
reduction in CFC production. The result was short-run competitive advantage for
DuPont, which effectively shut former competitors in the CFC market out of the new
substitute market (Esty and Winston, 2006; Reinhardt, 2000).

Whether induced by firm behavior or regulatory agency goals, Maloney and
McCormick (1982) demonstrate several situations in which regulatory strategies can
enhance the value of some or all of the firms in a particular industry. Regulation that
10

restricts both output and entry can increase the profitability of existing firms by
assigning environmental assets in the form of existing emissions permits to existing
firms, and also by increasing market prices due to restricted production. A frequent
mechanism is for the regulatory agency to impose differential pollution control
requirements on new firms, analogous to a grandfather clause. As an example, the
authors cite the 1970 Clean Air Act and its amendments, which imposed standards on
existing sources as a function of ambient air quality, while imposing the strictest
standards on new sources regardless of local ambient air quality. This arrangement
created barriers to entry for new firms. Another example cited is the benefit that
accrued to U.S. airline firms when Air France and British Airways landings of the
Concorde were restricted due to noise levels. A final example cited is the Alaska
pipeline construction, which was subject to extensive delays due to issues related to
environmental regulation. In the case of the pipeline, the price of crude oil would
have been reduced with the increased production from the North Slope. As the price
remained higher than it would have been with the new supply, rents were generated
for competing oil producers. In both the airline and pipeline cases, existing firms
benefitted from regulation, while entrants to the industry suffered. In support of the
examples described, Maloney and McCormick (1982) found evidence that firm stock
prices increased in two situations related to changing regulatory scenarios: 1) textile
mill share prices increased contemporaneously with impending restrictions for
cotton-dust levels; and 2) smelter share prices increased in the wake of a Supreme
Court ruling limiting entry of new smelting plants.
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While firms can engage in strategic behavior with respect to regulation, other
participants in a regulatory scenario may also employ strategies to gain competitive
advantage. Baldwin and Cave (1999) describe how regulators can be viewed as
producers of a competitive product who may engage in competition or collaboration
to improve their position. Regulatory competition involves adjusting requirements to
secure competitive advantage for a jurisdiction, typically in order to attract business
interests or investment to a region. Mechanisms to attract business interests can
include lower compliance costs, access to technical assistance, or other benefits. In
the optimistic view, this competition does not necessarily involve a lowering of
standards (although a "race to the bottom" is a risk), but can lead to a "race to the
top". If residents are free to move among regions, local policymakers will create
regimes that provide the regulatory protections residents desire in order to appeal to
constituents.

However, achievement of this optimistic view depends on numerous assumptions,
many of which may not be met in a given region. For example, constituents may not
be able to move freely among regions for professional or personal reasons related to
job opportunities, housing options, access to public schools, and so forth.
Constituents also may not have access to complete information about all regulatory
regimes in neighboring regions in order to make relocation decisions based on all
pertinent factors. Finally, externalities (cross jurisdiction pollution) may affect
constituents in adjacent regions. One solution may be regulatory coordination, where
12

regulators in multiple jurisdictions collaborate to create uniform standards across a
broader region. This collaboration is complex and incurs high transactions costs, yet
the increasing array of international protocols is evidence that regions are attempting
to address externalities in a coordinated manner.

The Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) suggests that properly
crafted regulation provides opportunities for firms to gain competitive advantage,
thus benefitting both firms and regulatory agencies. The Porter Hypothesis operates
under the assumption that pollution is waste, and improvements in efficiency will
reduce this waste, thereby reducing production costs and possibly improving product
quality. With stringent regulatory constraints, firms would be stimulated to seek cost
savings and product improvements that partially, completely, or more than fully
offset the costs of compliance (termed innovation offsets). This can place firms
operating under more stringent rules at an advantage over firms in locations with less
stringent regulations, according to the theory of dynamic comparative advantage.
According to Porter and van der Linde (1995), inefficiencies may be present because
firms operate within the constraints of constant technological change, incomplete
information, organizational inertia, and the difficulty of aligning individual and
organizational incentives. Properly crafted regulation can prompt firms to address
these inefficiencies by signaling potential resource inefficiencies, providing
information (e.g., the TRI), reducing the uncertainty of investments in environmental
management, creating flexibility to innovate, and leveling the playing field by
13

eliminating the possibility of gaining competitive advantage through noncompliance.
Finally, regulation is necessary when innovation offsets will not completely cover the
costs of reducing environmental impacts. In this case, regulation assures a level of
protection beyond the level firms would choose based on economic payoffs alone.
The most critical aspect to the Porter Hypothesis is what constitutes properly-crafted
regulation. The authors posit that in lieu of pollution control, regulation must focus
on resource productivity, since pollution is an "unproductive resource utilization".
Therefore, regulation should focus on outcomes, rather than practices or
technologies. Such mechanisms are typically market-based rather than prescriptive
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995).

Finally, Lyon and Maxwell (2004) describe several opportunities for strategic
behavior to result in competitive advantage at the intersection of firm and industry
behavior, regulatory agency goals, and the interests of the larger community. The
authors suggest that political-economic analysis is necessary to understand the trend
in beyond-compliance behavior, which they term "corporate environmentalism", and
define as consisting of any "environmentally friendly actions not required by law"
(the aforementioned definition used in this research). While traditional management
theories of cost control and production differentiation explain voluntary actions that
reduce costs and create environmentally preferable products and services, the authors
propose that new models are needed to describe the interaction between corporate
strategy and public policy. Lyon and Maxwell (2004) define four stages of policy
14

development, which will generate differing firm behavior with respect to regulatory
constraints. In the development stage, events occur which create public awareness
and interest in an environmental issue, such as substantial accidental releases. In the
next phase, politicization, the issue is identified and discussed publicly by opinion
leaders. In addition, the news media increases coverage, and interest groups begin to
mobilize around the issue. The third stage is the legislative stage, where political
leaders begin creating laws to address the issue. Finally, the fourth stage,
implementation, is where administrators refine and begin enforcing new regulations
implemented as a result of the new laws.

Within this framework, firms may take differing strategic actions depending on
which phase of the cycle a particular issue is in. Firms may be interested in
preempting future regulations during the politicization phase, influencing impending
regulations during the legislative phase, or reducing regulatory inspections and other
enforcement actions in the implementation phase. In the politicization phase, the
authors model a three-stage political influence game involving regulators, the public,
and potentially regulated firms. In this scenario, individuals face substantial
information, organization, and lobbying costs to determine and promote the
appropriate level of pollution abatement for societal benefit. These costs create a
"wedge" between public benefits of voluntary abatement and mandatory abatement.
Firms can take advantage of this, and preempt regulation by acting voluntarily at
lower cost than the cost of mobilizing the public. The outcome depends on the level
15

of cost to the public, and level of self-regulation implemented by firms. These are
hypothesized to move inversely—when public costs of political action are high,
minimal self-regulation is required, because the threat of legislated regulation is low.
As costs of political action fall, more self-regulation is required, because the threat of
legislated regulation increases in response to increasing public pressure. The
conclusion is that when firms engage in some self-regulation initially, then society
gains greater abatement at lower overall costs. One important aspect of this model is
that firms must be allowed to collaborate on self-regulation targets for the industry as
a whole to avoid the anticompetitive effects of individual action to reduce costs or
gain advantage.

Moving to the legislative phase, Lyon and Maxwell (2004) offer a similar scenario as
described by Reinhardt (2000) where a firm can influence future regulations and gain
competitive advantage by voluntarily implementing high-quality abatement, citing
the DuPont example described above. In this model, firms that voluntarily implement
abatement reduce their price competition and raise profits. The model extends earlier
frameworks by incorporating minimum quality standards set by regulators. These
standards are set strategically to allow the top-performing firm to continue to improve
performance and remain at a competitive advantage while mandating a minimum
abatement level for low-performing firms. Alternatively, firms may engage in
signaling, where a firm with lower costs implements additional abatement
technology, and the regulator responds by requiring all firms to follow suit.
16

In the administrative phase, after regulations are in place, the authors suggest that
firms will seek to be a lower inspection priority. In this scenario, firms voluntarily
exceed compliance, and the regulatory response is to reallocate enforcement
resources away from these firms. One mechanism frequently used by the EPA is to
offer membership in formal voluntary environmental management programs. For
example, firms that participate in Star Trak, a program where participants voluntarily
create an auditing plan and report violations, are a lower inspection priority for the
EPA. The EPA also forgoes gravity-based penalties and criminal prosecution if firms
voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct violations of existing statutes (Lyon and
Maxwell 2004).

The preceding discussion demonstrates that firms may gain competitive advantage by
exceeding compliance, and that regulators may exert significant influence over a
firm's competitive advantage by implementing regulatory strategies that create entry
barriers, transfer rights to existing firms, or which offer other benefits to top
environmental performers. However, recent literature reveals that significant
influences on firms' efforts to go beyond compliance comprise a mix of responses to
regulatory pressures as well as responses to other internal and external motivations
(e.g., customer and environmental interest group pressures), as described in the
following sections on motivations.

17

Theoretical work comparing voluntary agreements and legislative mandates for
pollution abatement by Segerson and Miceli (1998) develops an economic model
predicting the probability that a firm will enter into a voluntary agreement based on
the expected costs and benefits of the agreement. Segerson and Miceli's work
informs the development of the theory presented in this research that more highly
regulated facilities face greater costs of mandatory compliance, and therefore, their
decisions regarding voluntary behavior may differ from decisions at unregulated
facilities.

Segerson and Miceli (1998) assume that benefits of pollution abatement are the same,
regardless of the whether the level of abatement is mandated or chosen voluntarily.
They also assume, however, that costs are different for mandated actions and
voluntary actions. Mandated abatement involves both compliance costs (equipment,
lost profit from reductions in output, etc.) and transactions costs (enforcement,
administrative, etc.), while voluntary abatement would incur only transactions costs.
The authors posit that costs of abatement under voluntary agreements are lower than
under legislative mandates because of the reduced reliance on formal legal processes
and the greater flexibility inherent in voluntary agreements. In the model, the costs of
a voluntary agreement are given as Cv(av): the cost of implementing the voluntary
abatement times the level of abatement achieved. If, however, a legislative mandate
is imposed, the costs axepCi(a*[J, which is the probability of the legislative mandate
times the cost of the mandate times the level of required abatement. In this scenario, a
18

firm will enter into a voluntary agreement so long as Cv(av)

<PCL(O.*I).

Segerson and

Miceli (1998) note that as p increases, the level of av the firm will accept increases. If
costs under voluntary agreement are lower than costs of mandatory abatement, the
firm may accept an abatement level voluntarily that exceeds the level that would
otherwise be mandated. In this case, the firm may be induced to participate in
voluntary programs such as the EPA's National Environmental Performance Track,
which encourage overcompliance by participants in exchange for regulatory relief
and other benefits.

Segerson and Miceli conclude that a credible regulatory threat is critical to inducing
firms to adopt voluntary agreements, and that the level of environmental protection
achieved by such agreements depends on the level of threatened mandates.

The theories that guide this research include the ideas that firms may choose different
environmental management strategies and exhibit different levels of environmental
performance depending on the extent of the regulatory constraints faced by the firm,
as well as the types of motivations. It is as yet unclear whether the theoretical
frameworks described here pertain to smaller firms with less opportunity for gain
from strategic behavior with respect to regulation. Several questions emerge. First,
what constitutes an environmentally "regulated" firm? Frequently, media refer to
"highly regulated industries", but there is no definitive definition of the term, and
regulatory agencies tend to view processes, not facilities or industries, as regulatory
19

targets (Albertson 2006; EPA, 1997,1995a, 1995b). Second, how do motivations for
voluntary environmental management differ for firms that are subject to relatively
few regulatory constraints, and therefore not able to take advantage of regulatory
capture available to "regulated" firms? Does the extent of voluntary environmental
management differ among firms subject to varying levels of regulatory constraints?
Are there differences in environmental management and performance among firms
subject to differing regulatory constraints? Any differences that may be revealed
could be informative for regulatory agencies as they seek to foster greater voluntary
environmental efforts and create more cost-effective regulations, and for policy
makers who are interested in supporting such behavior at firms that are not subject to
extensive environmental regulation.
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Literature Review
Case studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that business is shifting from a reactive
to a strategic approach to environmental management in for-profit organizations,
attributed in part to managers' perceptions that their organizations have a
responsibility to protect the environment (Esty and Winston, 2006; Preuss, 2005;
Reinhardt, 2005). Recent theoretical and empirical literature has advanced a utility
maximization framework that includes the intrinsic values managers derive from
performing well environmentally (Ervin et al, 2008; Nakamura, Takahashi and
Vertinsky, 2001). This approach expands on the traditional profit-maximization
models used to explain firm behavior with respect to voluntary environmental
management, and early evidence shows increased explanatory power over traditional
models. Furthermore, literature examining motivations for voluntary environmental
management suggests that voluntary environmental management is not entirely
explained by the strategic behavior with respect to regulatory constraints described in
the previous section. Findings from numerous studies suggest that stakeholders such
as customers, environmental interest groups, and investors are exerting significant
influence on voluntary environmental management (Alberini and Segerson, 2002;
Khanna, 2001). Very few studies, however, have examined differences in
environmental management based on the intensity of the regulations affecting the
firm.
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This review is divided into the following five sections. The first section describes
studies using a utility maximization framework that forms the basis for the theoretical
model developed in this research. The second section examines literature using
empirical techniques that are common to the study of environmental management and
policy studies, and which are used in this research. The third section describes cluster
methodology. Clustering is a classification method widely in a variety of disciplines
to organize observations into groups based on various characteristics. Two-step
clustering can accommodate both categorical and continuous variables, and is used in
this research to organize facilities into categories based on regulatory intensity. The
fourth section describes composite indexing techniques similar to those used in this
research as an alternative to the factor analysis (FA) and principal component
analysis (PCA) techniques more common to this discipline. The final section
summarizes findings on various motivations for and barriers to environmental
management, from which several independent variables were derived for this
research.

Studies Using a Similar Theoretical Framework
Utility maximization models that expand the explanatory power of profitmaximization models to predict environmental management strategies are appearing
in the economic literature. This research uses a similar theoretical framework to the
studies described here, while classifying firms into categories based on the intensity
of the regulatory pressures the firm faces, and separating out management attitudes
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into those attitudes regarding regulation and those regarding environmental
stewardship, as described in the sections on the theoretical framework and variable
definitions.

Nakamura, Tkahashi, and Vertinski (2001) examine the impact of firm characteristics
and management attitudes toward environmental protection on a firm's level of
environmental commitment. The authors establish three levels of commitment:
presence of a formal policy, policy integration into corporate strategy with
organizational support, and visible external commitment through third-party
environmental management system (EMS) certification to ISO 14001 standards. Data
on financial and other firm characteristics was derived from numerous published
sources, while data on managers' attitudes and environmental commitment level was
obtained through a survey of Japanese manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. A total of 193 firms responded to the survey, resulting in a response rate
of 32%, similar to the survey response rate obtained in this research.

Nakamura, Tkahashi, and Vertinski (2001) use factor analysis (FA), ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression, and two types of decision models to examine how a
manager maximizes utility. First, the authors assume environmental management is
determined by maximizing profits, which are assumed to depend on the firm's
environmental management decisions, conditional on past production decisions.
Second, they assume environmental management decisions are based on profits, costs
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of environmental management, and the intrinsic value the manager derives from
environmental stewardship.

Dependent and independent variables based on survey responses were created as
single scores from multiple-item scales using FA. Dependent variables were a formal
policy variable that measured the degree to which firms had formally institutionalized
environmental policies (FP), while a policy integration variable measured how
intensely the firm had integrated environmental policies into corporate strategy, and
the degree to which upper management supported the policies (PI). Independent
variables included three factors measuring respondent beliefs about environmental
protection: 1) beliefs about global environmental vulnerability the respondent
attributed to human impacts; 2) beliefs that humans must harmoniously coexist with
nature, and 3) perceptions of the manager's personal responsibility to protect the
environment. This research uses a similar variable to capture upper management (or
CEO) attitudes about their responsibility toward the environment, as described in the
section on variable definitions.

Independent variables used in Nakamura, Tkahashi, and Vertinski (2001) also
assessed responses toward societal pressures, government pressures, environmental
interest groups, and regulatory agencies. Variables were also included to measure the
degree of control the manager felt they had over the firm's environmental impact
(controllability), and perceptions that polluters should pay for environmental damage.
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Finally, various firm characteristics such as size, profitability, R&D expenditures, the
level of energy-efficient equipment installed, and ISO 9000 certification were
included as independent variables.

The first analysis used OLS to examine the factors determining formal policy
institutionalization (FP) and integration (PI), and probit to predict whether or not a
firm sought ISO 14001 certification within a profit maximization framework. Three
variables were significant determinants of policy institutionalization (FP): R&D,
investor pressure (represented by bank ownership), and membership in a bank-based
business group (keiretsu) specific to Japan. The only significant influence on policy
integration (PI) was debt ratio, which was negative, indicating that firms with high
debts exhibited less policy integration. The significant determinants of ISO 14001
certification were firm size, employee age, and existing ISO 9000 certification.
Larger firms (representing greater resources), firms with younger management
(representing learning capacity), and firms that had obtained ISO 9000 certification
(representing accumulated knowledge) were more likely to seek ISO 14001
certification, and to seek certification in a shorter time frame (early adoption).

In contrast to the foregoing profit maximization models, the utility maximization
models considerably increased the explanatory power. In this framework, some
significant determinants of formal policy institutionalization (FP) were R&D,
societal pressures, government pressures, controllability, and energy efficiency.
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Surprisingly, the managerial attitudes about global environmental vulnerability and
harmonious coexistence were negative and significant. These were hypothesized to
have a significant positive influence on policy institutionalization. The authors
suggest that these results may indicate that formal recognition is not important to
managers who hold deeply personal beliefs about environmental protection. In
contrast, the estimates of policy integration (PI), indicated that controllability and
responsibility were significant determinants of the extent of policy integration.
Managers who felt a responsibility toward the environment, and those who believed
they have some level of control over impacts, were more likely to view
environmental objectives as an integral part of business operations. In the utility
maximization framework, determinants of ISO 14001 certification were again firm
size, and employee age, and also the manager's feeling of responsibility toward the
environment.

In summary, Nakamura, Takahashi and Vertinski (2001) found that while costs and
benefits of voluntary environmental management to be significant determinants of
environmental management activities, upper management values and beliefs were
also important. Larger firms, firms in more economically viable positions, and those
with younger management were more likely to have institutionalized a more
comprehensive policy and to certify to ISO 14001 standards. In addition, firms where
managers felt personal responsibility toward the environment were more likely to
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certify to ISO 14001 standards, while firms where management felt some level of
control were more likely to have implemented a more comprehensive policy.

In a separate analysis of the data used in this research, Ervin et al (2008) use a utility
maximization framework to examine both internal and external motivations for
voluntary environmental management. The study uses principal component analysis
(PCA) to derive factors representing customer, environmental interest group,
competitive, investor, and regulatory pressures. Components representing upper
management attitudes toward environmental protection and barriers to environmental
management were also included. The effects of these factors and various firm
characteristics on environmental management and performance were then analyzed in
a linked three-equation system using three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation
techniques.

In this approach, the manager's utility is hypothesized to be a function of profit and
environmental performance conditional on the manager's attitudes and values toward
environmental management. Environmental performance (EP) in a facility depends
on its environmental management policy (EM), pollution prevention actions (P2),
and facility characteristics, such as size and R&D capacity. Further, while the
assumption is that the manager's attitudes and values affect the choice of
environmental management policy and pollution prevention actions, it is assumed
attitudes do not directly affect environmental performance.
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Profit depends on the product price, the quantity of sales, and the cost of production.
Therefore, the authors estimate implicitly how EM and P2 affect these variables,
based on the assumption that price, sales, and costs are potentially affected by the
firm's environmental efforts and performance, which are in turn influenced by
motivations such as consumers' willingness to pay for environmentally friendly
products. The models together determine how environmental management policy,
pollution prevention actions, and environmental performance interact and how they
are influenced by facility characteristics, motivations, barriers, and management
values. In the staged approach, the first stage estimates EM and P2. The next stage
adds an environmental performance (EP) equation to determine the effect of the
policy and actions on performance.

As noted above, dependent variables were created as indexes of multiple responses
using PCA. The EM component was derived from a series of items measuring how
intensely a facility had implemented a variety of practices such as continuous
improvement and environmental cost accounting. The P2 variable was derived from a
series of items measuring the extent of spill prevention, process modifications, and
other pollution prevention actions. The EP variable was measured with an index
based on the reported percentage changes in wastewater discharged, solid waste
landfilled, hazardous/toxic wastes generated, and carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted over
the calendar year 2004.
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Findings indicated that the largest positive influence on environmental management
was the upper manager's attitude toward environmental protection, which supports
the use of a utility maximization model over a profit maximization model.
Competition, investor pressures, and regulatory pressures were also significant
influences on the intensity of the environmental management policy (EM). The
authors suggest that the significant influence of competitive pressures may indicate
that firms are seeking competitive advantage through cost-saving innovations in the
arena of environmental management. The only facility characteristic which was a
significant determinant of environmental management policy intensity was parent
company ownership. Facilities owned by a parent firm were significantly more likely
to exhibit greater environmental management policy intensity. Barriers to
environmental management, as expected, were a significant deterrent to
environmental management policy intensity.

Environmental management policy intensity (EM), in turn, was found to be a
significant influence on both pollution prevention actions (P2) and on performance
(EP). Facilities that had implemented more extensive environmental management
were more likely to have implemented more pollution prevention practices and to
exhibit more improvements in environmental performance than other facilities. R&D
capacity was also a significant influence on pollution prevention actions (P2), while
medium-revenue facilities were significantly less likely to exhibit improved
environmental performance than either small-revenue facilities or high-revenue
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facilities. This finding suggests a potential nonlinear relationship between facility
size and environmental performance (Ervin et al, 2008).

Studies Using Similar Empirical Methodology
Much of the literature examining various motivations for environmental management
uses discrete choice techniques, including Poisson, negative bionomial, probit, logit,
and related models (Alberini and Segerson, 2002). Previous research has
predominantly modeled environmental strategy and performance intensity using
counts of environmental practices, discrete choices in performance levels (e.g.,
compliance or overcompliance), or discrete environmental management decisions
such as whether or not to participate in voluntary environmental management
programs. This research uses similar techniques.

Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) examined the factors that influence the adoption of
an environmental management system (EMS), and the extent to which EMS
comprehensiveness impacts toxic releases. The sample consisted of Standard and
Poor (S&P) 500 firms, and data was obtained from S&P 500, Super Compustat, the
TRI, and the EPA Superfund Enforcement Tracking System (SETS). The authors
propose that because EMSs are suites of practices (e.g., employee training, internal
standards, and regular environmental audits), firms have flexibility in choosing
elements, and systems vary in intensity across firms. The study assumed that a
rational firm chooses both the comprehensiveness of its EMS and the level of
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pollution to maximize net benefits. Pollution levels would be expected to vary across
firms because the costs and benefits of pollution, as well as the implementation of
and compliance with an EMS, vary across firms.

Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) defined EMS comprehensiveness as the sum of
the environmental management practices (EMPs) implemented. Due to the count
nature of the dependent variable, EMS intensity was modeled with Poisson and
negative binomial regressions to estimate the expected number of EMPs as a function
of firm characteristics. The analysis also includes an estimate of the impact of EMS
adoption and other factors using instrumental variables in a Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) model. For a discussion of GMM, refer to Koenker and Bassett
(1982, 1978).

The independent variables used to predict EMS intensity included regulatory
pressures (the number of inspections and the number of Superfund sites for which the
firm was a potential responsible party [PRP]), whether the firm produced final
consumer goods, total releases reported to the TRI, whether the firm was a
multinational corporation, R&D-sales ratio, and sales-assets ratio. Firms subjected to
a higher number of inspections were expected to seek ways to reduce the potential for
future penalties by implementing a comprehensive EMS. Firms potentially
responsible for Superfund sites were considered likely to be more aware of the
potential liability of continued waste generation, and therefore expected to implement
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more comprehensive EMSs to reduce impacts. Firms that produce consumer goods,
firms with greater total releases, and firms with a global presence were considered
likely to face greater pressure from social stakeholders (e.g., consumers) to reduce
environmental impacts due to their increased visibility. Regarding costs, EMS
implementation is likely to impose certain fixed costs, at least initially, irrespective of
a firm's emissions. Therefore, because emissions vary across firms, those firms with
greater emissions were anticipated to achieve greater economic benefits from
implementing an EMS. More innovative firms (those with greater R&D investments),
were hypothesized to implement more comprehensive EMSs, due either to the ability
to implement practices at a lower cost, or the greater potential for increased
productivity.

Findings indicate that firms that were PRPs for a greater number of Superfund sites,
those that reported a greater volume of releases to the TRI, firms that produce final
consumer goods, and those with a low sales-asset ratio were more likely to
implement a more comprehensive EMS. These results support findings in other
studies that firms producing final consumer goods are more likely to have more
comprehensive environmental management plans. The significant influence of total
releases supports the hypothesis that other social stakeholder pressures induce firms
to implement more comprehensive environmental management efforts. The greater
EMS comprehensiveness among PRPs indicates that potential liability influences a
firm's environmental efforts, while the likelihood of firms with low sales-asset ratios
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to implement more comprehensive EMSs indicates that investor pressures may
induce more comprehensive environmental efforts.

The estimations for environmental performance indicated that the comprehensiveness
of a firm's EMS was significantly related to reduced releases reported to the TRI per
unit of sales. Findings further indicate that firms with lower sales-asset ratios have
higher toxic releases per unit of sales. The other factors that significantly influenced
the comprehensiveness of a firm's EMS (e.g., customer pressures, regulatory
pressures) were not significant predictors of performance, indicating that these
factors influence environmental performance only indirectly through the influence on
EMS comprehensiveness.

Another common approach in the economic literature is to use a discrete choice
decision model predicting environmental management decisions, using either probit
or logit techniques. Videras and Alberini (2000) investigated firms' decisions to
participate or not participate in each of three voluntary environmental management
programs operated by the EPA: 33/50 (a program targeting reductions of 17 highpriority toxic chemicals), Green Lights (now part of ENERGY STAR®), and
WasteWise (a solid waste reduction initiative). Firm-level panel data on
manufacturing firms in the S&P 500 was obtained from the Investor Responsibilities
Research Center (IRRC) and Compustat. IRRC data included both direct surveys and
information from EPA databases. Participation was estimated using a bivariate probit
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model. A sample selection correction was used to correct for the increased likelihood
of larger firms and those producing consumer goods to provide data to the IRRC.

The authors assumed that participation depends on perceived discounted net benefits
of participation, and that firms would participate if benefits were perceived to be
greater than zero (0), leading to the choice of the probit model. Independent variables
included firm size, past period increases in sales, past period increases in R&D
expenditures, past period fines issued under the Clean Air Act, and industry
characteristics (e.g., pollution intensity and regulatory burden). Increased sales were
anticipated to indicate the financial ability to support program participation costs,
while large firms, being more visible, were expected to realize greater benefits from
publicity. R&D was used to represent innovation. Innovative firms could be
positioned to implement new technologies at lower cost, while less innovative firms
could be seeking knowledge and information transfer. Firms with prior
environmental infractions were hypothesized to participate to gain regulatory relief.

Four binary independent variables captured environmental management strategy:
1) whether or not environmental performance was a factor in senior or operating
management compensation; 2) whether or not the firm considered environmental
risks in selecting contractors; 3) whether or not the firm published an environmental
report; and 4) whether or not the firm conducted environmental audits.
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Findings indicated that the potential for positive publicity and public recognition was
a significant determinant of program participation. Two types of firms considered
likely to be interested in positive publicity—larger firms and those firms that
published environmental reports—were found to be more likely to participate in each
of the three programs. The third type of firm likely to be concerned with public
recognition—consumer goods producers—was significantly more likely to
participate in both WasteWise and Green Lights. R&D intensity was significantly
associated with participation in WasteWise. Regarding regulatory pressures, firms
with past infractions were more likely to participate only if the program related
directly to the firm's pollution reductions, while firms that received Superfund PRP
notifications were more likely to participate in all three programs. Firms in different
industrial sectors, where sector was used to represent regulatory burden, participated
in different programs. Three sectors examined by Videras and Alberini (2000) were
similar to the sectors in this research: electronic and electrical equipment, food
products, and transportation. Results showed that food products manufacturers and
transportation firms were more likely to participate each of the three programs, while
electronic and electrical equipment firms were more likely to participate in Green
Lights.

Khanna and Damon (1999) investigated the effect of firms' participation in the 33/50
program on the toxic releases and economic performance of U.S. chemical
manufacturers. The study used panel data on releases from the TRI, and firm data
35

from Compustat, the CD/Corporate database, and the Chemical Manufacturers
Association membership list. The study included economic impacts because the costs
of program participation impact a firm's economic performance. The authors note
that program participation may increase labor and capital expenditures for pollution
abatement. However, these expenditures may be offset by increases in productivity
(through reduced input use), reduced risk of accidental spills or releases (which may
appeal to investors), and reduced costs of regulatory compliance attributable to the
reduced chemical production. Further, customers could be attracted to firms that
reduce their impacts, thereby increasing revenues. The authors hypothesize that
through the numerous possible benefits to participation, participating firms may be
more profitable in the long run than nonparticipants.

Although firms had complete flexibility in choice of pollution abatement methods,
the EPA encouraged source reductions in preference to end-of-pipe solutions. This
study analyzed reductions in releases reported to the TRI during the first three years
of the 33/50 program's operation (1991 - 1993) compared to releases reported in
1988. Using a two-stage model, the authors simultaneously estimated the
determinants of a firms' decision to participate, and determined the outcome of
program participation. As with Videras and Alberini (2000), the authors assumed that
rational firms choose levels of pollution generation at any given time that maximize
the discounted net benefits over a specified time period. Because many of the same
variables were assumed to determine both participation and outcome, the authors first
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obtained the participation probability with a probit model and then inserted it as an
explanatory variable into the second stage. This stage was estimated with a feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) method.

The independent variables included firm sales, sales-asset ratio (capacity utilization),
rate of sales growth, whether the firm produces a final consumer good, equipment
age, innovativeness (R&D), riskiness of return (return on investment), and measures
of environmental and social responsibility. Hypothesized influences were as
described in the preceding studies. Findings for the participation decision indicated
that firms that produced final goods, those with larger release-output ratios, and those
with older equipment were more likely to participate in 33/50. Regarding regulatory
pressures, results indicated that firms that were PRPs for a greater number of
Superfund sites and those that faced potential increases in the cost of compliance
with the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP),
contained in Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, were more likely to
participate.

Findings for the outcome estimation indicated that mandatory regulations and several
firm-specific characteristics had a direct impact on 33/50 releases regardless of
participation in the program. Both potential Superfund responsibilities and NESHAP
compliance were significantly associated with reduced releases. Annual sales were
positively and significantly related to 33/50 releases, while lower sales-asset ratios
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were significantly related to lower releases (indicating idle capacity). Finally, firms
with newer assets or a high rate of asset replacement had lower 33/50 releases. These
findings provide support for the hypotheses that the desire to earn public recognition
and consumer goodwill are significant incentives for participation among final goods
suppliers, and that firms which expect greater benefits or that have lower costs of
participation are more likely to participate in a voluntary environmental management
program. Findings also support the hypothesis that regulatory pressures are a
significant determinant of program participation and environmental performance.
Findings did not support results reported in other studies that increased
innovativeness (R&D) influences either program participation or performance.

Studies Using Similar Classification Methodologies
Due to the predominance of samples consisting of large, publicly traded
manufacturing firms in environmental management research, few studies in this area
have attempted to classify firms to analyze differences among groups of firms based
on differing levels of regulatory pressure or other characteristics. Cluster analysis is a
common classification technique used in a variety of disciplines including medicine,
financial management, industrial management, and agriculture. Applications include
classification of industries and farms according to sustainability criteria (Chan and
Zang, 2007; Tola et al, 2007; Zeng et al, 2007; Bernhardt, Allen and Helmers, 1996).
Cluster analysis refers to a large number of techniques that attempt to determine
whether or not a data set contains distinct groups and, if so, to find the groups.
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Zeng et al (2007) used cluster analysis to classify 25 manufacturing sectors in
Shanghai, China into sustainable and nonsustainable groups. According to the
authors, as China promotes economic development, authorities are concerned about
environmental impacts from highly polluting industries. The government of Shanghai
grouped the manufacturing industry into groups of those industries that would be
encouraged to develop, those for which development would be restricted, and
industries that would be prohibited, based on social and economic benefits and
environmental impacts inherent to the industries.

Zeng et al (2007) used four variables reflecting the three most common measures of
sustainability, as well as an institutional indicator developed in the U.K. The
variables used in the cluster analysis were: 1) competitive advantage as defined by
the value added by the sector as a proportion of the value added by all manufacturing;
2) social contributions as measured by employment in the sector as a proportion of all
manufacturing employment; 3) an environmental impact score; and 4) economic
contributions as measured by market share. Prior to conducting the cluster analysis,
the authors rescaled all four variables using the following formula:
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where Vts is the normalized value of the ith variable Vi (i= 1, 2, 3, 4). This is the
rescaling procedure used in this research.
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Zeng et al (2007) used agglomerative hierarchical clustering, which begins with each
individual observation in a separate cluster and joins similar observations into
groups. Four clusters were created from the analysis. The first cluster contained a
single sector with large market share and high competitive advantage, comprising of
more than 70% of manufacturing sales in the district. This cluster was defined as the
top priority for development, based on the government criteria that manufacturing
sectors with strong competitive advantage and economic performance are encouraged
to develop. If those firms innovate cleaner production, they may be able to obtain
government financial assistance. The second cluster was comprised of seven sectors
considered "environmentally friendly", with high employment levels. The third
cluster was comprised of sectors exhibiting poor performance on all four variables.
These sectors contributed the least to the economy, and had significant environmental
impacts. The fourth cluster was comprised of sectors with the highest employment,
but with significant environmental impacts. The sectors with significant
environmental impacts would be recommended for prohibition from developing in
central Shanghai. The remaining clusters may face restrictions such as mandatory
ISO 14001 certification, or relocation to other areas.

A study of North American swine producers used hierarchical cluster analysis to
classify producers according to their level of proactive participation in agricultural
extension programs and good management practices (Rosenberg and Turvey, 1991).
The goals of that study were similar to the goals of this study—to inform effective,
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efficient efforts to reach targeted groups. This study intended to identify managerial
profiles of swine producers for extension program managers to target outreach efforts
to those producers most likely to take advantage of available assistance, and to tailor
policies and programs to different groups.

The study surveyed 837 swine producers on their participation in extension program
activities and a variety of characteristics of their operations such as farm assets, other
income sources, frequency of soil testing, preventive veterinary visits, and other
practices. The cluster analysis determined five classes of producers, ranging from
what were termed "eager beavers", to "introspectives". Eager beavers were those
producers who were very active in extension programs, who practiced good
management (e.g., frequent soil testing, preventive veterinary care), and were open to
new swine management practices. The introspectives tended not to participate in
extension programs, and tended not to implement recommended good management
practices. The other groups were in between these extremes. Based on the
classification, the authors recommended targeted approaches for the different groups,
such as personal onsite visits for the introspective group, and public seminars for the
proactive group.

This research uses a two-step cluster procedure to classify facilities into highly
regulated, moderately regulated, and lightly regulated groups to analyze differences
in environmental management among these groups of facilities. Two-step cluster
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analysis is a relatively new technique developed to accommodate categorical
variables and large data sets. An extensive literature search did not reveal examples
of two-step cluster analysis in the economic literature, but it has been used in
business management applications. Okazaki (2006) used two-step cluster analysis to
classify mobile internet users in Japan based on their attitudes toward the technology
and various demographic characteristics. The intent of that study was to develop user
profiles to assist information managers in identifying mobile internet adopters,
developing effective business-to-consumer mobile strategies, and targeting
customers.

Okazaki (2006) surveyed 612 consumers regarding their attitudes toward mobile
technology, incomes, and other demographic characteristics. The categorical
variables used in the first step of the cluster analysis included marital status, gender,
age, and occupation. Continuous variables were indexes created from multiple-item
scales measuring perceptions of the value of entertainment, information, and so forth.

Four clusters were identified based on the analysis: 1) Predominantly male,
professional consumers aged in their 20's to 30's, with substantial disposable
income; 2) Younger single individuals (teenaged to early 20's), with disposable
income; 3) Married women and part-time workers with lower incomes, aged 30's
to 50's; and 4) Married men with senior managerial positions and high incomes.
Regarding attitudes, cluster 1 had the most negative attitude toward mobile
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technology, cluster 2 valued entertainment and technology, and clusters 3 and 4
viewed mobile technology positively overall, although cluster 3, the married women,
had a less enthusiastic view than the married men. The author concluded that the
study provided valuable information on the Japanese mobile internet market by
identifying four groups of consumers with different attitudes and characteristics. This
study revised the conventional wisdom which held that young males were the most
rapid adopters, and suggested that income is an important factor in technology
adoption.

Studies Using Similar Composite Indexing Techniques
FA and PCA are common in the economic literature, and are extremely useful
techniques for discovering underlying constructs represented by correlated variables.
With factors and components, weighting can reveal which of the original variables
capture the majority of the variation in the underlying construct. However, factors
and components are not used in this research for reasons of interpretability. With FA
and PCA, it is up to the researcher to define the underlying construct captured by a
factor or component created from a set of correlated variables. While some groups of
variables used to create composite indexes in this research could have been
interpreted in a fairly straightforward manner using FA or PCA, others would have
been problematic. For example, a factor or component derived from the three items
measuring perceptions of the importance of customer motivations for environmental
management in this survey could have been interpreted fairly straightforwardly as a
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factor or component of customer motivations. Other multiple-item scales, however,
are not so easily interpreted. For example, the subparts of question 12 in Appendix A
measure a range of environmental management practices, including rewarding
employees for contributions to environmental performance, conducting regular
audits, and using cost accounting. Depending on which items weighted more heavily
in the factor or component, interpretation could have been difficult, since these
practices cover a variety of activities. Therefore, in lieu of the approaches using FA
and PCA described previously, in this research, composite indexes are created using a
rescaling method that applies equal weights to the individual variables in the
composite.

Composite indexes, which can be interpreted as a construct of all the variables
included, are commonly used for a diverse array of applications, including assessing
air quality in a given region, estimating environmental sustainability, tracking or
ranking business financial performance, and ranking countries according to
conditions of human development, to name a few examples. Specific indexes that
have been created using the linear scaling transformation technique used in this
research include: the Human Development Index produced by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) (UNDP, 2008), the Environmental Vulnerability
Index produced by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP,
2008), the Economic Resilience Index produced by the University of Malta (Brigulio,
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1995), the Composite Leading Indicators index produced by the OECD (OECD,
2008), and others.

In an example of rescaling in the empirical literature, Bruner et al (2001) used linear
scaling transformation to normalize variables measured on differing scales. Bruner et
al (2001) examined the impacts of numerous anthropogenic threats on protected areas
in 22 tropical nations to test the hypothesis that parks are an effective mechanism for
tropical biodiversity preservation. The authors used a questionnaire to collect
information on land use (e.g. clearing, logging, and grazing), proximity to human
development, and management practices (e.g., the number of protection enforcement
staff, community involvement in park protection). Due to the differing units of
measurement and types of items, the authors used the same linear scaling procedure
used by Zeng et al (2007) to transform variables to a uniform scale. Results indicated
that most parks are successful barriers to land clearing, and to some extent logging
and grazing. Effectiveness was found to be correlated with basic management
activities such as enforcement and direct compensation to surrounding communities.

Characteristics, Motivations, and Barriers Affecting Voluntary Environmental
Management
In general, a relatively large literature has identified numerous significant influences
on voluntary environmental management efforts such as participation in voluntary
environmental management programs and implementation of a certified (e.g., ISO
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14001 compliant) environmental management system. These influences can be
loosely categorized as firm, industry, community, and market characteristics, internal
and external motivations, and barriers. Characteristics that have been found to
significantly influence environmental management include public trading status,
facility or firm size (by number of employees or facility square footage), public
interest group activity level, and several others. External motivations that have been
found to be significant include customers, environmental interest groups, investors,
regulatory pressures, competitive pressures, and management attitudes (Innes and
Bial, 2002; Nakamura, Takahashi and Vertinsky, 2001; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett,
2000; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996).

Literature on barriers is more limited, and primarily has focused on transaction and
information costs associated with learning about abatement technology and
participating in voluntary initiatives (Alberini and Segerson, 2002). A separate
analysis conducted with the data used in this research explores the impacts of barriers
such as upfront and operational costs of implementing environmental management
strategies, time requirements, availability of knowledgeable staff, uncertain benefits,
and risk of downtime associated with uncertain technologies (Ervin et al, 2008). In
that analysis, both upfront costs and day-to-day costs were significant barriers to
voluntary environmental management. The characteristics, motivations, and barriers
described below inform the choice of variables used and the models developed in this
research.
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Facility, Industry, Community, and Market Characteristics
One characteristic that has been found to have a statistically significant positive
relationship to environmental management is facility size. Johnstone et al (2007a)
report that nearly three times as many large facilities (those with more than 500
employees) had an environmental management system than did facilities with fewer
than 100 employees. Johnstone et al (2007b) found that facilities with more
employees were more likely to have taken pollution reduction actions and to report
reductions in air pollution, water pollution, and solid waste. Arimura, Hibiki, and
Johnstone (2007) found that facilities with more employees spent more on
environmental R&D.

Henriques and Sadorsky (2007) found that significant determinants the presence of
an environmental management system and dedicated environmental management
staff include facility size (in terms of the number of employees) publicly traded
status, foreign ownership, an R&D budget, participation in global markets, revenues,
and parent company ownership. In contrast, Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky
(2001) found that foreign ownership was not a significant determinant of the presence
of a formal environmental policy or the level of policy integration. Arimura, Hibiki,
and Johnstone (2007) found that publicly traded firms were more likely to have
implemented environmental cost accounting.
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Henriques and Sadorsky (2007) also found that facilities with higher revenues, an
R&D budget, and global market participants were more likely to have implemented a
greater number of environmental management practices. In addition, the study
comprised a variety of manufacturing sectors, and Henriques and Sadorsky (2007)
found that food and wood products manufacturers were more likely than other
manufacturers to have implemented an EMS and to have obtained certification.

Additional firm, industry, community, and market characteristics are included in the
following discussions on motivations and barriers.

Competitive Advantage / Cost savings
Traditional business and economic theories regarding profit maximization and
expenditure minimization explain firms' efforts to reduce the costs of environmental
impacts. The more a firm can reduce costs and increase productivity, the greater
advantage it may have over competitors. Common cost-saving strategies have
typically included energy-efficiency measures, water conservation, process
innovations, materials substitution, recycling, and reuse (Reinhardt 2000; Allenby,
1999). However, as described earlier, firms may be engaging in more strategic
approaches to obtain competitive advantage, going beyond simple efficiency
measures to develop cost-effective beyond-compliance abatement methods. Recent
case studies indicate that firms are beginning to cite improved productivity, reduced
absenteeism, and even the ability to attract higher quality employees at competitive
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salaries as motivations for environmental management strategies that result in
competitive advantage (Esty and Winston 2006; Reinhardt 2005). This emerging
phenomenon appears to be due both to the fact that employees prefer to work for
firms with values similar to their own, and also because firms that make
environmental protection a priority also tend to view social issues as an important
corporate responsibility. This social conscientiousness may be equally appealing.

Empirical studies also suggest that competitive pressures play a role in environmental
management. Khanna and Anton (2002a) found that multinational firms (with greater
exposure to global competitive markets) were more likely to implement more
proactive environmental management, and a separate analysis on the data used in this
research found competitive pressures to be a significant determinant of environmental
management intensity (Ervin et al, 2008).

However, from a market composition perspective, it is unclear whether competition
encourages improved environmental performance, because results in the literature
have been mixed. Firms in concentrated industries (those dominated by a few large
firms) that have developed cost-effective pollution abatement methods may be
particularly likely to exceed compliance with regulatory standards in order to pursue
higher standards that disadvantage their competitors (Innes and Bial, 2002; Salop and
Scheffman, 1983). Conversely, some evidence has suggested that industry
concentration has a negative effect on innovation, suggesting that firms in
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concentrated industries are less likely to implement innovative environmental
strategies (Frondel, Horbach, and Rennings, 2007). In this environment, facilities
with more competitors could therefore be more likely to pursue environmental
strategies to improve their market position than other facilities (Esty and Winston,
2006).

Customer Desire for Environmentally Friendly Products and Services or Willingness
to Pay (WTP) /Differentiation
The premise for this motivation is that firms seek to attract environmentally
conscious consumers for two primary reasons. First, the firm desires to avoid losing
business to more environmentally friendly competitors by retaining customers who
choose products which are produced in an environmentally preferable manner.
Second, the firm perceives that customers would be willing to pay a higher price for
environmentally preferable products and services (Reinhardt, 2005; Reinhardt, 2000;
Arora and Cason, 1996). Environmental product differentiation depends on the
presence of barriers to entry and mobility in the industry; otherwise, competing firms
could match differentiation efforts and remain competitive. When barriers to entry or
mobility exist, firms may be able to capture a price premium for providing more
public good characteristics (lower environmental impact) in their products or
services, regardless of whether they provide the greater private benefits (e.g.,
appealing style) typically associated with product differentiation.
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Willingness to pay, though, has not been consistently evident in the marketplace
(Reinhardt, 2005). Studies of consumer behavior in the retail market have shown that
consumers respond to ecolabels, and may be willing to pay higher prices for
environmentally friendly food products and sundries. However, whether or not
customers will pay a premium, and how high a premium they will pay, both depend
on the type of product or service (Baltzer, 2004; BJ0rner et al, 2004; Loureiro et al,
2002; Moon et al, 2002; Teisl, Roe and Hicks, 2002; Laroche et al, 2001). Moreover,
environmental product differentiation strategies differ in industrial markets and
consumer markets (Reinhardt, 2005, 2000). Differentiation in the industrial arena is
driven by total cost reduction, with branding and image being less important than in
consumer markets. In the industrial market, firms must demonstrate that the reduced
environmental impacts of their products or services will in turn reduce the
environmental impacts of their industrial customers, thereby reducing environmental
costs such as compliance and disposal costs (Reinhardt, 2005, 2000). Despite this
different focus, some evidence does suggest that consumer influences are an
important determinant of environmental management effort in the industrial market.
Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) found that consumer pressures were a significant
motivator for firms to implement an environmental plan, and Khanna and Anton
(2002a) found consumer pressures resulted in firms' implementing a more
comprehensive environmental management system.
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Environmental Interest Group Pressures / Voluntary Pollution Prevention and
Reduction
High profile environmental incidents—such as the 1984 gas leak at a former Union
Carbide subsidiary facility in Bhopal, India, and the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in
the Prince William Sound in Alaska—along with increasing global stresses such as
greenhouse gas emissions, have generated public interest in a safer and cleaner
environment (Reinhardt, 2000). In this milieu of pressing issues, environmental
interest groups could be expected to be viewed as a threat, at least by large polluters.
In support of this idea, studies suggest that for-profit corporations contribute financial
and other support to environmental interest groups and that they express agreement
with the idea that corporations and interest groups should collaborate to improve
firms' social responsibility (Rondinelli and London, 2003). Additionally, case studies
have found that interest group involvement with the implementation of voluntary
environmental programs can have a significant influence on program
implementation; however, results depend on the effectiveness of the corporateinterest group collaboration (Murdock et al, 2005). Henriques and Sadorsky (1996)
found that perceived pressures from lobby groups and neighborhood and community
groups were significant in motivating voluntary environmental management.
Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) found that the presence of strong environmental
group membership in a state with high emissions levels was a significant predictor of
reductions in toxic emissions over time.
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Regulatory Pressures
As described earlier, a relatively large literature discusses the reasons why a firm
would choose a strategic approach to overcomplying with, influencing, or preempting
regulatory constraints. Numerous studies have consistently found regulatory
pressures to be among the most significant determinants of environmental
management effort and environmental performance (Anton, Deltas and Khanna,
2004; Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Khanna, 2001; Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler,
2000; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). Selected findings were described in the
previous discussions of Anton, Deltas and Khanna (2004), Videras and Alberini
(2000), and Khanna and Damon (1999). In particular, regulatory inspections and the
threat of inspections have been frequently studied, and have been shown to induce
compliance with environmental regulations (Johnstone et al, 2007). Henriques and
Sadorsky (2007) found that facilities subject to more frequent inspections were more
likely to allocate responsibility for environmental management to a dedicated staff
member, and to have implemented a greater number of environmental practices.
Inspection frequency was also found to be significantly related to facilities' taking
action to reduce environmental impacts and reporting reductions (Johnstone et al,
2007).
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Investor Pressures
Previous studies have provided some evidence that investor interests are impacted by
environmental performance. Studies have hypothesized that investor interest in
reduced risk of accidental releases or other environmental damage increases
environmental strategy intensity. Khanna (2001) and Alberini and Segerson (2002)
conclude that empirical studies have generally found that a firm's stock price is
sensitive to a firm's environmental performance and, by inference, to its
environmental management effort. Moughalu, Robinson, and Glascock (1990) found
that stockholders suffered on average a statistically significant 1.2% loss in market
value at the time hazardous waste lawsuits were filed under the either the Superfund
Act or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against a firm in which
they held shares. Findings indicate that lawsuits impose lump-sum penalties on firms
when information about the suit becomes publicly available.

In other measures of investor pressures, Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004), as
described earlier, found that susceptibility to investor pressures (proxied by salesasset ratio) was a significant determinant of environmental management system
comprehensiveness. In the financial market, Esty and Winston (2006) cite a growing
trend in environmental screening in investment funds, where funds choose firms with
good environmental records. Investor pressure is often assessed with both qualitative
measures of perception, as well as through public trading status, which represents
shareholder interest.
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Management Attitudes
Few studies in the economic literature appear to have explicitly examined how upper
management attitudes impact environmental management and performance (Ervin et
al, 2008; Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky, 2001). Evidence from the
management literature examining the general "CEO effect" has found for the most
part that upper management attitudes are an important influence on a broad range of
business strategies and performance measures (Crossland and Hambrick, 2007;
Barker and Mueller, 2002; Johnson, 2002). Regarding environmental management in
particular, Cordano and Frieze (2000) studied the association between managerial
attitudes toward pollution prevention preferences. The authors found managers'
attitudes toward pollution prevention (that this was a worthwhile activity) and
regulation to be significantly positively associated with preferences for source
reduction activities. However, in contrast to Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky
(2001), they found managers' perceptions of control over pollution prevention efforts
to be negatively associated with preferences for source reduction activities.

In a different approach, Marshall, Cordano, and Silverman (2005) used interviews
and focus groups to examine individual and institutional drivers of environmental
stewardship in the U.S. wine industry. Some pressures for increased environmental
management derived from the following: wineries being found in violation of the
Clean Water Act, wineries being prevented from siting facilities due to the presence
of endangered species habitat, and wineries facing opposition to pesticide use by
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neighbors. Moreover, the industry is characterized by small- and medium-sized firms
(SMEs), which exhibit highly varied management styles, and pressures tend to be
localized due to the habitat-specific impacts and small firm size that predominate in
the industry. Despite these differences, the study found that the variation in
management styles notwithstanding, winery managers have strong personal beliefs
about environmentalism, and wineries have cultures that link environmental
stewardship to the long-term sustainability of their organizations. The authors noted
that at the time of the study, the industry was in transition from being a heavily
compliance-oriented sector in the 1980s, when environmental practices were driven
almost entirely by regulations, to a more proactive industry. In 2002, the industry
implemented a standard code of ethics directed toward sustainability, yet findings
indicated that regulations remained important to environmental stewardship at
wineries (Marshall, Cordano, and Silverman, 2005).

Other studies have indicated that a firm's perception that the environment is an
important issue is a significant influence on environmental management decisions.
While not an attitude per se, this perception may reflect a manager's understanding of
the importance of the environment to business operations. Henriques and Sadorsky
(1996) report that the perceived importance of environmental issues was associated
with increased probability of having an environmental plan. Henriques and Sadorsky
(2007) also found that facilities with managers who perceived that natural resource
use negatively impacts the environment were more likely to have implemented an
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EMS, to have certified the EMS, to have dedicated environmental staff, and to have
implemented a greater number of environmental management practices. A separate
analysis of the data used in this research also found that the perception that the
environment is an important issue was a significant determinant of both the
likelihood that a facility would implement a greater number of environmental
practices, and also that a facility would participate in a voluntary environmental
management program (Khanna et al, 2007).

A logical extension in the economic literature is to examine the effect of attitudes
specifically on environmental management and performance. Alberini and Segerson
(2002) cite the importance of an attitude of environmental stewardship to the success
of any voluntary initiative, and Esty and Winston (2006) describe an emerging
"Green Wave" where environmental thinking is a logical element of core business
strategy, but few studies in the economic literature have systematically measured the
association between management attitudes and environmental performance. As
studies begin to examine upper management attitudes toward environmental
protection, the model of choice appears to be a utility maximization framework that
extends the explanatory power of profit maximization models (Ervin et al, 2008;
Carpentier and Ervin, 2002; Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky, 2001). Both Ervin
et al (2008) and Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky (2001) found that upper
management attitudes significantly influenced environmental management, as
described earlier.
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Barriers
This research examines barriers to environmental management such as high up-front
costs of implementation, significant time investments, uncertain future benefits, and
the lack of knowledgeable staff across facilities classified according to regulatory
intensity. Previous studies have typically limited examinations to the economic
constraints of implementing pollution abatement technologies in reference to the
motivations being studied (Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Andrews et al, 2001;
Khanna, 2001). These costs have generally been treated as a constraint within a
traditional profit-maximizing approach, predicting that firms will implement
abatement technologies only to the extent that the marginal benefits are equal to or
exceed the marginal costs of implementation. As noted earlier, Ervin et al (2008)
found that cost was the most significant deterrent to voluntary environmental
management, and that barriers did deter environmental management efforts.

In contrast, Vastag, Kerekes, and Rondinelli (1996) note that managers who perceive
themselves to be at personal risk of incarceration or financial penalties for their
organizations' violations of environmental laws may overestimate the level of
environmental strategy required by legal and market demands for environmental
performance, thereby reducing the resources available for other profitable activities.

In a slightly different approach, Preuss (2005) cites uncertainties in the supply chain
as affecting firms' abilities to fully control environmental impacts. In particular,
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constraints included a lack of environmental assessment in purchasing decisions.
Only large, visible firms were assessing suppliers based on environmental criteria. In
addition, companies cited a perception that environmental assessment of suppliers
would be costly, while generating unclear benefits for their firms (Preuss, 2005).
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Theoretical Propositions, Framework, and Model
This research follows the utility maximization approach of Nakamura, Takahashi,
and Vertinsky (2001) and Ervin et al (2008), but extends the analysis by assuming
that facilities subject to some degree of environmental regulation operate within a
regulatory framework that directly and/or indirectly affects the environmental
management strategy, environmental performance, and the personal utility of the
manager. "Unregulated" facilities, meanwhile, operate without the restriction
imposed by regulation. In addition, this research separates managers' attitudes into
two separate types: attitudes toward regulatory constraints, and attitudes toward
environmental stewardship. This is a refinement of Nakamura, Takahashi and
Vertinsky (2001), who examined managers' perceptions of the general level of
control over, and responsibility toward, the environment.

Theoretical Propositions
Based on the capture theory of regulation, the Porter Hypothesis, and theories
presented by Lyon and Maxwell (2004), facilities subject to regulatory constraints
(e.g. permit requirements, mandatory technologies) are assumed to view the
regulatory framework as an opportunity if the perceived benefits of obtaining
competitive advantage through regulatory strategies (capture, preemption, influence)
are greater than the costs of such strategies. To a certain degree, facility
characteristics such as size determine whether the regulatory framework provides an
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opportunity for strategic advantage or not. Larger facilities may be subject to more
regulations than smaller facilities, whose emissions may fall below minimum
regulatory thresholds, exempting these smaller facilities from more stringent
requirements. Among facilities subject to regulations, facilities with greater market
share, innovative facilities, (e.g., those with R&D capacity), facilities operating in
multinational markets, and facilities subject to more stringent regulations than other
facilities could all be expected to perceive greater benefits to strategic regulatory
behavior than smaller, less innovative facilities, or facilities subject to less stringent
regulation. Facilities subject to regulatory constraints are assumed to view
opportunities for competitive advantage as having two sources: strategic behavior
with respect to regulatory constraints, and other (voluntary) differentiating processes
that appeal to stakeholders (e.g. consumers, investors, environmental interest groups)
other than regulators. Furthermore, facilities are assumed to ensure that operations
are in compliance with respect to regulated environmental impacts before
undertaking voluntary efforts to reduce impacts beyond compliance levels, to reduce
impacts in unregulated areas, or to appeal to non-regulatory stakeholders.

Meanwhile, facilities that are not subject to environmental regulation are assumed to
view only one opportunity with respect to regulation: preempting or providing input
on future regulations. All other motivations for voluntary environmental management
would therefore stem from the desire to achieve differentiation, cost savings,
productivity increases or other advantages, and to appeal to stakeholders other than
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regulators. Given these differing constraints on different types of facilities, the
motivations that determine environmental management strategy are expected to vary
among facilities subject to different levels of regulation, with regulatory pressures
likely having greater importance than other motivations for facilities that are subject
to more stringent requirements. All analyses of the importance of motivations for
environmental management are exploratory, in the absence of prior research
suggesting the association between regulation and other motivations.

Based on the theoretical discussion presented in this research, this study presents the
following general propositions, each assessed independently in this research. The
following sections apply a theoretical framework and model to these propositions.
Proposition 1. The level of regulatory constraint imposed on a facility is
associated with the perceived importance of non-regulatory external motivations
for environmental management (e.g., customer and investor pressures) and nonregulatory barriers to environmental management (e.g., costs and time).
Proposition 2. The level of regulatory constraint imposed on a facility is
associated with the level of overall environmental management and the level of
voluntary environmental management at the facility.
Proposition 3. The level of regulatory constraint imposed on a facility is
associated with the level of overall environmental performance, performance with
respect to regulated impacts, and performance with respect to unregulated
impacts at the facility.
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Theoretical Environmental Management Framework
The following diagrams illustrate hypothesized environmental management decision
elements and relationships for facilities subject to environmental regulations, and
facilities that are not subject to these regulations. The first row of factors (e.g.,
stakeholders, managers' attitudes, and facility characteristics), are considered as
exogenous or given conditions relating to environmental management that contribute
to the environmental management strategy depicted at the second level.
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Figure 1: Environmental Management at Regulated Firms
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In Figure 1, the factors in the first row are hypothesized to influence facility
environmental management based on the studies reviewed earlier. In this case, the
manager is first assumed to meet regulatory requirements imposed by the regulatory
framework in which the facility operates. Next, the manager is presumed to make
three decisions regarding environmental management strategy {EM), as influenced by
the factors in the first row: the selection of environmental management policies and
practices, the level of environmental performance (EP) with respect to regulated
impacts (EPR), and the level of environmental performance with respect to
unregulated impacts (EPU). These are interrelated actions: the selection of a
particular set of policies and practices, such as periodic environmental audits, may
facilitate the modification of production processes to reduce impacts, while the
selection of an environmental performance target has implications for the intensities
of environmental management actions. In addition, although the facility is
hypothesized to set performance targets for regulated impacts first, in order to ensure
that regulatory obligations are met before other benefits are pursued, these targets are
presumed to affect the performance targets for unregulated impacts and vice versa.
This is hypothesized to be the case because the facility may be able to extend existing
strategies applied to regulated impacts to the management of unregulated impacts,
and because reductions in unregulated impacts may result in cost savings that can be
devoted to further improvements in regulated impacts.
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Finally, the facility's profit and environmental performance are hypothesized to
determine the manager's utility. The dual outcomes are interrelated, as the level of
environmental performance (EP) with respect to regulated and unregulated impacts
chosen by the manager, apart from the environmental strategy, will influence profit.
Note that the profit outcome flows back to EP choices, which in turn flow back to
EM choices, to illustrate continuous learning and adaptation of environmental
management to maximize utility in a dynamic process. This research examines a
static "snapshot" of this process, considered representative of the process because it
is assumed that most facilities are in a fairly steady-state long run position with
respect to environmental management. In addition, this research tests the relationship
between motivations and environmental management and the relationship between
motivations and performance separately, rather than in a staged approach. In this
manner, the effect of the regulatory framework on different aspects of environmental
strategy is assessed independently in order to examine which decision elements may
be affected by the regulatory framework. The dotted lines indicate relationships that
are hypothesized, but which are not tested here.
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Figure 2: Environmental Management at "Unregulated" Firms
In Figure 2, the factors in the first row are assumed not to be affected by an
environmental regulatory framework, and therefore could vary substantially in
importance compared to the influences hypothesized for regulated facilities. As with
the regulated facility, using this combined information set, the manager is presumed
to make decisions regarding environmental management strategy (EM) based on the
influences in the first row. However, in this case, there are two decisions: the
selection of environmental management policies and practices, and the level of
environmental performance with respect to all environmental impacts, which in this
case are not regulated (EPU). Again, these are interrelated actions: the selection of a
particular set of policies and practices may address inefficiencies, while the selection
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of an environmental performance target has implications for practice and policy
intensity. In this case, the facility is hypothesized to set performance targets that
achieve cost savings, eliminate waste, or that appeal to stakeholders. Finally, as with
the regulated facility model, the facility's profit and environmental performance are
hypothesized to determine the manager's utility in a dynamic process.

As noted above, because the constraints created by the regulatory framework apply
only to regulated facilities, the motivations for and barriers to voluntary
environmental management are hypothesized to vary in intensity for facilities
classified in different regulatory categories. For example, a highly regulated facility
may view customer desire for environmentally friendly products as less important
than meeting their regulatory obligations with respect to the environment. An
"unregulated" facility, however, may consider customers the most important
stakeholder, in the absence of regulatory constraints on their environmental behavior.

Theory of the Regulatory Framework
One intent of this research is to take a first step at defining indefinite terms such as
"highly regulated industry", which are frequently used in the media. Such terms
imply that regulation impacts decisions, but do not suggest how or why. From an
economic standpoint, one reason facilities subject to varying levels of regulatory
constraints would be expected to make different decisions is based on the differing
costs of environmental management imposed by differing levels of regulation.
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According to standard theory (Glazer and Janeba, 2004), the general cost function for
abatement assumes that costs increase at an increasing rate, given as C(A), where
C > 0 and C" > 0. Following Segerson and Miceli (1998), this research assumes that
the benefits (B) of abatement (A) are independent of the source of motivation (e.g.,
mandatory regulatory standards or potential gains from voluntary efforts). The
general benefits function is B(A), where benefits increase at a decreasing rate because
of decreasing marginal returns: B *> 0 and B " < 0. Net benefits available to the firm
are given by
NB(A) = B(A) - C(A)
where NB(A) is the net benefit of abatement, B(A) is the benefit that would be
obtained if costs were zero, and C(A) are the nonzero costs of voluntary abatement.
Assuming the firm maximizes net benefits, firms would chose an abatement level A
such that first order conditions are satisfied:
B'(A*)-C'(A*) = Q>
where abatement {A) includes both compliance and voluntary activity at a regulated
facility, and is limited to voluntary activity at an "unregulated" facility.

Also following Segerson and Miceli (1998), this research assumes: 1) voluntary
actions provide potential cost savings compared to mandatory compliance actions
through waste reductions, productivity increases, and so forth; 2) the level of
compliance cost C(c) is positively related to the level of regulatory constraint, given
as RCC, where R is the level of regulatory constraints in the form of permits,
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inspections, and other factors, and; 3) as R increases, C(c) increases, causing firms
with greater regulatory constraints (greater R) to incur higher environmental
management costs. As noted by Segerson and Miceli (1998), costs are net any profits
that may be derived from "going green", and could potentially be negative. Profits or
avoided costs could be realized either from increased market share or productivity, or
from regulatory relief if regulatory agencies reduce inspection and enforcement
pressures based on voluntary environmental efforts at the facility.

Given the cost constraints associated with regulatory compliance, managers of more
highly regulated facilities are expected to perceive different levels of potential utility
compared to facilities subject to less regulation. The above cost theory is not
explicitly tested in this research—it is merely one potential explanation for any
differences in facility behavior according to regulatory group classification that may
be revealed by the empirical testing. Another potential explanation is based on the
logic that regulated facilities will first ensure compliance before undertaking
voluntary actions. This effort to ensure compliance first could reduce the level of
voluntary action taken at these facilities, or it could create opportunities to take
advantage of existing management technologies and practices to reduce impacts
beyond regulatory requirements. In either case, the manager's utility would be
affected by the need to meet obligations before engaging in additional activities that
provide personal utility. Managers at "unregulated" facilities, by comparison, would
have more flexibility in pursuing activities that provide personal utility.
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Within the framework described above, highly regulated facilities would be those
facilities whose primary operations have the potential to impact multiple

environmental media (air, land, water), pose serious hazards or risks (hazardous
waste generation), and that are subject to more extensive environmental regulations at
the federal and state level, relative to other facilities. In this sample, highly regulated
facilities would be expected to be the manufacturers: Food Manufacturing (NAICS
311), Wood Product Manufacturing (NAICS 321), and Computer and Electronic
Product Manufacturing (NAICS 334), based on EPA assessments of the impacts
typical of these industries (EPA 1997,1995a, 1995b). In addition, facilities in this
group are expected to be larger facilities, which are more likely to generate greater
emissions and effluents, and therefore be subject to more extensive permitting
requirements and more frequent inspections, which in turn pose greater compliance
costs. Once "highly regulated facilities" are identified, by extension, the industries
which are dominated by many highly regulated facilities could be considered "highly
regulated industries".

Moderately regulated facilities are considered to follow the same cost structure as
highly regulated facilities. The difference would be in the level of RCC faced by the
facility, which changes the level of impact that the cost function exerts on the
benefits of abatement.
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In this research, moderately regulated facilities would be expected to be those
facilities that operate primarily in the Transport (NAICS 484) and Construction
(NAICS 236) sectors. The safe transport of hazardous materials, wastewater
discharge, hazardous material storage and disposal, and activities such as food
transport are stringently regulated. However, a minority of transporters are registered
to handle hazardous wastes (one-fourth of all transporters in this sample), and many
trucking operations, particularly independent owner-operators, do not maintain
vehicle maintenance facilities. Moreover, what could be expected to be the most
significant impact of this industry, CO2, is not yet regulated. Therefore, the majority
of facilities in this sector, and the sector as a whole, are expected to be classified as
moderately regulated. Individual facilities may fall into the highly or lightly regulated
categories, depending on the number of regulatory constraints that apply to a specific
facility.

Construction is expected to be classified in this category for similar reasons.
Although asbestos removal and other hazardous material removal and disposal
activities are stringently regulated, the minority of construction facilities is registered
to conduct such activities. In addition, many construction project impacts are
considered short term. Short-term stormwater and wastewater management and dust
control are all typically regulated through specific prescriptive best practices, which
can be fairly simple to install and which are typically removed at project completion.
As with transport, major impacts in this industry were largely unregulated at the time
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of this study. Major impacts include the generation of construction and demolition
(C&D) wastes and CO2 emissions from diesel-powered equipment. In addition, green
building techniques were predominantly voluntary at the time of this study (although
standards are rapidly becoming codified), and formal programs such as LEED®
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) are widely available and growing
rapidly.

Complex regulations may apply to projects with site-specific impacts to sensitive
resources (e.g. wetlands and endangered species), and those subject to federal-level
regulation (which requires assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act),
but many projects, particularly retrofits and remodels, are subject to far less stringent
environmental regulations than large manufacturing operations. And, with the
availability of voluntary programs, it could be expected that most impact reductions
in this sector would be obtained through voluntary measures such as green building
techniques, voluntary C&D waste recycling, and voluntary use of alternative fuels in
vehicles. Compliance costs with respect to environmental regulation therefore
expected to be lower for construction facilities than manufacturing facilities, so most
construction are expected to fall into the moderately regulated category. By
extension, the industry would be considered moderately regulated.

Costs for "unregulated" facilities are assumed to follow the model described for other
facilities, with the exception that costs are assumed to derive entirely from voluntary
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actions, C(v). It is possible that a facility could face potential future compliance costs
if impending regulations appear imminent, and that the facility may treat some
voluntary costs as the discounted value of future regulatory costs, depending on the
expected level of R. However, for simplicity, in this research, all costs will be treated
as voluntary expenditures for facilities that are not subject to environmental
regulation at the state or federal level. In an "unregulated" facility, in the absence of
constraining regulatory costs, manager utility is affected only by the costs of
voluntary action, in contrast to regulated facilities.

For the purposes of this analysis, "unregulated" facilities are expected to be those
whose primary operations are not subject to formal environmental regulation at the
federal or state level. In this research, the "unregulated" industry is expected to be
Accommodation (NAICS 721). Hotels and resorts which maintain onsite dining
facilities may require permits for cooking stove vents and hoods, but this was not
found to be common during industry research or pretests, and no such permits were
held by any facilities in this sample. The primary impacts, water and electricity use,
are not subject to environmental regulatory requirements (although building codes
typically require efficient fixtures and appliances), and so the greatest impact
reductions may be achieved through voluntary environmental management.
Compliance costs, in turn, would be minimal. To the extent that accommodations
facilities are classified into this category, the industry as a whole, by extension, could
be considered "unregulated".
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Theoretical Model
The formulation for the regulated facility suggests that environmental management
strategy (EM), environmental performance with respect to regulated impacts (EPR),
and environmental performance with respect to unregulated impacts (EPU) can be
assessed with equations predicting the level of influence of the various factors in the
first rows of the diagrams. This follows the approach used by Nakamura, Takahashi
and Vertinsky (2001), with three modifications: 1) environmental performance is
divided into regulated and unregulated impacts; 2) management attitudes about
control and responsibility are replaced by a composite index of attitudes toward
regulatory constraints and a composite index of attitudes about environmental
protection; and 3) facilities are assigned to a regulatory group based on the level of
regulatory constraints affecting the facility.

The formulation for the "unregulated" facility suggests that environmental
management strategy (EM) and environmental performance with respect to
unregulated impacts (EPU), which are all environmental impacts for these facilities,
can be assessed in the same manner.

For ease of exposition, assume that the facility is selling one product. The decision
model for environmental management, based on models developed by Ervin et al
(2008), Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky (2001), Lyon and Maxwell (2004), and
Carpentier and Ervin (2002), can be represented with the following variables and
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reduced form equations. For the maximization framework, derivations and first order
conditions, refer to Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky (2001).
EM = e(X, M, B, RG, AR, A V)

(1)

EPR =J{X M, B, RG, AR, A V)

(2)

EPU = g(X, M, B, RG, AR, A V)

(3)

where
EM: Environmental management strategy
EPR: Environmental performance with respect to regulated impacts
EPU: Environmental performance with respect to unregulated impacts
X: Exogenous facility characteristics such as size, public trading status, R&D
capacity, and others
M: An index of external motivations due to stakeholder influences
B: An index of barriers such as cost of implementation, time, and others
RG: The regulatory group classification
AR: An index of the manager's attitudes toward regulatory constraints
AV: An index of the manager's attitudes toward environmental protection

For regulated facilities, (EP) is comprised of performance with respect to regulated
impacts (e.g., hazardous wastes, EPR) as well as unregulated impacts (e.g., CO2
emissions, EPU), given as: EP = EPR + EPU.
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The assumption that regulated facilities will first ensure regulatory compliance before
devoting resources to reducing unregulated impacts suggests that environmental
performance with respect to unregulated impacts (EPU) depends in part on
environmental performance with respect to regulated impacts, which could be
represented as EPU = h(EPR, X, M, B, RG, AR, A V). However, this is not tested
empirically in this research due to data limitations. Finally, because environmental
performance with respect to unregulated impacts (EPU) can be assessed for all firms,
the formulation suggests that EPU can be compared for regulated and unregulated
firms.
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Survey and Data
Data for this analysis was obtained from a survey of Oregon facility managers as well
as publicly available data sources as described in this section.

Sample Selection
The sampling frame was the population of 2,044 facilities in Oregon that employ 10
or more individuals operating primarily in one of the following six industry sectors:
•

NAICS1 236, Construction of Buildings

•

NAICS 311, Food Manufacturing

•

NAICS 321, Wood Product Manufacturing

•

NAICS 334, Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing

•

NAICS 484, Truck Transportation

•

NAICS 721, Accommodation2

The sampling frame was provided by the Oregon Employment Department (OED)3.
Facilities were selected as the appropriate business unit to survey because studies
1

The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), replaces the earlier Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) system. NAICS codes contain up to six digits; however, sectors were defined at
the 3-digit level to obtain adequate sector sample sizes for analysis.
2
Sectors are referred to as construction, food, wood, electronics, transport, and accommodation in the
text. Accommodation includes hotels, recreational vehicle camping resorts, guest ranches, and other
types of lodging.
3
The population of facilities was obtained from the Oregon Employment Department (OED), which is
authorized by Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 657.665(3) to release information to state agencies for
the purposes of socioeconomic analysis. Information is provided at the facility level, including
individual branches of multiple-facility firms. Information includes facility location, primary industry
classification, and the number of individuals employed at the facility. No individual persons are
identified, and information is provided subject to strict confidentiality rules (ORS 2005, Slater 2005).
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suggest that environmental management can vary substantially across the different
facilities in a company, environmental permits are typically issued at the facility level
(or issued for specific equipment installed in a particular facility), and emission data
is typically reported at the facility level (DEQ 2006; EPA 2006; Vastag, Kerekes, and
Rondinelli, 1996).

Facilities employing fewer than 10 individuals were excluded because the
environmental impacts and regulatory and market influences on environmental
management were not considered comparable with those of larger facilities. It was
also considered unlikely that extremely small facilities would have adequate
resources available to complete the comprehensive survey. This stratification
excluded sizeable segments of these sectors, capturing only 8% of construction
facilities, 51% of food manufacturers, 66% of wood manufacturers, 57% of
electronics facilities, 22% of transport facilities and 42% of accommodations
operating in the state within the sampling frame. However, even with these large
exclusions, this study captures a more representative sample of the business market
than studies comprised solely of large manufacturing facilities.

The choice of industry sectors was based on careful consideration of several factors.
This study was intended to provide a comprehensive view of environmental
management among facilities of varying sizes, characterized by a variety of
organizational characteristics and voluntary environmental management approaches,
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and subject to varying environmental regulations. The selected sectors were chosen to
capture both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries of importance to the
Oregon economy, in sufficient numbers to facilitate sector-specific analysis.

Economic importance was evaluated by examining the importance of the sector to the
labor market, as well as the economic value added by each sector. The six sectors
included in this study are among those that employ the greatest numbers of
individuals and operate the greatest numbers of facilities in Oregon4 (OED, 2005;
USCB, 2003). In addition, these sectors contribute substantially to the Oregon
economy. According to Oregon Department of Revenue (DOR) information for 19
industry categories, manufacturing generated the fourth highest taxable business
income and corporate tax assessed in Oregon in 2002, surpassed only by finance and
insurance, retail trade, and wholesale trade. Construction, transport, and
accommodation ranked seventh, ninth, and tenth respectively (DOR, 2004).

Survey Development and Administration
The survey was developed and administered using a Tailored Design Method (TDM)
protocol (Dillman, 2000). The survey asked questions in four general areas:
environmental management, environmental practices, environmental performance,
4

The electronics sector includes less than 300 facilities in Oregon, but this sector employs more
individuals than each of the other sectors in this survey. The sampling frame and study sample sizes
for this sector are smaller than for other sectors. This small study sample is due to the fact that not only
was the sampling frame smaller for this sector, but 43% of this sector employed fewer than 10
individuals, and this study excluded those facilities. Employment in this sector is concentrated among
a small number of very sizable facilities.
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and general information (e.g. annual revenues). Information was collected primarily
for the calendar year 2004, with the close of the survey period defined as December
31,2004. Questions on environmental performance were customized to the relevant
conditions in the different sectors. Four versions of the survey were created; one for
the three manufacturing sectors, and separate versions for construction, transport, and
accommodation. The manufacturing survey is included in Appendix A.

To ensure that the survey questions were easily understood and relevant, twenty
telephone interviews were conducted with facility managers responsible for
environmental issues during the design of the survey instrument. In addition, the
survey instrument was pre-tested by six facility managers with responsibility for
environmental issues in the target sectors. Individuals who pre-tested the survey were
then interviewed for their interpretations of each question, and suggestions for
clarification. Additional reviews were conducted with environmental management
consultants and university faculty with research interests in business environmental
management. This review process resulted in refinements to the survey.

The survey was targeted to the environmental manager, where available, or to the
appropriate facility manager with responsibility for environmental compliance and
related issues. To ensure that the survey was sent to the most appropriate candidate,
facilities in the OED sampling frame (all facilities employing 10 or more individuals
in the six sectors) were contacted by telephone to obtain the name of the individual
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with responsibility for environmental management decisions. The intent of these calls
was specifically to obtain the correct contact person; no survey information was
collected. However, during these contacts, 3.8% of those contacted chose not to
participate. Refusal rates varied by sector, with 8.1% of the transport sector, 3.5% of
the construction sector, and 3.4% of the wood product manufacturing sector declining
to participate. Less than 2% of each of the remaining sectors declined. The remaining
1,964 facilities received the survey.

The self-administered survey was mailed to recipients in hardcopy. The survey
mailing and data collection were managed by the Social and Economic Sciences
Research Center (SESRC) at Washington State University in Pullman, Washington.
SESRC mailed the survey to the sample of 1,964 facilities on October 14,2005,
together with a cover letter and a stamped reply envelope. The cover letter described
the purpose of the survey and provided SESRC contact information for respondent
questions. To test the influence of incentives and to increase response rates, SESRC
divided the sample into four treatment groups which were evenly divided among the
four versions of the survey5. Treatment groups are shown in Table 1.

5

All analyses of the relationship between mailing service, incentive, and response rates are the
responsibility of SESRC, and are not discussed here.
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Table 1: Survey Mailing Treatment Groups
Experimental
Group

First Questionnaire
Mailing

1

First Class Mail®
No incentive
Priority Mail
No incentive
Priority Mail
$5 incentive
Priority Mail
$5 incentive

2
3
4

Second
Questionnaire
Mailing
First Class Mail
No incentive
Priority Mail
No incentive
First Class Mail
No incentive
Priority Mail
$5 incentive

Third Questionnaire
Mailing6
Priority Mail®
$5 incentive
Priority Mail
$5 incentive
Priority Mail
$5 incentive
Priority Mail
$5 incentive

Ten days after the survey mailing, a reminder postcard was sent to the entire sample.
This card thanked the respondent if they had already completed the survey, and asked
those that had not responded to please complete the survey as soon as possible. Thirty
days after the initial survey mailing, on November 14, 2005, a second package
containing a survey, cover letter, and postage-paid business reply envelope was sent
to all non-respondents. Six weeks after this mailing, on January 4, 2006, a postcard
was sent to all nonrespondents, reminding them of the survey purpose and asking
them to complete the survey as soon as possible.

Due to low response rates in the electronics and transport sectors, a third survey was
mailed to all nonrespondents in those sectors on February 2,2006. To increase
response rates, all mailings were sent Priority Mail, and included the $5 incentive.
This third mailing was not planned, and was conducted specifically to obtain
sufficient sample sizes for analysis of these sectors. This complete mailing process
6

This mailing targeted nonrespondents in the electronics and transport sectors, and was not sent to the
entire sample.
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generated a total of 689 responses, representing an overall response rate of just over
35%. The 689 respondents are referred to as the full sample7 in this study.

Table 2: Survey Response Ratesi by Industry Sector and overall
Sector

Sample
Size

Completes Refusals

No
Response

Other

Response
Rate

Construction (236)
Manufacturing
(Combined)
Food (311)
Wood (311)
Electronics (334)
Transport (484)
Accommodation (721)

394

135

12

233

14

34.3%

752
286
317
149
343
475

284
106
118
51
128
142

68
32
26
10
24
12

358
124
157
85
162
296

43
24
16
3
29
25

37.8%
37.1%
37.2%
34.2%
37.3%
29.9%

Totals

1,964

689*

116

1,048

111

35.1%

•Sector information was missing for 1.3% of respondents (nine observations)

Survey Instrument
The survey included ordered-response, categorical response, binary response, and
open-ended questions, as shown in Appendix A. Binary and categorical response
questions were primarily used to determine facility type: e.g., those that sell into
retail markets (retailers) versus nonretailers, and multinational corporations versus
other facilities. These types of questions were also used to assess whether certain
environmental practices had been implemented and the staff involved in
environmental decisions. Open-ended questions were designed to capture information
that did not fit into any queried categories, and to provide facilities an opportunity to

7

As noted in the results section, due to missing data, analyses were conducted on two samples, a full
sample, and a reduced sample. All respondents are included in the full sample. A stable reduced
sample was createdfromrespondents for whom no data was missing.

83

address issues not covered in the survey. The ordered-response questions on
motivations and performance are described in more detail in the following sections.

The broad categories of influence and stakeholders that have been described in
previous studies, and which were included in this study, are as follows:
•

Customers

•

Interest groups (e.g. environmental organizations)

•

Investors and lenders

•

Regulations

•

Competition

•

Upper management and parent company attitudes

The above influences were assessed with two types of 5-point ordered response
scales: Likert scales measuring the extent of agreement, and Likert-type scales
measuring perceptions of priority or influence. A 5-point scale was chosen for this
study for several reasons, based on determinations by Clark (1995) and Lehman
(1972). First, the 5-point scale has been found to be approximately as effective as a
continuous scale at estimating the mean response. With the addition of each point, the
differences between continuous and discrete scales decrease rapidly up to the level
where five or six points are included. After this, adding points results in less
measurement improvement. Furthermore, due to the length and intensity of this
survey, a 7-point scale was considered too detailed to be used throughout the survey.
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Conversely, a 3-point scale was considered too limited. Fewer points on the scale
may not capture adequate variation, which increases the likelihood of a departure
from the assumption of a normal distribution, a requirement for many statistical tests
(Jacoby and Matell, 1971).

The Likert agreement scale was used to assess perceptions of upper management and
parent company attitudes, the extent to which certain practices have been
implemented, and the effectiveness of certain environmental management efforts
(questions 7,12,14, and 20 in Appendix A). On this scale, 1 indicated strongly
disagree, and 5 indicated strongly agree. The Likert-type ordered response scale was
used to assess perceptions of customer and competitive influences, barriers to
environmental management, and regulatory, lender, and investor priority (questions
3,4, 5, and 8 in Appendix A), with 1 indicating a low priority, minor influence, or
limited barrier, and 5 indicating a high priority, major influence, or strong barrier. In
these scales, the value of three (3) is interpreted as the neutral value for agreement
questions, and as a moderate influence, priority, or barrier for those questions.

Performance was assessed with three types of measures: actual impact amounts,
changes in these amounts, and regulatory compliance status for those impacts subject
to regulation. The following quantitative impacts were asked on the surveys for all

sectors (subparts of question 16 in Appendix A):
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•

Million gallons of wastewater discharged8

•

Tons of solid waste landfilled9

•

The percentage of recyclable waste that was recycled

•

Tons of hazardous or toxic wastes generated

•

Tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted

Remaining impacts were specific to each sector, as shown in Appendix A. In addition
to the above, all sectors except construction were asked the amount of hazardous air
emissions generated10. The manufacturing and accommodation facilities were asked
how many kilowatt-hours (kWh)11 of electricity and how many therms of natural gas
were used. Construction facilities were asked about the percentage of energy-efficient
appliances that were installed in projects and the percentage of projects constructed to
green building standards. Transport facilities were asked about conventional diesel
and biodiesel use.

Facilities were asked to report any changes in impacts over the 2004 calendar year
using a 7-point ordered- response scale (questions 17a through 17h in Appendix A),
8

For construction, wastewater was actually measured as the amount of discharge due to dewatering.
Dewatering discharge is not directly comparable to wastewater discharge generated through
production processes. However, dewatering is typically a regulated activity and permit requirements
may include specified treatment. For purposes of assessing impacts to water resources in a general
sense, construction dewatering is considered together with wastewater discharge.
In the construction sector, wastes were measured as solid and hazardous construction and demolition

9

(C&D) wastes, respectively.
10
Construction was asked about compliance with fugitive dust control measures, but not about actual
amounts.
11
The survey instrument inadvertently specified kilowatts rather than kilowatt-hours (kWh). Some
respondents crossed out the term kilowatts and wrote in kWh. It is assumed that all respondents
reported kWh.
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ranging from "increased greatly" (greater than 10%) to "decreased greatly" (greater
than -10%). Using this scale, the value of 4 indicated no change in impacts, with
lower values indicating an increase, and higher values indicating a decrease.

For impacts potentially subject to regulation, compliance was assessed by asking
facilities whether the impacts were regulated at their facilities, and the level of
compliance, using the following scale:
•

1 indicated "working towards meeting regulation"

•

2 indicated "meet regulatory standards"

•

3 indicated "do more than regulation requires"

•

4 indicated "not regulated at the facility"

This categorical response scale differs from the ordered-response scales used for
other questions in that this scale is intended to classify facilities into discrete states of
compliance, rather than capture an underlying continuous range of positions.

Secondary Sources
Numerous secondary data sources were used in this study to obtain information on
demographics and facility regulatory characteristics. Data from the following sources
were used in this research. Demographic information including county population
and education level was obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census. The number of
members of the Sierra Club and members of The Nature Conservancy in each Oregon
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County were obtained to assess environmental interest group presence on a regional
basis. Membership was obtained through personal contact with representatives of
numerous interest groups in Oregon, but responses were received from only these
two organizations. Nonattainment data for air quality pollutant levels for each county
in Oregon was obtained from the EPA Greeribook. Voluntary program participation
was obtained from membership and certification lists for ENERGY STAR, LEED,
the Oregon Natural Step Network, WasteWise, The National Environmental
Performance Track, Smartway Transportation Partnership, and various local utility
programs.

Facility characteristics such as estimated annual sales and facility size in square feet
were obtained from the infoUSA data service, using the ReferenceUSA access
provided by the Fort Vancouver Regional Library in Vancouver, Washington. This
service is widely available at public libraries. infoUSA estimates sales volume at the
facility level using U.S. Department of Commerce-supplied data on sales per
employee for the specific industrial sector, and the number of employees at the
facility (infoUSA, 2008).

Regulatory and performance information was obtained from a variety of sources.
Emissions data was obtained from the TRI. The EPA Enforcement & Compliance
History Online (ECHO) database was used to determine whether facilities were in
compliance with federal regulations in 2004. Oregon Department of Environmental
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Quality (DEQ) enforcement history was obtained through the DEQ Facility Profiler
2.0 web-based database, and online enforcement web-based queries for notices of
violation and notices of noncompliance. Environmental regulatory permit
information was obtained through the DEQ Facility Profiler 2.0, and the DEQ
searchable databases for water quality, land quality and air quality permits and
licenses. In Oregon, the DEQ manages federal air quality, stormwater and wastewater
programs that are managed by the EPA in some other states. Therefore, the DEQ
databases provide both state and federal permit information for each facility regulated
at those levels in these impact areas in the state. Additional air quality permit
information for Lane County was obtained from the Lane County Regional Air
Pollution Authority (LCRAP A), which manages federal air quality permits for that
region. The permit and violation information obtained from these sources included air
emissions permits, hazardous waste generator status, underground tank permits,
environmental cleanup site information, and stormwater, wastewater, water pollution
control facility, and solid waste disposal permits.

Hazardous material transport permit and violation information was obtained from the
U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration annual "Hazardous Materials Registration Data" and "Penalty
Action" reports for the year 2004. Historical information was not available.
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Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA) permit information for food handlers,
weigh stations, and other licensees was obtained from the ODA online searchable
license database.

Sample Characteristics and Summary Statistics
As mentioned earlier, this sample is characterized by small- and medium-sized
facilities (SMEs). No definitive definitions of small, medium, and large firms have
been established in the U.S. However, according to the definition of SMEs adopted
by the European Commission (EC) in 2003, Oregon industry in the target sectors is
characterized predominantly by SMEs (EC, 2003). By EC definitions, firms with 250
or more employees are classified as large, firms with between 50 and 249 employees
are classified as medium, and those with 10-49 employees are small. Firms with
fewer than 10 employees are classified as micro firms, which were excluded from
this study. In this study, employment levels were widely dispersed in the completed
sample (M= 67.73, SD = 136.97), with a median of 24 employees per facility. Using
the EC classification, 95% of the facilities in the completed sample would be
considered SMEs (that is, either small or medium). Five percent of facilities
employed 250 or more individuals and would be considered large. By U.S. standards,
these proportions remain unchanged. Based on the Small Business Administration
(SB A) size standards for these sectors, the same proportion of the completed sample
that would qualify as SME's under the EC definition also qualify as small businesses
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for the purposes of determining eligibility for U.S. Federal Government programs
(SBA, 2006; EC, 2003).

This composition is consistent with the Pacific Northwest region, the U.S. as a whole,
and the global marketplace according to data from the 2000 U.S. Census and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (USCB, 2003;
OECD, 2002).

The full sample was comprised primarily of privately held facilities (89%), which is
not surprising, given the predominance of small facilities. Comparable estimates of
the proportion of privately held facilities in either the Pacific Northwest region or the
U.S. are not widely available. However, based on a search of the U.S. stock exchange
listings and consultation with business experts, the completed sample is consistent
with the composition of the U.S. market. The vast majority of U.S. firms are privately
held, based on estimates that approximately 7,000 -10,000 firms are publicly traded
on the U.S. national exchanges (Brown, 2006; Hoover's, 2006; SEC, 2005).

General characteristics of the full sample include the following:
•

Seventy-nine percent of respondents reported being independently owned.

•

Thirteen percent reported that either the facility or the parent firm was a
multinational corporation.
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•

Twenty percent reported that either the facility or the parent firm had R&D
capacity, 87% of which were in the manufacturing sectors.

•

Slightly less than one-half of respondents (43%) sold directly into retail markets.

•

Nearly 80% reported having 10 or fewer competitors while 90% reported 20 or
fewer close competitors.

•

Average annual revenues were nearly $ 17 million; median revenues were $3
million. By proportion, 59% percent of reported revenues were less than $25
million, 40% were less than $100 million, and less than 2% of facilities reporting
revenues earned $ 100 million or more.

•

Facilities reported spending an average of 2.4% of annual revenues on
environmental management in 2004.

Data Screening
Variables were screened for missing data, outliers, nonnormality, and other violations
of assumptions. The primary issues were missing data, particularly for the
performance variables, and nonnormal distributions in ordered response variables.

Two solutions were attempted to address missing data in the ordered response
variables: replacement with maximum-likelihood estimation (EM), and replacement
with the mean. The EM results were questionable, yielding some results that
exceeded the bounds of the original variable scale. Replacement with the mean
reduced explanatory power in all models (which is a typical drawback), but had
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minimal impact on significance when results were compared for estimations on the
data with missing values replaced, and data with missing cases excluded (that is, no
variables changed from significant or non significant or vice versa, but significance
level changed in a few cases). Due to the very large amount of missing data in the
performance variables, no replacement was attempted; instead, a smaller sample size
was used for the analysis of the performance variables. Due to these issues, analyses
were conducted on both the full data set excluding missing values listwise, which
eliminates an entire observation if any values are missing from either the predictors
or dependents (which results in a different sample size for each analysis) and then
repeated on a reduced set containing responses on all variables used in analyses,
referred to as the stable sample. Both sets of estimations are reported in the Results
section. While there is a loss of data when missing values are excluded, this approach
maintains true data for all analyses (as opposed to "generated" data), and takes
advantage of all available observations.

Regarding nonnormality and heteroscedasticity, it is not common in social sciences
literature to transform data measuring the extent of agreement, or perceptions of
intensity. Therefore, data was not transformed, and where appropriate, categorical
variables were used in place of the continuous variables. For example, categories of
facility size based on the number of employees were used in place of the continuous
variable, using the small, medium, and large categories defined by the EC described
earlier. The dependent variables for performance outcomes were created as binary
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variables, and test methods to predict binary outcomes have been used. Diagnostic
statistics for continuous variables are reported in Table 3.

Table 3: Data Screening Statistics for Continuous Variables
N
M
Variable
SD Skew Kurt Missing
CUST
613 0.40 0.29 0.13 -1.06 11.00%
EIG
622 0.28 0.27 0.78 -0.18 9.90%
INV
598 0.50 0.31 -0.18 -1.05 13.20%
AR
581 0.56 0.30 -0.35 -0.94 15.70%
COMPET 601 0.42 0.27 0.10 -0.98 12.80%
AV
578 0.68 0.20 -0.73 0.62 16.10%
BARRIER 478 0.48 0.23 -0.26 -0.28 30.06%
PRACINT 511 0.41 0.23 0.10 -0.45 25.80%
P2
565 0.70 0.20 -0.67 0.60 18.00%
EM
610 0.16 0.19
1.33
1.6
11.50%
PRACSUM 662 2.15 2.44
1.04
0.18
3.90%
VEPSUM 643 0.34 0.76 2.99 11.14 6.70%
SIERRA
668 0.39 0.25 0.66 -0.33 3.00%

K-S
s-w
1.00*** Q_94***
0.15*** 0.89***
on*** 0 94***
0 J J*** 0.95***
0.08*** 0.96***
0 Q9*** 0.96***
0.07*** 0.98***
0.07*** 0.98***
0.08*** 0.96***
019*** 0.83***
0!21*** 0.83***
0.45*** 0.51***
Q JO*** 0.900***

Outliers were verified to ensure that no data entry errors had occurred, but otherwise
were used in the analysis, and observations were not deleted. Widely dispersed data
was expected on the environmental management and performance measures, due to
the highly variable nature of facility operations and output that typifies a sample of
diverse facilities. Only two variables of interest, facility annual revenues and the
number of infractions, penalties, or third-party lawsuits reported by facilities,
consistently exhibited multicollinearity problems in models and were therefore
excluded from all analyses. Estimated annual sales were used in place of revenues.
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Bias Assessments
Self-selection bias is a concern in environmental management surveys because
facilities with stronger environmental programs may be more inclined to respond
than those with poor observations. Potential bias was evaluated to determine whether
a disproportionate number of responses were received from facilities with better
performance records than others. Responses were also assessed based on facility
characteristics and geographic location. For a description of those evaluations, refer
to Jones (2007).

A chi-square test of proportions was conducted to compare the proportion of
responding facilities and nonresponding facilities that had received notices of
noncompliance and notices of violation (summed together for a total enforcement
score) from the DEQ in 2004. Facilities were classified as responding or not, and as
having received a notice or not. A slightly larger proportion of respondents, 2.8%,
had received a notice than nonrespondents, 2.0%. This difference was not statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level: Pearson's x 2 ( l ) = 1.57,/? = 0.211. A small
number of facilities received multiple notices, so the mean number of notices
received in 2004 was also compared for respondents and nonrespondents. The twogroup t-test correcting for unequal variances (due to the differences in group size)
was not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level: *(1,675) = -0.08, p =
0.940. The negative value for the t statistic is due to the higher mean number of
violations among respondents, which were treated as the second group in this test.
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A second chi-square test was conducted to compare the proportion of responding
facilities and nonresponding facilities that had received a notice of infraction from the
DEQ, the EPA, or the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 2004. Again, facilities
were classified as responding or not, and as having received a notice or not. As in the
previous test, a slightly larger proportion of respondents, 9.3%, had received an
infraction than nonrespondents, 8.2%. This difference was not statistically significant
at the 95% confidence level: Pearson's %2(l) = 0.63,p = 0.429. The two-group t-test
correcting for unequal variances (due to the differences in group size) was not
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level: ^(1,391) = -0.13,p = 0.893. The
negative value for the t statistic is due to the higher mean number of violations
among respondents, which were treated as the second group in this test.

In addition to collecting secondary data from publicly available enforcement records,
a followup telephone survey was conducted to further query the reasons for the lack
of response. The survey included seven questions asking about the facility's
environmental record and why the facility had not responded. A total of 900 nonrespondents, selected at random from among all nonrespondents, were contacted.
Responses were received from 370 facilities that did not complete the mail survey,
for a response rate of 41.1 % to the telephone survey. The most frequently cited
reason for not responding to the mail survey was that the survey was too long and
required too much time. Organizationally, telephone respondents were similar to mail
survey respondents: 68% of the nonrespondents contacted by telephone employed
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fewer than 50 people, compared to 69% of respondents to the mail survey. Similarly
to the above evaluations, regulatory infractions were not significantly different
between nonrespondents to the mail survey and respondents to the mail survey:
approximately 2% of mail survey respondents and nonrespondents alike reported
receiving such an infraction. Together, the lack of significance and the greater
proportion of mail survey respondents who had received notices by regulatory
agencies as compared to nonrespondents suggest a lack of bias based on
environmental performance.
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Research Methodology
This research consists of the following primary steps:
1. Classify facilities into highly regulated, lightly regulated, and unregulated
groups
2. Generate the following scores for environmental management, performance,
and management attitudes:
a. An overall environmental management score indicating the intensity
of environmental management efforts at the facility;
b. An environmental management score for only those environmental
management activities that are strictly voluntary (not required by
regulation);
c. An overall environmental performance score for all impacts, regulated
and unregulated;
d. An environmental performance score for regulated impacts, such as
toxic wastes and wastewater;
e. An environmental performance score for unregulated impacts, such as
C0 2 ;
f.

A score for management attitudes toward regulation

g. A score for management attitudes toward environmental protection
3. Assess environmental management intensity and performance using a suite of

independent variables to control for facility characteristics, regulatory
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classification, and motivations and barriers, determining any associations with
group membership

Each of these steps is discussed in detail in the following sections on facility
classification, composite indexing methodology, and model development.

Regulatory Group Classification
Facilities are grouped into highly regulated, moderately regulated, and lightly
regulated categories using cluster analysis. This exploratory approach analyzes an
initially unclassified data set to determine the underlying categorical structure using a
statistical method to identify homogeneous subgroups within a sample. The result is a
set of groups which both minimizes within-group variation and maximizes betweengroup variation. Clusters can be chosen based on either the similarities between
individual observations, or the differences—referred to as the distance between
observations. Developing classification systems through cluster analysis allows the
data to determine the groups, rather than the researcher. However, with this method,
the researcher can specify the number of clusters to be created, if desired.

Two-step cluster analysis is used when one or more of the classification variables is
categorical with three or more levels, and is often preferred for large datasets,
because other methods do not scale efficiently when sample sizes are very large.
Two-step cluster analysis addresses the scaling problem by identifying pre-clusters in
99

a first step, then treating these clusters as individual observations in a second step
(Garson, 2008).

Two-step clustering uses a distance measure based on a probabilistic model in which
the distance between two clusters is equivalent to the decrease in the log-likelihood
function as a result of merging. In the first step, original cases are grouped into
"preclusters" that are then used in place of the raw data in the hierarchical clustering.
Each successive observation is added to form new preclusters based on its similarity
to existing preclusters. In the second step, the preclusters are grouped using
agglomerative hierarchical clustering, where every observtion is initially considered a
cluster on its own, then the two observations with the lowest distance (or highest
similarity) are combined into a cluster. The observaton with the lowest distance to
either of the first two is considered next. If that third observation is closer to a fourth
observation than it is to either of the first two, the third and fourth observations
become the second cluster; if not, the third observation is added to the first cluster.
The process is repeated, adding observations to existing clusters, creating new
clusters, or combining clusters to get to the desired number of clusters (Garson, 2008;
Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 1999).

The following variables were examined for their potential to describe the regulatory
intensity faced by a facility:
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1. The industry sector as defined at the 3-digit NAICS level, which serves as a
proxy for the regulatory burden via the likelihood of inspection, after Videras
and Alberini (2000)
2. An alternative four-group indicator of industry activity, where the
nonmanufacturing sectors (construction, transport, and accommodation) were
retained as individual categories, while the three manufacturing sectors were
combined into a single category. This is equivalent to defining groups at the
2-digit NAICS level, where 31-33 represent manufacturing, 23 represents
construction, 48-49 represents transportation and warehousing, and 72
represents accommodation and food services (USCB, 2008)
3. The size of the facility in terms of the number of employees
4. The size of the facility in estimated square footage, obtained from the
infoUSA data service
5. The number of regulatory environmental permits that are classified as general
or minor (these permits contain fewer requirements than individual or major
permits) held by the facility
6. The number of regulatory environmental permits the facility held that were
classified as individual or major (these permits contain more requirements
than general or minor permits)
7. The total number of permits, both general and individual, held by the facility
8. The number of environmental regulatory inspections in 2004
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9. The number of penalties issued by an environmental regulatory agency in
2004
10. The number of impacts on which the facility reported being subject to
regulation (responses to the subparts of Q15 in Appendix A that indicated a
compliance level on the impact). This variable was anticipated to include
impacts managed by local environmental regulatory authorities, which
secondary data on state and federal permits would not include.
11. The number of different environmental media covered by facility permits:
land, air, water, and hazardous waste

The above items are intended to capture both the depth and breadth of environmental
regulatory pressures. The number of permits held by a facility and the level of burden
imposed by different permit levels (general versus individual, minor versus major)
indicate a depth of pressure, while the number of different media that a facility is
regulated on indicates a breadth of pressure. With the exception of the industrial
sector, which is a categorical variable, the above variables were scaled to have
distributions with a mean (M) of 0 and a standard deviation (SD) of 1, after Zeng et al
(2007), described earlier. Standardization ensures that all variables have equal impact
on the computation of distances in cluster analysis (Garson, 2008).

Cronbach's alpha (a) was obtained to assess how well these potential determinants fit
as a scale of regulatory intensity. Cronbach's a is a widely used test to determine
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whether items are sufficiently interrelated to justify their combination in an index.
Cronbach's a measures the extent that items correlate highly with each other, and is a
measure of mean intercorrelation for standardized data, based on the reasoning that
items in an index will normally be more intercorrelated with each other than with
other items in the data (items representing the same latent variable are expected to be
more interrelated with each other than with items representing other latent variables).
In standard practice, a should be 0.70 or higher. However, given that 0.70 is the level
where the standard error of measurement is over one-half (0.55) of a standard
deviation, some authors advocate use of a threshold of 0.80 (Garson, 2008).

Cronbach's a was obtained using the Reliability Analysis feature of the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 14.0. (The industry classification category
was not included in the reliability analysis due to its categorical nature.) Based on
results, a three item scale was chosen, with a = 0.77. This is slightly lower than the
more conservative 0.80 threshold, but well above the standard 0.70 threshold. The
three items—the number of general permits, the number of individual permits, and
the number of different media on which facilities were regulated—that were included
in the scale are as follows.
•

Regulated media comprises the number of environmental media (land, air,
and water) on which the facility was regulated, plus hazardous waste
generation or transporter status. Although hazardous waste is not an
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environmental medium, it is an important impact category that is treated as a
medium here.
•

General permits
o General stormwater discharge permits, issued for storm runoff
discharges under the national pollutant discharge elimination system
(NPDES) with standard conditions; individual facilities are assigned
to the permits
o

General NPDES wastewater discharge permits, issued for industrial
discharge into surface waters with standard conditions; individual
facilities are assigned to the permits

o

General water pollution control facility permits (permits for
wastewater or sewage treatment operations such as land irrigation
using process water and evaporation lagoons), issued with standard
conditions; individual facilities are assigned to the permits

o Underground storage tank permits
o

Conditionally exempt hazardous waste generator status, which does
not require a specific management plan or reporting

o

General air contaminant discharge permits (ACDPs) for stationary or
mobile sources, which are assigned to an entire source category with
standard conditions; individual facilities are assigned to the permits

o

Oregon Department of Agriculture licenses, which are issued to
facilities for various handling, transport, and processing activities
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involving food and agricultural products, measurement devices such
as scales, fuel dispensing operations, and other activities
o U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) permits for transporting
hazardous materials and wastes
Individual permits
o Individual wastewater discharge and water pollution control facility
permits, which are issued to specific facilities and which contain
customized conditions for activities not covered under the general
permits described above
o

Small or large quantity hazardous waste generator status, which
requires registration, recordkeeping, and other compliance
requirements

o Leaking underground storage tank permits, which require a
management plan
o Title V air quality permits, which are issued to individual facilities and
require more extensive monitoring and reporting than general ACDP
permits
o

Solid waste disposal facility permits, which are issued to individual
facilities to permit composting, application of sewage sludge,
landfilling, and other solid waste disposal activities
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Summary statistics for the four raw variables (without standardization) are shown in
Table 4.

Table 4: Regulatory Group Classification Variables with Summary Statistics
Name
INDUST

Description
Categorical variable indicating the industrial activity:
manufacturing, construction, transport, or accommodation,
equivalent to identifying sectors at the 2-digit NAICS level.
GENPMTS Standardized score for the total number of general or minor
environmental permits held by the facility. General permits are as
follows:
INDPMTS Standardized score for the total number of individual or major
environmental permits held by the facility.
REGMED Standardized score of the number of different media for which the
facility held permits: air, land use (including tank and disposal
permits), water, and hazardous waste.

N
668

M

SD

668

0.84

1.80

668

0.16

0.62

668

0.47

0.94

Two-Step Cluster Analysis of Regulatory Groups
The two-step cluster analysis was conducted in SPSS 14.0 on randomly sorted data
(cluster analysis can be affected by the order in which records are sorted) using the
three-item scale and industry indicator described in Table 4. Scales with few
variables that generate valid classifications are desirable because Cronbach's a takes
the number of items into account based on the theory that the more items in the scale,
the more reliable a scale will be. Therefore, when one scale contains more items than
another, a will be higher even when the estimated average correlations are equal—as
the number of items increases, a increases (Garson, 2008). Zeng et al (2007) used a
four-item scale to classify industrial sectors according to sustainability level, and
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Okazaki (2006) used four items to represent demographic characteristics of
consumers, each with reliable results, as indicated by verification procedures.

Three clusters were selected as the target number of clusters, based on an a priori
decision that two clusters would not capture sufficient variation to determine any
potential transition between "lightly regulated" and "highly regulated" firms.
Furthermore, a three-level classification is used in existing regulatory classifications
such as hazardous waste generator status. Finally, while additional levels may more
thoroughly describe the range of regulatory intensity faced by firms, in this sample
dominated by small facilities the number of regulated facilities was not sufficient to
capture more than three levels. In addition, a wider range of levels would not achieve
one of the goals of this study, which is to create groups of facilities that can be
targeted by policymakers in a streamlined process.

For verification, 10 random samples of 75% of the sample were drawn and the
classification was repeated on these samples. Cluster analysis was first conducted
with the six-group sector variable, with sectors defined at the 3-digit NAICS level, as
the categorical variable. However, classifications varied from 13.4% to 62.2%, for an
average of 43.3% variation among the ten replications. This variation was due
predominantly to a pattern of movement in the wood products manufacturing sector
(NAICS 321). In four of the runs, the wood products manufacturing sector was
divided roughly evenly between the highly regulated group and the lightly regulated
107

group, while in six of the runs, this sector was classified entirely in the highly
regulated group. Excluding this change, the proportion of facilities falling into
different clusters in different replications varied from 10.2% to 31.1%, for an average
of 17.5% variation from the original classification.

The cluster analysis was conducted again using the four-group industry activity
classification where all manufacturing sectors were combined, equivalent to defining
sectors at the 2-digit NAICS level. This change resulted in a more stable
classification, where replications varied from 0.6% to 14.5%, for an average of 5.7%
variation from the original classification. The four-group industry variable was
retained due to its greater stability. Summary statistics for the resulting clusters
generated are presented in the tables; groups are described in the following sections.

Table 5: Regulatory Group Cluster Summary Statistics
Variable

1
(Highly Regulated)
N=277
%
M
SD

2
(Moderately Regulated)
N=124
M
SD
%

3
(Lightly Regulated)
N=265
%
M
SD

industry
mfg

99.99

const
trans
accom
genpmts
indpmts
regmed

49.6
99.00
0.01

0.10

50.4

1.44

2.27

0.99

1.8

0.12

0.43

0.32

0.88

0.13

0.44

0.01

0.09

0.87

1.17

0.43

0.87

0.07

0.31

"Summary statistics are reported for the unstandardized variables.

108

Table 6: Regulatory Group Cluster Proportions
Variable

Cluster 1
(Highly
Regulated)
60.0%
31.8%
20.5%
16.2%
7.6%

Cluster 2
(Moderately
Regulated)
43.9%
20.3%
4.9%
9.8%
1.6%

Cluster 3
(Lightly
Regulated)
8.6%
2.3%
0.4%
0.4%
0%

Permits for one or more media

43.7%

24.4%

5.3%

Permits for two or more media
Hazardous waste generator status

26.4%

13.0%

0.9%

22.4%

10.6%

3.0%

Reporting to the TRI
Inspected by a state or federal
environmental agency in 2004
Average number of employees

8.3%
14.8.%

0%
11.4%

0%
2.6%
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58

32

1 or more general permits
2 or more general permits
3 or more general permits
1 or more individual permits
2 or more individual permits

Table 7: Regulatory Group Cluster Proportions and Significance Tests between tfo
Highly Regulated Group and the Other Two Groups
Characteristic
One or more general
permits
One or more
individual permits
Permits for one or
more media
Hazardous waste
generator status

Employees

x2

x2

P

8.6

156.56

<001

.082

0.4

41.03

<.001

13.86

<.001

5.3

106.8

<.001

10.6

7.98

.005

3.0

45.2

<.001

M(SD)

M(SD)

t

M(SD)

t

105.2
(189.2)

58.5
(100.8)

3.20

P
<.001

31.7
(45.4)

6.24

P
<.001

HR

MR

%

%

60.0

43.9

9.28

.002

16.2

9.8

3.03

43.7

24.4

22.4

P

LR
%

Cluster 1—Highly Regulated Group
Cluster 1 represents the "highly regulated" group. All of the manufacturers, as well as
one large resort hotel (with over 250 employees), are in this group. According to ttests with Bonferroni adjustments applied, this group had significantly more
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employees than the other groups. Based on Pearson's chi-square tests, this group held
significantly more general and individual permits than the other groups, and is
regulated on more media than the other groups, as shown in Table 7. Some facilities
in this group did not hold any permits, but for the most part, facilities in this group
held at least one permit. This group contains the greatest proportion of hazardous
waste generators, 22.4%, and all but one of the large quantity generators in the full
sample were classified into this group. This group also contains all of the respondents
who reported to the TRI, all of whom were manufacturers. This cluster can be
considered to characterize larger facilities that are primarily involved in production
(with the exception of the resort hotel), and that are more likely to be regulated on
multiple media, more likely to hold at least one individual permit, more likely to
generate hazardous waste, and more likely to report to the TRI, than the other groups.
With the exception of the resort hotel, this cluster contains the anticipated industrial
sectors.

Cluster 2—Moderately Regulated Group
Cluster 2 represents the "moderately regulated" group. All of the transport facilities,
as well as one medium-sized hotel (with nearly 75 employees) are included in this
cluster. As with the highly regulated group, this group was significantly different
from the other two groups in terms of the number of employees, as well as each of
the criteria used in classification. As with the first cluster, there were facilities in this
group that did not hold any permits, and in general, this group held fewer permits and
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was regulated on fewer media, than the highly regulated group. Among the 10.6%
that were hazardous waste generators of some type, all but two facilities were
conditionally exempt generators; one facility was a small quantity generator, and one
was a large quantity generator. Table 8 shows the significance tests between the
moderately and lightly regulated groups.

This cluster can be characterized by nonmanufacturing facilities that are subject to
general or minor permits, that may generate small quantities of hazardous waste, but
that are generally below the threshold for individual permits, that are likely to be
regulated on only one or two media, and that are likely to be small-to-medium sized
facilities. As expected, transport facilities are included in this cluster, but
surprisingly, construction facilities are not.

Table 8: Regulatory Group Cluster Proportions and Significance Tests between the
Moderately and Lightly Regulated Groups
Characteristic
One or more general
permits
One or more
individual permits
Permits for one or
more media
Hazardous waste
generator status

Employees

MR

LR

x2

P

%
43.9

%
8.6

64.7

<.001

9.8

0.4

19.4

<.001

24.4

5.3

30.1

<.001

10.6

3.0

9.2

.002

M(SD)
58.5
(100.8)

M(SD)

t
2.82

P
.003

31.7
(45.4)
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Cluster 3—Lightly Regulated Group
Cluster 3 represents the "lightly regulated" group. All of the construction facilities
and all but the two aforementioned accommodations facilities are in this category.
Construction facilities were not expected to be in this category. The classification of
construction facilities as lightly regulated is potentially due the fact that much
construction work involves retrofits and remodels, which are not subject to extensive
environmental permitting, and the temporary nature of most environmental permits in
this sector. At any given time, a particular facility may hold a limited number of
permits for its projects, and this study captures only a static "snapshot" of activity. In
addition, many projects require only a single stormwater runoff permit, if there are no
sensitive resources (e.g., endangered species or wetlands) located at the construction
site.

Another contributing factor may be the small size of most construction facilities in
Oregon. As noted earlier, 92% of facilities in this sector employ fewer than 10
individuals, only one facility is considered large, with over 250 employees, and only
9.0% of the sector (12 facilities) is considered medium size, having between 50 and
249 employees. Smaller facilities are likely to manage smaller projects, or act as
subcontractors on large contracts, where the primary contractor or project owner
obtains permits for the project. Only one construction facility held two general
permits, and 11 facilities, 8.3%, held a single general permit. This is in contrast to the
approximately 20% of the transport sector, classified as moderately regulated, that
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held two general permits, and the approximately 43% that held a single general
permit.

Facilities in this group held significantly fewer general and individual permits, and
were regulated on fewer media, than the other groups. As a general rule, this group
held very few permits and was not regulated on multiple media. Only one facility in
the group held an individual permit. This group also has fewer hazardous waste
generators, and all are conditionally exempt except for one small quantity generator.
This group was comprised of the smallest facilities compared to the other groups,
with 32 employees on average, compared to the full sample average of 68 employees.

This cluster can be characterized as consisting of predominantly small
nonmanufacturing facilities that are subject to few permits, and who generate little
hazardous waste. When these facilities are regulated, they are likely to be subject
only to general permits issued for a single media.

To summarize, in this study, highly regulated facilities, and by extension, highly
regulated industries, are characterized by larger manufacturers that are regulated on
multiple media, that are more likely to hold an individual permit, and that generate
larger quantities of hazardous waste than other facilities or industries. Lightly
regulated facilities, and by extension, lightly regulated industries, are characterized
by nonmanufacturers that hold few permits and generate minimal quantities of
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hazardous wastes. Moderately regulated facilities and industries are somewhere in the
middle, and are characterized by nonmanufacturers that hold general permits for one
or two media, and that generate small quantities of hazardous waste. With the
exception of construction facilities being classified as lightly regulated, these
classifications are as expected.

Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Analyses in this study incorporate both binary dummy variables, continuous
variables, and composite indexes, which create single continuous scores from scales
of multiple items, using the normalization technique described by Zeng et al (2007).
Table 9 contains descriptions of the variables shown in the empirical models and
used in the analyses. The table describes the type of variable, the notation used in the
equations for the empirical models, and, for the composite scores, the Cronbach's a.
Additional clarifying notes follow the table.

Table 9: Variable Definitions
Name

Description

Facility Characteristics
Binary variable indicating whether the facility is owned by a parent
PC
company or not: 0 = not owned by a parent firm, 1 = owned by a parent
firm
Binary variable indicating whether the facility or its parent is a
MC
multinational corporation or not: 0 = not a multinational corporation, 1 =
multinational corporation
PUBLIC
Binary variable indicating whether the facility is publicly traded an
exchange: 0 = not publicly traded, 1 = publicly traded
R&D
Binary variable indicating whether the facility or its parent has in-house
research and development (R&D) capacity or not: 0 = no R&D capacity,
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Model
Notation
X

Name

Description

Model

Notation
RETAIL

COMP01

SALES

SIERRA

EMP

STAFF

EXEC

INSP

1 = facility or parent has R&D capacity
Binary variable indicating whether the facility sells directly into retail
markets or not: 0 = facility does not sell into retail markets, 1 = facility
sells into retail markets
Binary variable indicating whether the facility has less than the median
(6) or more than the median number of close competitors reported by the
sample: 0 = facility has fewer than 6 close competitors, 1 = facility has 6
or more close competitors.
Binary variables indicating the level of facility estimated annual sales,
where SALESJd indicates estimated sales of $20-100 million, and
SALES_H indicates sales of more than $100 million. The base is
SALES_L, which indicates less than $20 million in estimated annual
sales.
Variable indicating the number of members of the Sierra Club in the
county in which the facility is located, normalized by county population,
and rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.
Binary variables indicating the number of employees at the facility,
where EMP_M indicates 50-249 employees, and EMP_H indicates 250
or more employees. The base is EMPL, which indicates 10-49
employees.
Binary variable indicating whether or not the facility maintains dedicated
environmental management staff: 0 = facility does not have dedicated
environmental management staff, 1 = facility has dedicated
environmental management staff.
Binary variable indicating whether or not environmental issues are
managed at the executive level (director and above): 0 = environmental
issues are managed at the staff level, 1 = environmental issues are
managed at the executive level.
Variable indicating the number of inspections the facility reported during
2004, rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.

Motivations
CUST

EIG

INV

COMPET

X

M
Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
perceptions of the importance of customer motivations for environmental
management (subparts a, b, and c of Q3 in Appendix A), rescaled to have
a distribution from 0 to 1.
Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
perceptions of the importance of environmental interest group
motivations for environmental management (subparts d, e, and f of Q3 in
Appendix A), rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.
Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
perceptions of the importance of investor and lender motivations for
environmental management (subparts a, b, and c of Q4 in Appendix A),
rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.
Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
perceptions of the importance of competitive motivations for
environmental management (subparts a through f of Q5 in Appendix A),
rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.
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Ml
a = 0.79

M2
a = 0.81
M3
a = 0.80

M4
a = 0.89

Name

Description

Barriers
BARRIER

Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
perceptions of barriers to environmental management (subparts a through
h of Q8 in Appendix A), rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.
Environmental Management

Model
Notation
B
a = 0.87

EM

EM

Sum of the number of environmental practices and voluntary activities at
EMI
the facility. Generated by giving a score of 1 for each practice reported in
Ql 1 of Appendix A, each voluntary environmental management program
reported in Q13 in Appendix A, and a score of 1 if the facility reported to
the TRI. The range of the raw summed scale was 0 to 10. Summed scores
were rescaled to have a distribution of 0 to 1.
PRACINT Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
EM2
perceptions of the intensity of implementation of several general
a = 0.92
environmental management practices (subparts a through k of Q12 in
Appendix A), rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.
P2
Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
EM3
perceptions of the intensity of pollution prevention activities (subparts a
a = 0.82
through f of Q14 in Appendix A), rescaled to have a distribution from 0
toL
VEM
Sum of the number of voluntary activities at the facility. Generated by
VEM
giving a score of 1 for ISO certification reported in Ql 1 of Appendix A,
each voluntary environmental management program reported in Q13 in
Appendix A, and a score of 1 if the facility reported to the TRI. The
range of the raw summed variable was 0 to 6. Summed scores were
rescaled to have a distribution of 0 to 1.
Environmental Performance
EP
EP

Binary variable indicating whether the facility indicated an improvement
in one or more environmental impacts in 2004 (generated from subparts
a, b, c, e, and f of Q17 in Appendix A, which were common to all
sectors): 0 = no improvements were reported, 1 = one or more
improvements were reported.
EPR
Binary variable indicating whether the facility indicated an improvement
in one or more environmental impacts in 2004 (generated from subparts
a, c, and f of Q17 in Appendix A, which were common to all sectors): 0
= no improvements were reported, 1 = one or more improvements were
reported.
EPU
Binary variable indicating whether the facility indicated an improvement
in one or more unregulated environmental impacts in 2004 (generated
from subparts b, and e of Q17 in Appendix A, which were common to all
sectors): 0 = no improvements were reported, 1 = one or more
improvements were reported.
Regulatory Group Classification
REG
Binary variables indicating whether the facility is highly regulated,
moderately regulated, or lightly regulated, derived from the two-step
cluster conducted prior to conducting estimates. REGH indicates the
highly regulated group, REG_M indicates the moderately regulated
group, and the lightly regulated group is the base.
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EP1

EP2

EPS

RG
a = 0.77

Name

Description

Model
Notation

Attitudes
ATTREG

ATTENV

Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
regulatory priorities (subparts d through h of Q4 in Appendix A),
rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1. Although the items in this
scale do not assess management perspectives on regulation per se, the
items capture management priorities with respect to various regulatory
pressures. Priorities are treated as attitudes in this research for the
purposes of comparison with ATTENV.
Composite scale created from ordered response questions regarding
management attitudes toward environmental protection (all subparts of
Q7 in Appendix A), rescaled to have a distribution from 0 to 1.

AR
a = 0.90

AV
a = 0.85

The Sierra Club membership variable is included in analyses to capture
environmental interest group pressures that may affect facility's perceptions of the
importance of such activist groups. Several interest groups operating in Oregon with
an emphasis on environmental issues were contacted to obtain the number of
members in each Oregon County. Counties were used as the geographic unit because
Census data is available at this level, and certain cities in Oregon, such as Portland
and Salem, span more than one County. Therefore, the facility County location was
the most reliable geographic variable.

Only two groups responded: the Sierra Club and the Nature Conservancy, reporting
nearly equal numbers of members, approximately 22,000, statewide (Huette, 2007;
Lepre, 2007). Only the number of members per county was provided, and no
identifying information for any individual was obtained. Therefore, it is unknown
how many individuals in any given County were members of both groups. To avoid
potential duplication, only the Sierra Club membership is used.
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The Sierra Club was chosen because this organization acts through legal and political
channels such as endorsing political candidates and participating in the legislative
process (SC, 2008). The Nature Conservancy works primarily though land purchases
and conservation easements, and does not appear to act through the legal system in
the same manner as the Sierra Club (TNC, 2008). Therefore, the Sierra Club was
chosen as the interest group that best represents environmental interest group
pressures with a potential legal impact on facilities.
Regarding the performance variables, solid waste and recycling were assessed
separately in the survey, and are treated independently in this research. Furthermore,
recycling is treated as a regulated impact, because most localities in Oregon have
mandatory recycling requirements. Solid waste, on the other hand, is largely
unregulated in Oregon, and is treated as an unregulated impact. Although solid waste
generation is undoubtedly impacted to some degree by the level of recycling at a
facility, solid waste contains a mix of materials that are not currently widely accepted
at recycling facilities, such as organic kitchen wastes and food-contaminated
containers. Therefore, despite the potential for recycling to impact solid waste, the
two items are treated independently. However, analysis of such interactions is beyond
the scope of this research, and impacts are considered unregulated if the facility was
not subject to specific regulations limiting the impact or prescribing practices to
manage the impact directly.
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Exploratory Analyses, Hypotheses, and Empirical Model Specifications
This research examines five sets of relationships as described below, conducted as
both exploratory assessments and examinations of hypothesized influences on
environmental management and performance. While the models presented do not
examine influences on environmental management and performance in a linked
equation system, they do examine the level and direction of association between
regulatory constraints and manager's attitudes on the level of importance of other
motivations, as well as the level of overall environmental management, voluntary
environmental management, overall environmental performance, and environmental
performance with respect to regulated and unregulated impacts respectively.

Together, these separate assessments may depict a pattern of association between the
regulatory framework and environmental management strategy, and also isolate those
stages of the environmental management decision-making process in which the
regulatory framework is related to other factors from areas where it is not associated
with other factors. For all assessments, all regulation is assumed to impose
command-and-control restraints on facilities. In this document, such regulation is
termed "prescriptive", and refers to the predominant type of environmental regulation
in the U.S.—regulations which specify a required abatement technology or specific
practices. Based on a search of DEQ records, less than 1% of responding facilities
(five facilities total) hold incentive instruments such as tradable sulfur dioxide (SO2)
permits. In addition, all facilities that hold an incentive instrument hold one or more
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prescriptive instruments. Therefore, regulatory constraints in this study refer to
prescriptive requirements.

A series of independent exploratory examinations was conducted to examine the first
proposition regarding the association between regulatory constraints and nonregulatory influences on environmental management. Separate estimations were
conducted to assess the association between the regulatory framework and managers'
attitudes on the perceived importance of customers, environmental interest groups,
investors and lenders, competitive advantage, and barriers, respectively.

A general specification for the four assessments of motivations, where notation
indicates the variables described in Table 9, is:

M =a«+axX +a2RG +aUR +aUV +e
where
M: An index of non-regulatory motivations being examined, representing
each of the following in turn:
Ml: Customer motivations
M2: Environmental interest group motivations
MS: Investor and lender motivations
M4: Competitive motivations
X: A vector of exogenous facility characteristics
RG: The regulatory group classification
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AR: An index of the manager's attitudes toward regulatory constraints
AV: An index of the manager's attitudes toward environmental protection
e: Error term

A general specification for the estimation of barriers where notation indicates the
variables described in Table 9, is:

B =a0+arX +a2RG +a,AR +a<AV +e
where
B: An index of barriers to environmental management such as costs and time
X: A vector of exogenous characteristics
RG: The regulatory group classification
AR: An index of the manager's attitudes toward regulatory constraints
AV: An index of the manager's attitudes toward environmental protection
e: Error term

OLS regression can be used to test whether the level of regulation, as indicated by the
membership in the highly regulated, moderately regulated, or lightly regulated group,
is significantly associated with a facility's score on the motivational or barrier index
in question.

The regulatory group classification could be negatively associated with any of the
motivations, because facilities in the moderately and highly regulated groups may
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prioritize complying with regulations over satisfying other stakeholder interests.
Regulatory group membership could also be positively associated with any of the
influences for different reasons, a few of which are suggested below.

Regulatory group classification could be positively associated with the perceived
importance of customer motivations for environmental management due to
synergistic effects. For example, a facility may ensure it is in compliance in order to
be able to promote their compliance record to customers, or the facility may attempt
to differentiate their products or services in an effort to gain market share by
exceeding regulatory compliance.

Regarding environmental interest group pressures, regulatory group classification
could be positively associated for a variety of reasons. First, to the extent that more
highly regulated firms may be larger, wealthier, or operating in industries with
reputations for having substantial environmental impacts, highly regulated facilities
may be more visible to interest groups. Interest groups may target these facilities
either adversely, through legal action or boycotts—or these groups could target
facilities as potential partners in environmental protection strategies. For example, an
interest group may be willing to provide labor for a restoration project funded by a
facility.
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For investor and lender pressures, to the extent that highly regulated facilities face
increased risks of severe environmental harm through accidental spills or releases due
to the nature of their businesses, the regulatory group classification may capture this
increased risk and therefore reflect a positive association. Conversely, more stringent
regulatory requirements could signal a reduced likelihood of risk, given that stringent
requirements are designed to reduce this risk.

Regarding competitive advantage, the theoretical and case study evidence presented
earlier suggests that regulated facilities may engage in strategic behavior with respect
to regulation, or that facilities facing stringent constraints may achieve such
advantage through the inherent waste reductions and productivity increases
associated with reduced pollution. In the latter case, the theory particularly suggests
that a facility facing stringent constraints may be at an advantage over facilities in
regions with less stringent constraints. This study does not directly assess any of
these theories; however, it seems likely that facilities would pursue competitive
advantage only if those facilities perceive such advantage as important and feasible.
To the extent that facilities subject to greater regulatory constraints perceive
competitive advantage as worthwhile and feasible, regulatory group classification
could be positively associated with the perceived importance of competitive
advantage.
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Importantly, though, previous studies have not examined samples consisting of such
a large proportion of small facilities as the sample used in this research, and case
studies demonstrating that companies have achieved competitive advantage through
strategic behavior with respect to regulation have focused on very large,
multinational organizations (Esty and Winston, 2006; Reinhardt, 2000). It is likely
that the small facilities in this study view regulation as a constraint rather than an
opportunity. In this sample, few facilities have R&D capacity, which appears to be an
important component to a strategic regulatory strategy. In the absence of R&D
capacity, facilities are assumed to posses few patentable resources, and therefore,
assumed not to perceive substantial benefits to strategic behavior with respect to
regulation. In addition, this sample includes few facilities that are multinational
corporations, and so it is likely that few facilities in this sample would perceive an
advantage over facilities operating in regions with less stringent regulatory
constraints. Therefore, it is possible that regulatory group classification could be
negatively associated with the perceived importance of competitive pressures as an
important motivation for environmental management. Given that a perception of the
importance of competitive advantage is not explicitly stated in existing theory, results
of this research could inform future theoretical work, particularly involving smaller
facilities.

The perception of the importance of barriers could differ among facilities in different
regulatory groups because more highly regulated facilities already incur compliance
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costs which may include such substantial expenses as maintaining dedicated staff to
manage compliance issues. Highly and moderately regulated facilities may therefore
perceive additional costs as less burdensome than other facilities, given that
incremental costs of additional requirements or voluntary activities may not pose as
great a burden to these facilities as startup costs would pose for lightly regulated
facilities. This could be especially true if the more highly regulated facilities are able
to take advantage of economies of scale and leverage existing compliance efforts in
their voluntary efforts. It is also possible that the prescriptive nature of regulation
poses sufficient barriers in and of itself so that other barriers are not viewed as
substantial by comparison. Conversely, more highly regulated facilities could
perceive their compliance efforts as burdensome enough that any additional costs or
time required for voluntary efforts could be perceived as more important barriers to
such activity by these facilities than lightly regulated facilities.

While the foregoing analysis was exploratory, remaining analyses assess
hypothesized relationships. The second proposition regarding the association between
regulatory constraints and the level of environmental management undertaken is
tested in a series of independent analyses of alternative measures of environmental
management intensity (hypotheses la, lb, lc, and 2) as described below.
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Hypothesis la:
Ho: Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of the
number of environmental management activities at the facility, ceteris
paribus.
Hi: Regulatory group membership will be a significant positive determinant
of the number of environmental management activities at the facility, ceteris
paribus.

Hypothesis lb:
Ho: Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of the
intensity of general environmental management activity at the facility, ceteris
paribus.
Hi: Regulatory group membership will be a significant positive determinant
of the intensity of general environmental management activity at the facility,
ceteris paribus.

Hypothesis lc:
Ho'. Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of the
intensity of pollution prevention activity at the facility, ceteris paribus.
Hf. Regulatory group membership will be a significant positive determinant
of the intensity of pollution prevention activity at the facility, ceteris paribus.
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A general specification, where notation indicates the variables described in Table 9,
is:

EM ^a^a.X

+

aM

+

a,B +atRG +a,AR +a6AV +e

where
EM: An index of environmental management intensity, representing each of
the following measures in turn:
EMI: The number of practices and voluntary activities
EM2: The intensity of general practice implementation
EM3: The intensity of pollution prevention activities
X: A vector of exogenous facility characteristics
M: A series of indexes of non-regulatory motivations, each included in all
estimations:
Ml: Customer motivations
M2: Environmental interest group motivations
M3: Investor and lender motivations
M4: Competitive motivations
B: An index of barriers
RG: The regulatory group classification
AR: An index of the manager's attitudes toward regulatory constraints
AV:An index of the manager's attitudes toward environmental protection
e: Error term
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Again, OLS can be used to test whether the level of regulation, as indicated by the
group membership, is a significant determinant of a facility's environmental
management efforts. Note that while the exploratory analyses described above treated
the motivational and barrier variables as exogenous, in these estimations, they are
endogenous, and considered to influence environmental management strategy as
theorized.

Regulatory group membership is anticipated to be positively associated with all three
measures of environmental management, because facilities subject to regulation
typically must implement at least minimal practices in order to comply with permits.
However, given that the three measures of environmental management each include
some activities that are voluntary or likely to be voluntary (program participation,
public release of information), it is possible that regulatory group membership would
be negatively associated with environmental management if stringent prescriptive
regulations prohibit innovation or impose high compliance costs that limit
overcompliance or other voluntary activities. The hypotheses follow theory and
empirical evidence demonstrating that regulatory pressures are a significant positive
influence on environmental management, and therefore, regulatory group
classification is expected to be positively associated with all three measures of
environmental management.
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Hypothesis 2:
Ho: Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of
voluntary environmental management at the facility, ceteris paribus.
Hf. Regulatory group membership will be a significant positive determinant
of voluntary environmental management at the facility, ceteris paribus.

The general specification, as for the estimation for environmental management (EM)
is:

VEM = a0+atX +aM +a,B +a*RG +a5AR +asAV +e
where all independent variables are identical to the model for hypotheses la, lb, and
lc, and the dependent, VEM, is an index of the number of voluntary environmental
management activities.

Regulatory group membership could be positively associated with voluntary activity
if the facility seeks competitive advantage as described earlier, or if the processes
required for regulatory compliance can be used to reduce unregulated impacts as
well. However, given the prescriptive nature of regulation captured in this study, and
the small size of the majority of facilities in this sample, regulatory group
membership could be negatively associated with voluntary activity. Smaller facilities
may lack resources to exceed compliance or engage in extensive voluntary activity
after meeting regulatory obligations. However, based on empirical studies described
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earlier that have found regulatory pressures to be a significant determinant of
voluntary program participation, regulatory group classification is hypothesized to be
positively associated with voluntary effort in this research.

The third proposition regarding the association between regulatory constraints on the
level of environmental performance is assessed in a series of independent analyses of
alternative measures of performance (hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c) as described below.

Hypothesis 3a:
Ho'. Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of
environmental performance, ceteris paribus.
Hf. Regulatory group membership will be a significant determinant of
environmental performance, ceteris paribus.

Hypothesis 3b:
Ho'. Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of
environmental performance with respect to regulated impacts, ceteris paribus.
Hi: Regulatory group membership will be a significant determinant of
environmental performance with respect to regulated impacts, ceteris paribus.
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Hypothesis 3c:
H0: Regulatory group membership will not be a significant determinant of
environmental performance with respect to unregulated impacts, ceteris
paribus.
Hi'. Regulatory group membership will be a significant determinant of
environmental performance with respect to unregulated impacts, ceteris
paribus.

The general specification is:

EP -a. + a^X +a2EM +a>M +a,B +atRG +a,AR +asAV +e
where
EP: A binary variable indicating performance outcome being examined,
representing each of the following probabilities, tested in turn:
EP1: Indicates whether the facility improved their performance in one
or more impact areas
EP2: Indicates whether the facility improved their performance in one
or more regulated impact areas
EP3: Indicates whether the facility improved their performance in one
or more unregulated impact areas
EM: The index of the number of environmental management practices and
programs described above
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All other variables are as described in the previous model descriptions. This model is
estimated as a logistic regression, predicting the binary environmental performance
outcome where 0 = no improvement, 1= improvement.

Regulatory group membership could be expected to be positively associated with
environmental performance, because firms that have already implemented abatement
technologies may be able to 1) take advantage of previous learning or experience and
transfer that knowledge to voluntary environmental management, or 2) take
advantage of economies of scale by using existing technology to reduce unregulated
impacts. For example, a system that treats wastewater discharge may be able to be
modified to reduce water use, or technologies that reduce toxics or hazardous wastes
may reduce unregulated solid wastes at the same time, depending on the system and
process or product composition.

Alternatively, it is possible that regulatory group membership would be negatively
associated with environmental performance if stringent prescriptive regulations
prohibit innovation or impose high compliance costs. The economic literature on
environmental performance is limited by available data and a lack of standard metrics
to provide meaningful comparisons. This study is affected by these limitations as
well. Therefore, the environmental performance estimates are exploratory and
suggestive at best, and no directions are hypothesized for any of the three
estimations.
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Note that although this research proposes that management attitudes toward
regulation and environmental protection may best be considered separately in
analyses and these variables are included in the estimations, no specific hypotheses
have been proposed to test these effects. The general supposition is that these
different sets of attitudes could have different associations with motivations,
management, and performance. Based on evidence from Nakamura, Tkahashi, and
Vertinsky (2001), and Ervin et al (2008), the attitudes toward environmental
protection would be expected to be positively associated with environmental
management and performance. Attitudes toward regulation could be either positively
or negatively associated with environmental management and performance based on
conflicting evidence in the literature. While Nakamura Nakamura, Tkahashi, and
Vertinsky (2001), found managers' perceptions of control over environmental
impacts positively associated with the presence of a formal policy and the level of
policy integration, Cordano and Frieze (2000) found that perceived control was
negatively associated with preferences for pollution prevention activity. Additionally,
this is the first study known to include a measure of regulatory pressure derived from
regulatory permits held by the facility as well as respondents' attitudes toward
regulation. Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky (2001) used a factor derived from
responses to a survey about perceived government pressures.

Given that the economic literature on managers' attitudes is as yet limited and
evidence is mixed, there is little basis on which to form directional hypotheses.
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Therefore, no hypotheses have been proposed regarding attitudes. Findings in this
research are intended to contribute to the creation of theory.

Statistical Procedures
Analyses were conducted in Stata/SE 10.0. Estimations of the motivations, barriers,
and environmental management intensity were conducted on both the full sample,
with missing observations excluded listwise (which resulted in varying sample sizes),
and also on a stable sample of respondents which had answered every question used
in the analyses. The estimations for the performance variables were conducted on the
stable sample only, due to the limited performance data obtained.

Estimations of the motivations, barriers, and environmental management variables
were conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) to predict scores for the
normalized, rescaled continuous composite dependent variables. Due to the violation
of the assumption of normality in several variables, standard errors were jackknifed.
Jackknifing is similar to bootstrapping, where the estimate is conducted on repeated
samples of the data. Unlike bootstrapping, which draws a specified number of
random samples, jackknifing drops each observation from the sample in turn, and
replicates the analysis without the observation. The number of replications therefore
equals the number of observations. The jackknife process creates more reliable
confidence intervals when the assumption of normality is violated than the
confidence intervals generated by regression without replication.
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To test the assumption of no heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
(BP/CW) test for heteroscedasticity was conducted for each estimation. The BP/CW
chi-square test examines the null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal
versus the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative function of one or
more variables. Significant chi-square values indicate that heteroscedasticity is
present. Where the BP/CW test is significant, Huber-White robust standard errors are
also reported. Robust standard errors are commonly reported in the economic
literature when the assumption of no heteroscedasiticy is violated. Finally, tests for
multicollinearity were conducted on each estimation, and no problems were
detected—variance inflation factors were well below the threshold of concern for all
variables in all models. Results of those tests are omitted for brevity. For more
information on OLS regression, significance testing, and treatment of standard errors,
refer to Cohen et al (2003), Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), or Greene (1997).

Estimations for the three environmental performance variables were conducted as
logistic regressions to predict the probability that facilities either had improved
environmental performance or had not improved environmental performance, using a
binary dependent variable where 0 indicates no improvement, and 1 indicates
improvement. Logistic regression is commonly used in the economic literature and is
similar to the probit models used by Nakamura, Tkahashi, and Vertinsky (2001) and

Videras and Alberini (2000) described earlier. Logistic regression relaxes typical
assumptions about independent variables and is particularly useful when the
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dependent variable is expected to be related nonlinearly to one or more of the
independent variables. Coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood in an
iterative procedure that determines the direction and size of change in the coefficients
that maximizes the likelihood of obtaining the observed frequencies (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 2001).

The Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) goodness of fit test was conducted on all logistic
regressions. A nonsignificant result fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable, and
indicates a good model fit. This does not indicate that the model explains much of the
variance, but only that it explains variance to a significant degree. However, a lack of
significance in the H-L test does not necessarily indicate a powerful or parsimonious
model. Models may appear to be a good fit simply because of the number of
independent variables included in the estimation (Garson, 2008).
The pseudo R2, is also reported for each estimation, which is calculated as

where Lj is the model with independent variables, and Lo is the constant only model.
As with the standard R2 reported for OLS estimates, a larger pseudo R2 indicates
greater explanatory power.
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Finally, the negative log likelihood (-ZX)is reported for each estimation. The -LL
represents the probability that the observed values of the dependent variable may be
predicted from the observed values of the independent variables. While the
probability varies from 0 to 1, the log likelihood (the log of the probability) varies
from 0 to -oo. The -LL is calculated through iteration using maximum likelihood
estimation. Given that maximum likelihood under a perfectly fitting model is 1, in
general, -LL values closer to 1 indicate better model fit than more negative values
(Garson, 2008; Cohen, 2003).

Coefficients are reported in logit form, which is the function of the predicted
probability that is linearly related to the independent variable. The logit ranges from
- co to + oo as the predicted probability granges from 0 to 1. The logit is centered on
0.5 and is given by (Cohen et al, 2003):

logit = In

\l-Pu
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Results
Results are presented on two samples for all estimates except for the estimates of
environmental performance. Tables 10 and 11 describe the summary statistics and
proportions for variables used in the models for the full and stable samples,
respectively. Results of the estimations follow the summary tables.

Key to the Tables
Standardized coefficients are reported (and intercepts excluded) because continuous
variables were normalized and rescaled to accommodate the different scales used for
different items. Therefore, coefficients indicate the amount the dependent variable
changes when the continuous independent variable changes by one standard
deviation. In the case of dummies, the coefficient indicates the amount the dependent
variable changes when the independent incurs a unit change from 0 to 1 (Garson,
2008). Jackknifed standard errors and significance tests are reported first, with robust
standard errors and significance tests, where reported, shown in parenthesis. In the
results discussions, standard thresholds are strictly enforced, and results that
approach but do not meet the thresholds are not indicated as significant. For example,
a result with ap-value of 0.052 is reported as significant at the 10% level, while
p = 0.121 is not reported as significant.
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Table 10: Variable Summary Statistics for Standardized and Dummy Variables
Full Sample
Stable Sample
Name

N

M

SD

N

SD

M

Facility Characteristics
PC

667

.21

.41

153

.20

.40

MC

659
641

.13

.33

153

.10

.11

666
658
582
592
592
668

.19
.45
.46
.16
.05
.39

.31
.40
.50
.49
.36
.22
.25

153
153
153
153
153
153
153

.08
.23
.45
.50
.22
.07
.36

.31
.28
.42
.50
.50
.41
.26
.25

EMPM

659

.22

.42

153

659

.22

153

STAFF

670
664
633

.05
.30

.29
.05

.46

EMPH

.46
.49
.04

153
153
153

.29
.64
.00

.45
.48
.03

.40
.28
.50
.42

.29
.27
.31

153
153
153

.29
.27
.27

.27

153

.43
.32
.31
.43

478
.48
Environmental Management and Performance
EM
610
.16
VEM
623
.06
PRACINT
511
.41
P2
565
.70
EP
EPR
EPU
Regulatory Group Classification

.23

153

.43

.26

.19
.13
.23
.20
-

153
153
153
153
153
153
153

.20
.07
.43
.71
.67
.56
.22

.21
.15
.24
.21
.47
.50
.41

REG_M
REGJH
Attitudes
ATTREG
ATTENV

PUBLIC
R&D
RETAIL
COMP01
SALES_M
SALES_H
SIERRA

EXEC
INSP
Motivations
CUST
EIG
INV
COMPET

613
622
598
601

.60
.00

.21

.27

Barriers
BARRIER

666
666

.18
.42

.39
.49

153
153

.16
.51

.36
.50

581
578

.56
.68

.30
.20

153
153

.57
.68

.28
.21
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Table 11: Proportions of Various Facility Types in the Full Sample and Stable
Sample
Full sample
N=6S9
%

Stable sample
JV=153
%

Construction (236)

19.7%

20.3%

Manufacturing (Combined)

40.5%

50.3%

Food (311)

25.2%

19.6%

Wood (311)

17.4%

24.2%

Electronics (334)

7.8%

6.5%

Transport (484)

18.9%

15.7%

Accommodation (721)

20.8%

13.7%

Employees < 50

72.8%

66.0%

Employees 50-249

22.2%

28.4%

Employees 250+

5.0%

4.6%

Publicly traded

10.4%

8.5%

Multinational Corporation

12.8%

10.5%

R&D

19.4%

22.9%

Retail

44.7%

45.1%

Competitors S 6

45.7%

51.0%

Owned by a parent

21.3%

20.3%

Highly regulated

41.6%

51.0%

Moderately regulated

18.6%

15.7%

Lightly regulated

39.8%

33.3%

No practices implemented

38.5%

32.0%

At least one practice implemented

61.5%

68%

No inspections

58.3%

58.8%

At least one inspection

41.7%

41.2%

No voluntary activities

76.1%

72.5%

At least one voluntary activity

23.9%

27.5%

Characteristic
Sector
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Results for Customer Motivations
For the estimation of customer influences (CUST), the BP/CW test was not
significant, so the null hypothesis that no heteroscedasticity is present is retained, and
robust standard errors are not reported. The R2 values for both samples are modest,
explaining less than one-half of the variation in perceptions of the importance of
customer motivations for environmental management. The results for both samples
provide support for the proposition, indicating that members of the moderately and
highly regulated groups (REGM and REGH) view customer motivations as
significantly less important than lightly regulated facilities. The relationship between
regulatory group membership and customer motivations is among the strongest
associations in the estimation, but is not as strong as the attitude variables, and results
are significant at the 1% level.

Managers' attitudes toward environmental protection (ATTENV) and toward
regulation (ATTREG) are significantly positively associated with perceptions of the
importance of customer motivations in both samples at the 1% level, with the
exception that ATTENV slightly exceeds the 1% level (p = 0.011) in the stable
sample, and these are the largest associations in this estimation. It is unknown
whether a manager would perceive environmental protection as important because
customers express a preference for environmentally preferable products and services.
It is also possible that, a manager motivated to protect the environment faces barriers
to communicating the importance of environmental protection as a business strategy
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throughout the organization (Cordano and Frieze, 2000). Customers are an important
motivator for business, and a manager seeking to promote a strategy may well seek
evidence of customer interests to support their position. These results do not suggest
a cause and effect relationship, but do indicate a positive association between
management attitudes toward environmental protection and perceptions of the
importance of customer motivations. Estimation results are presented in Table 12.

Table 12: Factors Associated with Customer Motivations (CUST)
Full Sample
Stable Sample
iV=331 ,R2=36,Adj.R2= .33
JV"= 1 5 3 , ^ = 4 2 , ^ / . ^ = .36
Variable Coeff !SE
SE
t
Coeff
t
P
P
PC
-.098
-1.62
.037
-1.91
.058
-.140
.063
.108
MC
.126
.050
0.85
2.18
.030
.074
.083
.395
PUBLIC
-.188
.054
0.05
-3.51
.001
.005
.098
.959
R&D
.161
1.72
.040
.004
.155
.063
.087
2.93
3.24
RETAIL
.160
.029
.047
2.8
.00
.001
.213
COMP01
-.037
.027
.428
-.076
.043
-1.03
.303
-0.79
.168
SALESJVT
.041
.002
2.33
.021
3.10
.188
.057
SALES_H
1.02
-.011
.081
.865
.307
-0.17
.115
.127
SIERRA
.135
2.62
.010
.050
2.97
.003
.160
.070
-.039
-0.90
EMP_M
.039
.369
-0.59
.556
-.065
.047
EMP_H
.055
.082
.384
0.23
.822
0.87
.026
.159
REG_M
REG_H
ATTREG
ATTENV
BP/CWz?

-.169
-.210
.292
.302

.042
.033
.057
.077

-3.08
-3.67
5.01
5.67
.61

.002
<001
<.001
<.001
.434

-.338
-.335
.289
.228

.060
.050
.093
.126

-4.55
-3.89
3.21
2.57

<.001
<001
<.001
.011

.41

.521

The positive association between managers' attitudes toward regulatory constraints
and the perceived importance of customer motivations suggests the presence of
synergistic effects described earlier. Facilities may ensure compliance in order to
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maintain a positive image as a responsible corporate citizen, thereby appealing to

customers. Additionally, facilities attempting to differentiate their products or
services in an effort to gain market share by exceeding regulatory compliance could
be motivated by customer desire for environmentally friendly products and services.
Another possibility is that managers view all their various stakeholders as important,
and that managers who prioritize establishing good relationships with regulators also
prioritize good relationships with customers. This research does not attempt to
answer these questions, but suggests that there are associations to be explored further
in the management and behavioral literature.

Other factors that are significantly positively associated with the perceived
importance of customer motivations in both samples at least at the 10% level are: the
presence of R&D capacity (R&D), selling directly into retail markets (RETAIL), a
moderate level of annual sales (SALES_M) compared to a low level of sales and the
number of Sierra Club members in the County in which the facility operates
(SIERRA). In addition, in the full sample, multinational corporation status (MC) is
positively associated with the view that customer motivations are important to
environmental management at the 5% level. These results are logically sensible,
because multinational status, R&D capacity, higher sales, and public trading status
are characteristics that tend to be associated with larger, more visible facilities. These
facilities may perceive a greater need to satisfy the desire of customers and other
members of the public for environmentally friendly goods and services. Retailers
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would also be expected to be more conscientious of customers. The significance of
SIERRA may suggest that facilities view customers and members of activist
organizations as components of the general public they seek to maintain relationships
with. The significant negative association for parent company ownership (PC) at the
10% level could suggest that facilities place more importance on directives from the
owner than other stakeholders. Similarly for PUBLIC, negatively associated at the
1% level, publicly traded facilities may place more importance on shareholder
demands than customer demands for environmental management, compared to
privately held facilities.

The negative, although not significant, association for moderately sized facilities
(EMP_M) and facilities with high sales (SALESH) may indicate a non-linear
relationship between facility size and environmental management. Previous studies
conducted on the data used in this research have also indicated that such a
relationship may exist (Ervin et al, 200; Hall, 2006).

Results for Environmental Interest Group Motivations
For the estimation of environmental interest group motivations (EIG), the BP/CW
test was significant, so robust standard errors are reported. The R2 values for both
samples are modest, explaining less than one-half of the variation in perceptions of
the importance of environmental interest group motivations for environmental
management. The results in general do not support the proposition that regulatory
144

group membership is significantly associated with the importance of environmental
interest group motivations for environmental management. The only significant result
is that membership in the highly regulated group (REGIT) is significantly negatively
associated with perceptions of the importance of environmental interest group
motivations at the 5% level in the full sample. These results suggest that in general,
regulatory constraints are not significantly associated with the perceptions of the
importance of environmental interest group motivations, but that highly regulated
facilities may perceive that they are less likely to be targeted for interest group action
due to the stringent regulatory structure that impacts their environmental
performance.

Managers' attitudes toward environmental protection (ATTENV) and regulation
(ATTREG) are significantly positively associated with perceptions of environmental
interest group motivations in both samples at the 1% level, with the exception that
ATTENVslightly exceeds the 1% level (p = 0.014) with the jackknifed standard error
in the stable sample. Attitudes again exhibit the largest association with the
perception of the importance of environmental interest groups, and in particular
ATTREG, with a coefficient double of that of ATTENV. As with customer
motivations, it is unknown whether a manager would perceive environmental
protection as important because environmental interest groups publicize the
importance of environmental protection and pose a threat, or whether a manager
motivated to protect the environment would view these groups' motivations as
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Table 13: Factors Associated with Environmental Interest Group Motivations
(EIG)
Variable
PC
MC
PUBLIC
R&D
RETAIL
COMP01
SALES_M
SALESJH
SIERRA
EMPM
EMP_H
REG_M
REG_H
ATTREG
ATTENV
BP/CW)?

Full Sample
Stable Sample
N= 337, /? 2 =38, Adj. R2=.36
N=\53,R2=A3,Adj.R2= =.42
Coeff
Coeff
SE
t
SE
t
P
P
.641
.028
.036
.50
.617 -.044
.062
-0.47
(.604)
(.035)
(.600)
(.53)
(.055) (-0.52)
.054
.062
0.71
.478
.193
1.88
.058
.088
(.024)
(.054)
(.77)
(.444)
(.072) (2.28)
-.101 .064
-2.10
.037
.155 -.228
-1.43
.102
(.013)
(-.059) (-1.54)
(.124)
(.085) (-2.51)
.151
.038
2.57
.011
.287
.054
3.29
.001
(.001)
(.036) (2.70)
(.007)
(.050) (3.54)
.110
.023
.106
1.34
.183
.025 2.283
.042
(.157)
(.024) (2.36)
(.019)
(.039) (1.42)
.025
.024
.585
.064
0.90
.370
0.55
.037
(.574)
(.343)
(.023) (0.56)
(.035) (0.95)
.026
.671
.051
.051
.607
.041
0.43
0.63
(.579)
(.658)
(.039) (0.44)
(.059) (0.56)
-.019
.456
.078
-0.29
.775
.079
0.75
.107
(.373)
(.071) (-0.31)
(.753)
(.090) (0.89)
-.003
.954 -.000
.046
-0.06
.082
-0.00
.998
(.952)
(.998)
(.045) (-0.06)
(.078) (-0.00)
.052
0.54
.588
0.85
.395
.054
.036
.058
(.564)
(.035) (0.88)
(.380)
(.054) (0.58)
.161
2.14
.134
0.86
.033
1.27
.205
.132
(.129)
(.078) (2.36)
(.019)
(.110) (1.53)
.522
-.000
-0.00
1.00
.053
0.64
.036
.060
(1.00)
(.507)
(.035) (-0.00)
(.058) (0.67)
-.124
-2.14
-1.29
.198
.030
.033 -.122
.049
(.177)
(.030) (-2.19)
(.029)
(.047) (-1.36)
.429
.369
<001
.051
8745
<001
.085
4.01
(<001)
(.049) (7.65) (<001)
(.080) (4.30)
.214
4.12
.217
.014
.067
<001
.110
2.49
(.006)
(.065) (4.26) « 0 0 1 )
(.100) (2.77)
24.90 <0.001
.019
5.54

support for their position, and cite this motivational factor when promoting strategic
environmental management in the organization. As with customer motivations, these
results do not suggest a cause and effect relationship, but do indicate a positive
association between management attitudes toward environmental protection and
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perceptions of the importance of interest groups' influence on environmental
management.

The positive association between managers' attitudes toward regulatory constraints
(ATTREG) and the perceived importance of environmental interest groups possibly
suggests the presence of synergistic effects suggested earlier. Facilities attempting to
differentiate their products or services in an effort to gain market share by exceeding
regulatory compliance could be seeking to gain the approval of, or avoid adverse
publicity by, environmental interest groups as well. Another possibility, as mentioned
before, is that managers view various stakeholders as important, and that managers
who prioritize establishing good relationships with regulators also prioritize good
relationships with environmental interest groups. Again, no answers to these
questions are offered here.

The only other factor that is significantly positively associated with the perceived
importance of environmental interest groups in both samples is the presence of R&D
capacity (R&D). The association is significant at the 1% level in all cases except for
the estimation with the jackknifed standard error in the full sample, which just
exceeds this level (p = .011). This result suggests that facilities with R&D capacity
may feel at greater risk of adverse action by environmental interest groups due to the
nature of their operations and impacts inherent to their businesses. In this study, these
facilities are primarily mid-to-large manufacturers. Facilities with R&D capacity in
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this study have an average of 220 employees, compared to the average of 68 for the

sample overall, and 87% are manufacturers. Both factors increase facility visibility
and the likelihood of increased emissions and wastes. The positive associations for
large facilities (EMP_H) and RETAIL, both significant at the 5% level in the full
sample, also support the idea that large, visible facilities consider environmental
interest group motivations more important than other facilities.

The negative significant association for PUBLIC in the stable sample (at the 5%
level) is perhaps an indication that publicly traded facilities place more importance on
investors than other stakeholders. Another possibility may be that these facilities
perceive fewer threats of sanctions due to the amount of information they provide to
the public, or due to positive alliances between facilities and interest groups as
suggested earlier.

The negative coefficient for SIERRA is surprising, but is not significant. This may
reflect the fact that the measures of environmental interest group motivations were
the lowest rated motivations for environmental management in this study. On
average, the rating for all three items in the index of environmental interest group
motivations (M=2.14, SD=\.21) was the lowest rating for all the motivational
influences, indicating that environmental interest groups are only slightly influential.
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Results for Investor and Lender Motivations
For the estimation of investor and lender motivations (INV), the BP/CW test was not
significant, so robust standard errors are not reported. The R2 values for both samples
are modest, but slightly higher than the two previous models, explaining
approximately one-half of the variation in perceptions of the importance of investor
and lender motivations. The results do not support the proposition that regulatory
group membership is significantly associated with the importance of investor and
lender motivations. Interestingly, membership in the highly regulated group
(REGH) is negative and significant at the 15% level (p = 0.132). In addition to
suggesting that highly regulated facilities place less emphasis on investor and lender
pressures than lightly regulated facilities, this result could suggest that highly
regulated facilities have less flexibility to meet investor desires for reduced risk of
environmental incidents than other facilities, because stringent regulation is
restricting innovation.

Interestingly, other than RETAIL, which is positive and significant at the 5% level in
the full sample, the only significant associations with the perception of the
importance of investor and lender motivations are management attitudes toward
regulation and environmental protection. ATTREG and ATTENV are positive and
significant at the 1 % level in both samples, and the association is stronger in this
estimation than in the estimations for the perceived importance of customers and
environmental interest groups. Possible reasons are as stated for the previous two
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Table 14: Factors Associated with Investor and Lender Motivations (INV)

Variable
PC
MC
PUBLIC
R&D
RETAIL

Full Sample
Stable Sample
N= 153, R2=.53, Adj. R2=.48
N= 332, R2=A$, Adj. 1?=.45
Coeff
t
t
SE
Coeff
SE
P
P
.434
.051 .038
1.02
.310
0.78
.056
.051
-0.15
-.073 .048
-1.37
.172
-.016
.101
.879
.742
.927
-0.33
-.006 .062
-0.09
-.035
.108
1.17
.242
.364
.059 .039
.069
.052
0.91
.096 .027
2.15
.032
.086
1.16
.246
.043

COMP01

-.013

.025

-0.30

.761

-.093

.037

-1.46

.147

SALES_M

.053

.037

1.12

.263

-.007

.055

-0.09

.928

SALES_H
SIERRA
EMPJVL
EMP_H
REG_M
REG_H
ATTREG
ATTENV

.058
-.035
-.050
.036
.036
-.051
.460
.321

.075
.056
.032
.030
.042
.042
.053
.074

1.03
-0.74
-1.07
-1.04
0.68
0.68
8.86
6.57

.304

-.013
-.086
-.022
.103
.069
-.118
.423
.395

.144
.079
.054
.177
.054
.045
.090
.109

-0.10
-1.24
-0.26
0.80
1.00
-1.52
4.79
5.09

.919
.217
.797
.424
.318
.132
<.001
<001

0.01

.919

BP/CW^

1.71

.462
.285
.540
.300
.494
<.001
<.001
.191

estimations. It is possible that managers perceive regulations and environmental
protection as important because investors perceive these issues as important and are
signaling their desire for the facility to strictly comply with regulation to reduce risk.
Again, it is also possible that a manager motivated to protect the environment is
seeking justifications for their position, and is keeping abreast of the movement
toward green fund screening and other evidence of the growing importance of a good
environmental record in the financial markets.

The positive association between managers' attitudes toward regulatory constraints
{ATTREG) and the importance of investor and lender motivations possibly suggests
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the presence of synergistic effects suggested earlier. Facilities attempting to reduce
regulatory enforcement pressures or other costly compliance requirements through
overcompliance may be motivated in part by a desire to attract investors or create
value for shareholders. The same could be true for facilities seeking to reduce
environmental risk by overcomplying or implementing voluntary abatement in a
strategic attempt to preempt future regulation, which imposes costs on a facility that
in turn affect investor value.

Results for Competitive Motivations
For the estimation of competitive motivations (COMPET), the BP/CW test was
significant for the full model, so robust standard errors are reported. The R values for
both samples explain approximately one-half of the variation in perceptions of
competitive motivations. The results support the proposition—regulatory group
membership is significantly associated with perceptions of competitive motivations
in both samples. (The components of COMPET included such measures as the
facility's perception that environmentally friendly actions can differentiate the
facility, lead to process or product innovations, reduce costs, and attract quality
employees [subparts of question 5 in Appendix A]). The signs of the coefficients are
negative, indicating that facilities in both the moderately regulated (REGM) and
highly regulated (REG_H) groups view competitive motivations for environmental
management as less important than lightly regulated facilities. In the full sample,
REGHis

significant at the 5% level, and REG_M is significant at the 10% level, and
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Table 15: Factors Associated with Competitive Motivations (COMPET)
Full Sample
Stable Sample
N= 332, R2=.51, Adj. Rl-=.49
N= 153, R2=.55, Adj. R2--=.50
SE
t
Variable Coeff
Coeff
SE
t
P
P
PC
-.008
.030
.862 . -.028
-0.17
.043
-0.42
.676
(.029) (-0.1)
(.855)
(.638)
(.038) (-0.47)
MC
-.004
.732
.038
-0.08
.939
-.033
.083
-0.34
(.934)
(.036) (-0.08)
(.068) (-0.42)
(.675)
.052
PUBLIC
-.091
-.165
.099
.050
.087
0.54
.588
(.074)
(.524)
(.048) (-1.79)
(.073) (0.64)
R&D
.041
.032
0.86
.391
.028
.047
0.37
.712
(.044) (0.39)
(031) (0.90)
(.368)
(.696)
RETAIL
.122
.025
2.67
.008
.170
.035
2.53
.012
(.024) (.2.76)
(.006)
(.034) (2.63)
(.009)
COMP01
.023
-1.12
.263
.033
-2.14
.034
-.047
-.135
(.022) (-1.15)
(.250)
(.031) (-2.28)
(.024)
SALES_M
.113
.033
2.42
.016
.207
.053
2.47
.015
(.032) (2.52)
(.012)
(.050) (2.63)
(.010)
SALES_H
0.74
-.031
.083
-0.45
.653
.066
.091
.459
(.076) (-0.50)
(.621)
(.073) (0.93) (..355)
.664
SIERRA
.019
.045
0.43
.062
.064
1.00
.319
(.043) (0.45)
(.651)
(.061) (1.05)
(.296)
EMP_M
.030
-.027
.576
-.112
.045
-1.43
.155
-0.56
(.029) (.-0.58)
(.564)
(.042) (-1.52)
(.130)
EMP_H
.060
.065
1.14
.254
.090
.111
1.02
.310
(.059) (1.26)
(.208)
(.089) (1.27)
(.207)
REG_M
-.089
.033
.051
.015
-1.91
-.160
.047
-2.46
(.032) (-1.95)
(.052)
(.045) (-2.55)
(.012)
REG_H
-.117
.028
.024
-.257
.002
-2.27
.042
-3.20
(.028) (-2.31)
(.021)
(.041) (-3.30) (<.001)
ATTREG
.339
.043
7.26
<001
.392
<.001
.076
4.81
(.042) (7.47) (<.001)
(.072) (5.08) (<.001)
ATTENV
.058
<001
.493
11.59
.413
.098
5.39
<.001
(.056) (11.95) (<001)
(.087) (6.09) (<001)
3.74
.053
.666
0.19
BP/CWrf

very close to significant at the 5% level (p = 0.52 for the robust standard error). In the
stable sample, REG_H is significant at the 1% level, and REG_M is significant at the
5% level, but approaches the 1% level. The association between regulatory group
membership and competitive pressures is not as strong as the association between
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management attitudes and competitive pressures, and the relationships are opposite in
sign.

These results suggest that facilities that face more stringent regulations perceive
fewer opportunities to differentiate their facilities or products based on environmental
management strategies relative to facilities that face fewer constraints. This is a
logical result, given the prescriptive nature of regulation captured in this sample, and
the small size and lack of R&D capacity that characterize facilities in this study, both
of which suggest that these facilities are likely to accept regulation as a given
constraint which inhibits voluntary environmental management efforts.

The results for ATTREG indicate a positive relationship, significant at the 1% level in
both samples, and the second largest association after ATTENV. The components of
this variable include such measures as the respondent's priorities with respect to
obtaining regulatory relief through reduced enforcement and streamlined permitting,
preparing for future regulations, and preempting future regulations, among others. As
respondents' priorities with respect to these regulatory pressures increase, so do their
views of the importance of competitive motivations for environmental management.
The positive sign of ATTREG compared to the negative signs of REG_M and REG_H
suggest that managers at regulated facilities perceive the importance of competitive
advantage, but that the constraints imposed by the regulation prohibit pursuit of the
advantage.
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ATTENVis also positive and significant at the 1% level in both samples, and exhibits
the strongest association with the perception that competitive advantage is an
important motivation for environmental management. This is logically sensible, in
that managers who perceive environmental protection as important would do so in
part because of the business advantages offered by environmentally friendly actions.

The other factors that are positive and significant in both models are: RETAIL,
significant at the 1% level for all but the jackknifed standard error in the stable
sample, which approaches this level; and SALES_M, significant at the 5% level. The
results for the sales variables again suggest a non-linear relationship between size
measures and perceptions of different influences on environmental management,
consistent with other studies conducted on this data. Mid-size facilities may more
actively seek differentiation as they seek to achieve greater market share. The
negative (although not significant) coefficient for SALES_H could suggest that after a
facility achieves a certain size, it has captured sufficient market share to view
competitive strategies outside the core business focus as less important than facilities
with lower sales.

PUBLIC is negative and significant at the 10% level in the full sample, which could
suggest that publicly traded facilities who answer to shareholder interests do not
perceive the same flexibility in pursuing other competitive strategies as other
facilities.
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The number of close competitors was negative in both samples, and significant only
in the stable sample, at the 5% level. This indicates that facilities with more than the
median number of close competitors reported in the study perceive fewer
opportunities to differentiate themselves through environmental strategy than other
facilities. These findings could be considered to support the findings of Innes and
Bial (2002) and Salop and Scheffman (1983), who found that firms in concentrated
industries which had developed cost-effective pollution abatement methods are more
likely to pursue higher standards that disadvantage their competitors. In contrast,
these results may not support other empirical and case studies such as Frondel,
Horbach, and Rennings (2007), and Esty and Winston (2006), who have found that
firms with more competitors exhibit greater environmental management effort.
However, this estimation does not examine environmental management, it examines
the factors that contribute to a facility's view that competitive motivations are
important to environmental management, so results are not directly comparable.

Results for Barriers
For the estimation of barriers (BARRIER), the BP/CW test was not significant so
robust standard errors are not reported. The R2 values for both samples are low,
indicating that the model explains less than 14% of the variation in perceptions of
barriers. The results do not support the proposition. Regulatory group membership is
not significant in either sample. Interestingly, however, the coefficients are negative,
which could suggest that facilities subject to regulatory constraints are accustomed to
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Table 16: Factors Associated with Perceptions of Barriers to Environmental
Management (BARRIER)
Full Sample
N= 278, R2=A4, Adj. R2=.09
Variable

Coeff
-.200

SE
.032
.053

PUBLIC

-.125
.036

R&D
RETAIL
COMP01
SALES_M
SALES_H
SIERRA

.092
-.051
.171
-.020
.075
-.059

PC
MC

t
-3.63

Stable Sample
N= 153, R2=A4, Adj. R2=.05
Coeff
SE
t
P
P
<.001
-.163
.047 -1.95
.053
.118

-.267

.088

-2.24

.026

.066

-1.57
0.45

.651

.150

.110

1.10

.272

1.30
-0.79
2.86
-0.27
1.13
-0.90
0.42

.194
.430
.004
.785
.258
.371
.678

.107
-.097
.046
-.054
.079
-.072

.057
.045
.038
.062
.068
.088

.010

.051

1.00
-0.98
0.54
-0.48
1.02
-0.73
0.10

.320
.329
.587
.633
.310
.469
.923

EMPM

.029

.041
.030
.028
.042
.064
.059
.037

EMPH

-.082

.076

-1.02

.307

-.033

.100

-0.35

.725

REG_M

-.056

.043

-0.80

.424

-.123

.065

-1.17

.244

-1.03
3.16
-1.05

.302
.002
.295

-.135
.193
.027

.050

-1.23
1.79
0.25

.222
.076
.805

0.35

.555

0.22

.642

REG_H
ATTREG
ATTENV
BP/CWx2

-.077
.225
-.082

.035
.059
.092

.086
.119

incurring monetary and time costs related to environmental management, compared
to facilities that are not subject to much regulation, and therefore view these barriers
as less important than lightly regulated facilities.

This is the first estimation in this study in which only one set of attitudes is
significant for both samples. ATTREG is positive and significant at the 1% level in
the full sample and at the 10% level in the stable sample, and it has the largest
association in this estimation. This is in contrast to the negative (although not
significant) coefficient for the regulatory group classification. This result possibly
suggests that respondents for whom obtaining regulatory relief and preempting
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additional regulatory constraints are high priorities perceive barriers as more
important than other facilities. This is logically sensible if those managers who
prioritize obtaining regulatory relief are constrained from doing so by the costs and
prescriptive restrictions inherent in current applicable regulations, which may leave
fewer resources available to overcome barriers to additional environmental
management. In addition, the seeking of regulatory relief incurs transactions costs
such as negotiation and administration costs (Segerson and Miceli, 1998), which
could pose greater barriers for facilities with these priorities than for other facilities.

While the preceding sections describe exploratory results, the remainder of this
section presents results for those estimations that asses hypothesized relationships.

Hypothesis la: Environmental Management
For the estimation of influences on the number of environmental management
practices and programs {EM), the BP/CW test was significant, so robust standard
errors are reported. The R2 values indicate that the model explains 49% of the
variance for the full sample, and 54% of the variance for the stable sample. Results
do not support Hypothesis la. Membership in the moderately or highly regulated
group, compared to the lightly regulated group is not significant in either sample.
Interestingly, however, the coefficients have opposite signs, with REG_M positive,
and REGH negative. The same is true for environmental interest group pressures
(EIG) and for investor and lender pressures (INV). Although none of these results are
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significant, the opposite signs could indicate a potential non-linear relationship
between environmental management effort and regulatory constraints. These results
may also reflect the potential nonlinear relationship for facility size in this sample,
given that the moderately regulated group consists of moderately sized facilities.
Finally, these results may suggest that the regulatory group classification is
somewhat inconsistent for the moderately regulated group. The classification was
designed to create three clusters, when it is possible that two clusters would more
clearly separate highly and lightly regulated facilities, although such a classification
is not considered representative of the variation in regulatory constraints facing
facilities. In addition, replications of the cluster process using the six-sector
categorical variable were not consistent for the moderately regulated cluster. It is
possible that using the four-group industry activity variable, equivalent to defining
sectors at the 2-digit NAICS level, does not fully differentiate facilities that are
subject to moderate levels of regulation.

The management attitudes are also not significant in these estimations, and the only
variables that are significant for both samples are COMPET, BARRIER, and STAFF,
with STAFF having the largest effect of the three variables. Results for COMPET,
positive and significant at the 5% level with jackknifed standard errors and the 1%
level with robust standard errors, indicate that as facilities' perceptions of the
importance of competitive motivations on environmental management increase, the
number of environmental management practices and programs increases. These
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Table 17: Factors Influencing Environmental Management Practices and Programs
(EM)
Stable Sample
Full Sample
N= 153, R2=.54, Adj. R2=..47
N= 230, R2=A9, Adj. R2=.45
Variable Coeff
SE
t
SE
t
Coeff
P
P
CUST
.714
.027
.050
0.39
.696
.031
.061
0.37
(.693)
(.046) (0.41) (.679)
(.057) (0.40)
0.54
0.57
.572
EIG
.035
.049
.590
.047
.066
(.061) (0.61)
(.540)
(.047) (0.57) (.571)
INV
.215
.050
3.00
.003
.086
1.31
.131
.118
(.048) (3.18) (.002)
(.060) (1.45)
(.150)
COMPET
.211
.014
.065
2.49
.246
.082
2.42
.017
(.010)
(.061) (2.65) (.009)
(.076) (2.62)
BARRIER
.067
-.113
.0468
-2.17
.031
-.124
.063
-1.85
(.043) (-2.29) (.023)
(.058) (-1.99)
(.049)
PC
.054
1.16
.046
0.60
.550
.146
.066
.246
(.043) (0.64) (.524)
(.060) (1.29)
(.200)
MC
-.024
-0.30
.762
0.15
.885
.051
.017
.081
(.856)
(.045) (.063) (.730)
(.065) (0.18)
.460
PUBLIC
.173
.070
1.78
.088
.090
0.74
.076
(.063) (1.99) (.048)
(.072) (0.92)
(.357)
R&D
.110
.035
1.56
.120
.041
2.05
.042
.167
(.033) (1.68) (.093)
(.025)
(.037) (2.26)
SALES_M
.094
.030
0.12
.905
1.57
.118
.009
.037
(.028) (1.69) (.092)
(.034) (0.13)
(.895)
SALES_H
.052
.079
0.42
.067
0.68
.496
.040
.677
(.058) (0.80) (•427)
(.064) (0.51)
(.610)
EMP_M
.036
0.67
.026
.0279
0.44
.662
.048
.505
(.030) (0.73)
(.025) (0.47) (.641)
(.466)
EMP_H
.023
.079
0.27
.088
0.21
.833
.786
.018
(.066) (0.32) (.747)
(.069) (0.27)
(.788)
STAFF
.253
.35
3.28 <001
.271
.048
2.63
<010
(.033) (3.48) (<.001)
(.044) (2.87)
(.005)
EXEC
.007
.026
0.12
.057
.032
0.79
.433
.906
(.025) (0.12) (.901)
(.029) (0.85)
(.398)
INSP
.092
1.06
.138
.292
.003
.124
0.04
.967
(1.21) (1.21) (.226)
(1.06) (0.05)
(.961)
REG_M
.012
.034
0.20
.046
.846
.023
0.29
.771
(.033) (0.20) (.838)
(.044) (0.31)
(.757)
REG_H
.028
-0.82
-.091
-1.32
.188
-.071
.036
.416
(.034) (-0.88)
(.027) (-1.39) (.165)
(.381)
ATTREG
.048
0.52
-.009
-0.13
.899
.041
.060
.603
(.045) (-0.13) (.894)
(.572)
(.055) (0.57)
ATTENV
.060
0.12
.084
.007
.918
.034
0.42
.673
(.057) (0.13) (.900)
(.076) (0.47)
(.642)
33.72 <.001
17.19
<.001
BP/CWrf
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results, the second largest influence after STAFF, are logically sensible, and could be
interpreted as supporting findings by Frondel, Horbach, and Rennings (2007), and
Esty and Winston (2006), who have found that firms with more competitors exhibit
greater environmental management effort. These results are not directly comparable,
because COMPET measures the perceived importance of competitive motivations on
environmental management, while other studies have measured the influence of the
number of competitors; however, the measures are closely related. Moreover, the
general concept that the facility perceives a need to differentiate itself, and therefore
engages in more environmental management, is similar.

BARRIER is negative and significant at the 5% level for all but the stable sample with
the jackknifed standard error, which is significant at the 10% level. The negative sign
indicates that facilities that perceive barriers to be greater have implemented fewer
practices and programs than other facilities. This supports theoretical work that
suggests that transactional costs of implementing additional abatement technologies
are a barrier to environmental management (Alberini and Segerson, 2002; Segerson
and Miceli, 1998), and is consistent with findings from other studies using this data
(Ervin et al 2008; Hall, 2006).

The positive, significant result for STAFF, the largest influence in this estimation,
indicates that facilities with dedicated environmental staff have implemented more
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practices and programs than facilities without dedicated staff, which is a logical

association.

In the foil sample, results indicate that investor and lender pressures (INV) and public
trading status (PUBLIC) are positively related to the number of environmental
management practices and programs implemented at a facility. Findings for PUBLIC
support findings by Henriques and Sadorsky (2007). For the stable sample, R&D is
positively associated with the number of environmental management practices and
programs implemented, which supports findings by Videras and Alberini (2000) and
Khanna and Damon (1999).

Hypothesis lb: Environmental Practice Intensity
For the estimation of influences on the intensity of environmental management
practices (PRACINT), the BP/CW test was significant for the stable sample, so robust
standard errors are reported. The R2 values indicate that the model explains over 60%
of the variance for both samples. Results support Hypothesis lb. Regulatory group
membership is positive and significant in both samples. REG_M is significant at the
5% level for the full sample, and at the 10% level for the stable sample. REGJI is
significant at the 1% level for the full sample, and the 5% level for the stable sample.
Results indicate that facilities in the two more highly regulated groups have more
intensely integrated environmental management practices into their operations than
lightly regulated facilities; however, the influence is only slightly larger than the
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Table 18: Factors Influencing Practice Implementation Intensity (PRACINT)
Full Sample
N= 212, R2=.62, Adj. R2= .58

Variable

Coeff

CUST

.105

EIG

.103

INV

.135

COMPET

.164

BARRIER

-.069

PC

.100

MC

-.043

PUBLIC

.071

SE

1.47
(1.57)
1.45
(1.56)
1.88
(2.05)
2.21
(2.36)
-1.18
(-1.26)
1.65
(1.81)
-0.60
(-0.70)

.148
(.119)
.148
(.120)
.061
(.042)
.028
(.019)
.238
(.210)
.100
(.072)
.546
(.486)

.058
(.051)
.038
(.035)
.037
(.035)
.086
(.073)

0.93
(1.06)
-0.36
(-0.39)
-1.03
(-1.10)
-0.24
(-0.29)
-0.12
(-0.13)
0.61
(0.71)
1.74
(1.84)
-0.245
(-0.26)
-0.06
(-0.07)
2.49
(2.56)
2.72
(2.84)

.353
(.291)
.723
(.700)
.306
(.272)
.807
(.774)

0.19
(0.20)
5.54
(6.07)
1.68

.850
(.840)
<001
(<.001)
.195

-.024

SALES_M

-.069

SALES_H

-.021

EMP_M

-.007

.032
(.030)

EMP_H

.047

STAFF

.112

EXEC

-.012

INSP

-.005

.078
(0.67)
.032
(.031)
.025
(.023)
.076
(.068)
.038
(.037)
.029
(.028)

.150

REG_H

.168

ATTREG

.013

ATTENV

.356

BP/CWrf

P

.059
(.055)
.062
(.057)
.057
(.053)
.066
(.062)
.059
(.055)
.033
(.031)
.049
(.043)

R&D

REG_M

t

Stable Sample
N= 151, R2=.64, Adj. R2= .58

.058
(.054)
.072
(.066)

Coeff
.108

t

P

.076
1.16
(.069) (1.28)
.081
1.08
(.074) (1.18)
.074
1.18
(.067) (1.30)
.080
1.18
(.072) (1.30)
.069
-0.83
(.064) (-0.90)
.048
1.41
(.040) (1.66)

.246
(.203)
.284
(.240)
.241
(.196)
.241
(.195)
.407
(.367)
.160
(.100)

.012

.069
(.042)

.025

.056
0.38
(.049) (0.44)
.046
-0.14
(.042) (-0.15)
.048
-0.68
(.043) (-.075)
.112
-0.51
(.090) (-0.63)
.038
-1.09
(.034) (-1.19)
.128
0.70
(.100) (0.90)
1.82
.043
(.040) (1.96)
.030
-0.04
(.028) (-0.05)
.081
0.21
(.072) (0.24)
.050
1.64
(.049) (1.69)
.032
2.14
(.030) (2.27)

.896
(.831)
.704
(.662)
.890
(.879)
.496
(.456)
.613
(.529)

.096
.106
.103
-.055
.113

-.011
-.056
-.062

.907
(.900)
.544
(.476)

-.078

.083
(.067)
.810
(.796)
.949
(.943)
.013
(.011)
.007
(.005)

.149
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SE

.079

-.003
.010
.125
.143
.058
.418

.086
(.075)
.324
(.343)

0.13
(0.21)

0.72
(0.79)
5.97
(6.82)
3.03

.279
(.238)
.483
(.368)
.070
(.052)
.964
(.961)
.834
(.813)
.104
(.093)
.034
(-025)
.471
(.433)
<.001
(<.001)
.082

other significant influences (discussed below). This is in contrast to the previous
estimation, which indicated that these facilities had not implemented a greater
number of practices or programs. PRACINT measures the level to which facility
environmental management goals guide decisions, how well-defined environmental
management policies are, the extent to which the facility makes continuous efforts to
minimize impacts, how well employees are trained in environmental management
issues, and other measures of general environmental policy and practice integration.

Combined, the results for EM and PRACINT are reasonable. Regulation may or may
not inspire facilities to implement additional practices or participate in programs;
however, facilities subject to regulation are likely to encourage continuous
monitoring and ensure that requirements are well-publicized to increase the
probability that the facility is consistently in compliance. This difference also could
suggest that practice count measures may be misleading as indicators of
environmental management strategy.

Between the two attitude variables, although both are positive, only ATTENVis
significant (at the 1% level), and the coefficient, the largest in this estimation, is over
twice as large as the regulatory group variable coefficients. Again, results seem
reasonable, because managers who value environmental protection would seem likely
to ensure that staff are well trained and aware of policies, that the facility works to
minimize impacts, and so forth. Not surprisingly, the presence of environmental
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management staff (STAFF) is also positively significantly related to practice
intensity. Dedicated environmental staff are able to manage programs and publicize
company policies throughout the organization.

Investor pressures (INV), competitive motivations (COMPET), and public trading
status (PUBLIC) are also positive and significant in one or both of the models,
suggesting that these factorss contribute to practice intensity. The positive association
for INV could indicate that facilities sensitive to investor desire for reduced
environmental risks integrate practices more thoroughly into operations. The positive
associations for COMPET and PUBLIC support the findings of other studies such as
Henriques and Sadorsky (2007), Frondel, Horbach, and Rennings (2007), and Esty
and Winston (2006).

Hypothesis lc: Pollution Prevention
For the estimation of influences on the intensity of pollution prevention activities
(P2), the BP/CW test was significant for both samples, so robust standard errors are
reported. The R2 values indicate that the model explains over 50% of the variance for
both samples. Results partially support Hypothesis lc. Membership in the highly
regulated group is positive and significant in both samples, at the 5% level in the full
sample and the 10% level in the stable sample. The effect of REGH is not as strong
as for STAFF, or either of the attitude variables. REGMis

not significant for either

sample. Results indicate that highly regulated facilities have implemented more
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pollution prevention activities such as process changes, product modifications, and
raw materials substitutions than lightly regulated facilities.

Reviewing the results for EM and PRACINT, highly regulated facilities have not
implemented any more practices or programs than other facilities, but they have
integrated general environmental management practices and pollution prevention
practices more intensely than lightly regulated facilities. Together, results suggest
that highly regulated facilities may perceive regulation as a constraint to
implementing additional practices, but as an incentive to more intensely
implementing practices that are used.

These results should be interpreted with caution with respect to the relationship
between regulatory group membership and environmental management. The
differences observed are likely due at least in part to the level of regulation the
facility is subject to, but differences may also reflect the nature of highly regulated
facilities operations. Facilities that are in the highly regulated group are primarily
large manufacturers. Many of the pollution prevention activities queried in the
survey, such as process or product innovations, do not apply to lightly regulated
facilities. In addition, opportunities for innovation are very different in the lightly and
highly regulated groups.
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Table 19: Factors Influencing Pollution Prevention Activity Intensity (P2)

Variable
CUST

Full Sample
N= 224, if 2 =53, Adj. R2=A9
Coeff
t
SE
P
.094

EIG

-.081

INV

.059

COMPET

.164

BARRIER

-.046

PC

-.072

MC

-.078

PUBLIC

.125

R&D

-0.34

SALES_M

-.037

SALESJH

.005

EMP_M

.043

EMP_H

.004

STAFF

.194

EXEC

.015

INSP

.110

REG_M

.030

REG_H

.177

ATTREG

.254

ATTENV

.243

BP/CW^

.045
(.043)
.049
(.046)
.050
(-047)
.062
(.059)
.056
(.053)
.032
(.030)
.058
(.051)
.070
(.061)
.030
(.028)
.032
(.030)
.056
(.050)
.028
(.026)
.054
(.047)
.029
(.027)
.024
(.022)
.067
(.061)
.036
(.035)
.029
(.028)
.052
(.049)

1.51
(1.59)
-1.27
(-1.36)
0.83
(0.89)
2.06
(2.17)
-0.73
(-0.77)
-1.11
(-1.20)
-0.81
(-0.93)
1.19
(1.37)
-0.56
(-0.61)
-0.58
(-0.63)
0.09
(0.10)
0.71
(0.76)
0.07
(0.08)
3.05
(3.30)
0.28
(0.29)
2.66
(2.88)
0.46
(0.48)
2.52
(2.62)
3.53
(3.75)
.074
3.29
(.071) (3.47)
27.34

.132
(.114)
.206
(.177)
.405
(.372)
.040
(.031)
.467
(.442)
.268
(.230)
.421
(.354)
.234
(.172)
.575
(.544)
.561
(.528)
.932
(.923)
.480
(.446)
.947
(.939)
.003
(.001)
.783
(.772)
.008
(.004)
.6434
(.631)
.012
(.009)
<001
(<001)
.001

(.001)
<0.001
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Stable Sample
N=l53,R2=.56,Ad/.R2= .50
Coeff
SE
t
P
.058
1.51
.133
.123
(.110)
(.055) (1.61)
.064
-0.74
-.059
.463
(.061) (-0.79)
(.433)
.021
.057
.791
0.27
(.052) (0.29)
(.773)
.079
1.86
.184
.064
(.073) (2.03)
(.044)
.065 -1.50
.135
-.105
(.060) (-1.61)
(.110)
.041
-0.73
.467
-.058
(.036) (-0.83)
(.406)
.094
.702
-.053
-0.38
(.074) (-0.49)
(.627)
.112
0.704
.057
0.38
(.088) (0.49)
(.627)
.038
0.704
-.029
-0.38
(.665)
(.033) (-0.43)
.042
-0.42
.674
-.035
(.037) (-0.47)
(.637)
.074
-0.02
-.002
.980
(.060) (-0.03)
(.976)
.035
0.46
.643
.035
(.031) (0.51)
(.609)
.078
0.11
.914
.008
(.064) (0.13)
(.896)
.205
.033
2.90
.004
(.030) (3.15)
(.002)
.031
0.04
.972
.002
(.028) (0.04)
(.970)
.094
.099
1.57
.118
(.074) (1.98)
(.049)
.742
.046
-0.33
-.027
(.734)
(.045) (-0.34)
.165
.036
1.89
.061
(.034) (2.02)
(.046)
2.22
.183
.061
.028
(.056) (2.45)
(.016)
.099
3.17
<002
.308
(.088) (3.58)
(<.001)
15.29
<.001

The lightly regulated group consists of accommodations and construction facilities.
Accommodations facilities are subject to very little environmental regulations, and
impacts are highly dependent on guest preference. Accommodations facilities may
not place restrictions on the water or energy that guests use, and even efficient
fixtures and appliances may not offset liberal guest use. Construction facilities,
meanwhile, may have very little opportunity to innovate process or product
improvements. As noted previously, many requirements in this sector are highly
prescriptive and temporary, and innovations would need to be practicable in a variety
of locations, since many construction impacts are site specific. Small construction
facilities, which predominate in this sample, are not likely to have the resources to
develop a range of solutions for different types of projects and sites. It is likely to be
less costly and more convenient to follow existing regulations. The results indicate a
significant relationship between regulatory group membership and pollution
prevention activity, but this relationship appears to be due in part to the difference in
operations and impacts inherent to different industries in different regulatory groups,
as well as the different potential for innovation with respect to regulation inherent in
the regulatory regimes that affect the different sectors.

Regarding attitudes, both attitude variables, ATTENVand ATTREG, are positive and
significant in both samples, and are again the strongest influences in the estimation.
These variables are significant at the 1% level with the exception that ATTREG is
significant at the 5% level in the stable sample. The significance of ATTREG may
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reflect the nature of the current regulatory regime—pollution prevention and
remediation of sites impacted by pollution are primary goals of prescriptive
regulation. Facilities that can reduce pollution, particularly regulated pollutants such
as hazardous air emissions, are more likely to obtain the regulatory relief they may be
seeking than they would be if they emphasized reductions of impacts that are not
regulated (e.g. electricity use). The significance of ATTENVlikely reflects the fact
that managers who value environmental protection will be just as interested in
specifically preventing pollution as they are in reducing their organization's overall
footprint.

Other factors that are positive and significant for both samples are STAFF, INSP, and
COMPET, with STAFF having the largest effect of the three. As with the general
environmental management practices, dedicated environmental staff are able to
manage programs and publicize company policies throughout the organization, and
can foster process changes and substitutions designed to reduce pollution. The
number of inspections conducted by a regulatory agency at the facility is not a
significant determinant of the other two environmental management measures (EM
and PRACINT), but here it is significant at the 1% level for the full sample, and at the
5% level for the stable sample with the robust standard error. This result supports
findings by Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler (2000), who found that facilities that had
been inspected were "cleaner" than facilities that had not been inspected.
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The positive coefficient for COMPET—significant at the 5% level, with the
exception of the stable sample with the jackknifed standard error, which is significant
at the 10% level—indicates that facilities that perceive greater potential competitive
advantage to implementing sound environmental management strategies exhibit
greater intensity in their pollution prevention activities.

Hypothesis 2: Voluntary Environmental Management
For the estimation of voluntary environmental management (VEM), the BP/CW test
was significant for both models, so robust standard errors are reported. The R2 values
indicate that the model explains less variation for VEM than, for other dependent
variables: 28% for the full sample, and 38% for the stable sample. Regulatory group
membership was hypothesized to be positively related to voluntary environmental
management, based on the theories presented earlier. The results do not support
Hypothesis 2. Regulatory group membership is significantly associated with VEM in
both samples, but the signs of the coefficients for both the highly regulated group
(REGH) and the moderately regulated group (REGM) are negative, indicating that
facilities in both groups engage in fewer voluntary activities than lightly regulated
facilities. Results are significant at the 1% level with the exception of REGM in the
full sample, which is significant at the 5% level. The magnitudes of the effects
differ—the effect of REG_H is substantially larger than the effect of REGM, and the
effects of COMPET and STAFF, described below, are between the two.
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The negative association for moderately and highly regulated groups is not consistent
with previous empirical findings which indicate a positive association between
regulatory pressure and voluntary environmental effort (Khanna and Damon, 1999).
This variable measures the number of voluntary environmental programs (e.g.
ENERGY STAR, WasteWise) the facility participates in, whether the facility reports
to the TRI, and whether the facility has obtained ISO 14001 certification, and studies
have typically found that large manufacturers engage in these activities (Khanna,
2001; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Arora and Cason, 1995,1996). Given that the
highly regulated group in this study consists of large- and medium-sized
manufacturers, this group was anticipated to engage in more voluntary activity
(VEM) than the other regulatory groups.

In addition to being inconsistent with empirical evidence, the negative associations
between the highly and moderately regulated groups and VEM do not support theory
suggesting that firms seeking regulatory relief may choose to participate in voluntary
programs. As described earlier, Lyon and Maxwell (2004) suggest that facilities
seeking to become a lower inspection priority will participate in programs that allow
facilities to gain this regulatory relief by establishing voluntary auditing and reporting
practices. The negative association between regulatory stringency and voluntary
activity found in this research, together with the positive association found by
Khanna and Damon (1999) and other studies conducted on larger facilities, together
suggest that previous theoretical work may be more applicable to large, visible
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Table 20: Influences on Voluntary Environmental Management Activity (VEM)
Stable Sample
N= 153, R2=.3$, Adj. R2=:29

Full Sample
N= 233, R2=.28, Adj. R2=.22
Variable

Coeff

SE

t

Coeff

.104

.043
(.040)

1.24
(1.32)

P
.215
(.188)

EIG

-.038

INV

.035

COMPET

.221

BARRIER

-.033

.043
(.041)
.042
(.039)
.054
(.051)
.038
(.036)

-0.49
(-0.52)
0.42
(0.45)
2.25
(2.39)
-0.56
(-0.59)

.626
(.607 )
.675
(.655)
.026
(.018)
.579
(.558)

PC

-.019

.094

.037
.169

.6568
(.613)
.121
(.088)
.181
(.150)
.055
(.041)
.620
(.563)

-.036

PUBLIC

-0.18
(-0.19)
0.45
(0.51)
1.56
(1.71)
-1.34
(-1.45)
1.93
(2.06)
0.50
(0.58)

.861
(.853)

MC

.039
(.037)
.037
(.033)
.057
(.051)
.025
(.024)
.030
(.029)
.072
(.062)

CUST

R&D

-.096

-.014
.135
.028
.185
-.036

.239
-.083
.142

SE

t

P

.045
-0.16
(-041) (-0.18)
.052
1.48
(.048) (1.61)
.055
0.26
(.050) (0.29)
.066
1.58
(.061) (1.72)
-0.49
.049
(.046) (-0.51)

.873
(.861)

.056
0.61
(.052) (0.67)
-0.29
.059
(.049) (-0.35)
2.18
.058
(.049)
2.61
.029
-1.01
(.026) (-1.11)
.034
1.49
(.032) (1.60)
.085
0.71
(.070) (0.87)

.541
(.503)
.769
(.723)
.031
(.010)
.312
(.268)
.139
(-112)
.479
(.387)

.148
(.110)
.793
(.775)
.116
(.087)
.635
(.610)

SALES_M

.163

SALESJH

.056

EMP_M

.120

.025
(.024)

1.55
(1.65)

.122
(.101)

.084

.028
(026)

0.98
(1.05)

.331
(.294)

EMP_H

.108
.174

EXEC

.010

INSP

.090

0.93
(1.10)
2.06
(2.20)
0.13
(0.13)
1.08
(1.19)
-1.98
(-2.12)

.354
(.271)
.040
(.029)
.900
(.895)
.282
(.234)
.049
(.035)

.070

STAFF

.077
(.065)
.027
(.026)
.024
(.023)
.098
(.087)
.023
(.022)

.080
0.62
(.064) (0.78)
.034
1.25
(.031) (1.37)
.027
.093
(.025) (0.99)
-1.04
.079
(.068) (-1.22)
.029
-3.36
(.027) (-3.61)
.034
-3.06
(.032) (-3.28)

.534
(.438)
.213
(.174)
.356
(.326)
.299
(.226)
.001
(<.001)

.044
-0.41
(.041) (-0.44)
.060
0.68
(-053) (0.72)
87.36

.682
(.658)
.521
(.470)
<.001

.105

.129
.081
-.078

REG_M

-.119

REG_H

-.295

.027
(.026)

-3.20
(-3.38)

.002
(.001)

-.349

ATTREG

-.094
-.007

-1.26
(-1.33)
-0.11

.210
(.186)
.916
(.909)
<001

-.035

ATTENV

.038
(.036)
.048
(.044)

BP/CWz?

(-o.il)
124.87

-.236

.054
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.003
(.001)

facilities with innovative capacity than the smaller facilities that make up the majority
of this sample.

The negative association for the highly regulated group likely reflects how few
facilities in the sample report to the TRI or have obtained ISO 14001 certification
(less than 5% each). The majority of voluntary activities reported in this sample
involved participation in a formal voluntary environmental management program
such as LEED and ENERGY STAR, and approximately equal proportions of the
highly regulated group and the lightly regulated group reported participating. The
proportions of the members of the highly regulated and lightly regulated groups that
reported one or more voluntary activities are also similar: 28% for REGH, and 26%
for REGJL, but a much lower proportion, 9%, of the moderately regulated group
(REG_M), reported any voluntary activity.

Another notable result is that managers' attitudes are not significant influences on
VEM. This lack of significance could be considered consistent with Nakamura,
Takahshi, and Vertinsky (2001), who found managers' beliefs that it is necessary to
live in harmony with nature and that the earth is vulnerable to human impacts to be
negatively associated with the presence of a formal environmental policy. Nakamura,
Takahshi, and Vertinsky (2001) suggest that managers with a strong belief system

view formalizing policies as unneeded efforts at public relations. The findings in this
research may support that notion as well, given the prevalence of voluntary programs
172

that offer public recognition as a benefit of participation. Certainly, some companies
do seek public recognition of environmental effort, and widely publicize their
environmental management efforts, but again, the majority of examples involve
larger facilities, often in different industrial sectors, than were captured in this study.
For example, Esty and Winston (2006) describe environmental management
strategies implemented by such major corporations as General Electric,
MacDonald's, and Toyota, which are willing to share knowledge, and which appear
to be seeking public recognition for their efforts.

Also notable is that COMPET is significant at the 5% level for the full sample, and at
the 10% for the stable sample with the robust standard error. These results suggest
that as the perceived importance of competitive pressures as a motivation for
environmental management increased, the level of voluntary activity increases. This
is a logical relationship that supports case study evidence of the importance of
environmental management as a strategy to achieve competitive advantage (Esty and
Winston, 2006; Reinhardt, 2005)

Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c: Environmental Performance
There is little notable about the results for the performance variables, so the three
hypotheses pertaining to the different performance measures are discussed together
and all results are presented in Table 21. Few variables are significantly related to
environmental performance in any of the estimations. The null hypotheses are not
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rejected for either the estimation of overall environmental performance (EP) or
performance with respect to regulated impacts (EPR). For these estimations,
regulatory group membership is not a significant determinant of environmental
performance. For the estimation of performance with respect to unregulated impacts
(EPV), the hypothesis that regulatory group membership is a significant influence on
performance is partially supported because REGH is positive and significant at the
10% level with the jackknifed standard error, and at the 5% level with the robust
standard error. REG_Mis not significant in the estimation for EPU. This result could
suggest that highly regulated facilities may be taking advantage of economies of
scale, using existing technologies and processes designed to reduce regulated impacts
to manage unregulated impacts as well. Another possibility is that these facilities are
working to preempt future regulations of currently unregulated impacts such as CO2
emissions by reducing impacts voluntarily. Given the negative association between
membership in the highly regulated group and voluntary environmental management
(VEM), this result suggests that much environmental effort takes place outside of
formal programs. This is a logical outcome, given that only one-fifth of respondents
in this study reported participating in a formal program, while approximately 60%
reported having implemented at least one practice. This sample appears to be
characterized by facilities that find their own solutions to environmental
management, rather than participating in a formal program.
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Table 21: Factors Influencing Improvements in Environmental Performance
N=153

Env. Perf. (EP)

Variable Coeff SE
EM
2.152 1.66 1.30
(1.327) (1.62)
CUST
.656 1.19 0.55
(.965) (0.68)
EIG
1.648 1.152 1.08
(1.246) (1.32)
INV
-1.899 1.188 -1.60
(.988X-1.92)
COMPET 2.363 1.475 1.60
(1.235) (1.91)
BARRIER .533 1.163 0.46
(.985) (0.54)
PC
.260 1.119 0.23
(.851) (0.30)
MC
-1.600 1.401 -1.14
(.955)(-1.67)
PUBLIC
.741 1.628 0.46
(1.145) (0.65)
R&D
.185 .972 0.19
(.774) (0.24)
SALES M .374 .733 0.51
(.575) (0.65)
SALES H 1.343 1.390 0.97
(1.059) (1.27)
EMP M
.332 .626 0.53
(.510) (0.65)
EMP_H -1.887 1.469 -1.28
(1.340)(-1.41)
STAFF
-.330 .714 -0.46
(.582X-0.57)
EXEC
-.033 .553 -0.06
(.447X-0.07)
INSP
-.036 1.740 -0.02
(1.357X-0.03)
REG M
-.010 .772 -0.01
(.661X-0.02)
REG H
.401 .6363 0.63
(.542) (0.74)
ATTREG -.175 1.17 -0.15
(994X-0.18)
ATTENV 1.011 1.507 -0.67
(1.228X-0.82)
2
PseudoR
140.21
HL Test
-81.42
-LL

Regulated Perf. (EPR)

Coeff
0.196 1.241
(.497)
584 .474
.497)
.281 1.691
186)
.112-1.081
055)
.111 1.773
.056)
6486 .087
.589)
.817 .226
760)
.256-2.678
094)
.649 2.553
517)
.850 .503
811)
.611 .660
,515)
.334 .139
,205)
.597 -.237
,515)
.199 -.546
159)
.645 .280
.570)
.953 .048
.942)
.984 .087
.979)
.989 -.279
,987)
.529 -.077
.459)
.881 -.789
860)
.503 -.670
,410)
.18
.275

SE
1.543
(1.265)
1.078
(.879)
1.266
(1.058)
1.137
(948)
1.374
(1.149)
1.065
(.908)
.937
(-741)
1.252
(1.435)
1.415
(1.705)
.861
(•704)
.692
(•572)
1.486
(1.052)
.583
(.494)
1.747
d-147)
.689
(-569)
.504
(•418)
1.590
(1.212)
.729
(•634)
.555
(.480)
1.045
(.890)
1.498
(1.237)
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Unregulated Perf. (EPU)

Coeff
0.80 .423 .604
(0.98) (.354)
0.4 .661 -1.94
(0-54) (.590)
1.34 .184 2.365
(1-60) (•110)
-0.95 .343 .614
(-1-14) (•254)
1.29 .199 5.245
(1.54) (•123)
-0.08 .935 .804
(-0-10) (.923)
0.24 .810 .517
(0.30) (•761)
-2.14 .032 .476
(-1-87) (.062)
1.80 .071 .130
(1-50) (•134)
0.58 .560 -.131
10/711 (•475)
0.95 .342 -.468
0-15) (-249)
0.09 .926 1.303
(0.13) (-895)
-0.41 .685 .923
(-0.48) (-632)
-0.31 .755-3.550
(-0.48) (-634)
0.41 .686 .101
(0.49) £623)
0.10 .924 1.102
(0-12) (.908)
0.05 .957 1.290
(0.07) (•943)
-0.38 .702 -.547
(-0.44) (-659)
-0.14 .891 1.341
(-016) (.873)
-0.75 .452-2.168
(-0.89) (•376)
-0.45 .655-4.066
(-0-54) (.588)
.15
147.82 .150
-89.64

SE
2.037
(1.517)
1.181
(1-453)
1.853
(1.430)
1.473
(1-143)
2.287
(1.816)
1.572
(1.226)
.874
(•617)
1.519
(•981)
1.745
d-124)
.891
(•671)
.793
(.583)
1.303
(1.137)
.766
(•593)
2.1503
(1.482)
.853
(•670)
.781
(-592)
2.519
(1.658)
1.254
(.908)
.809
(.608)
1.652
(1.343)
2.050
(1.623)

0.30
(0.40)
-1.07
(-1-34)
1.28
(1-65)
0.42
(0-54)
2.29
(2.89)
0.51
(0.66)
0.593
(0.84)
0.31
(0.49)
0.07
(-0-19)
-0.15
(-Q19)
-0.59
(-0.80)
0.71
d-15)
1.20
(1-56)
-1.65
(-2.39)
0.12
(0-15)
1.41
d-86)
0.516
(0.78)
-0.44
(-0.60)
1.66
(2-21)
-1.31
(-1-61)
-1.98
(-2-50)

.767
(.691)
.285
(•181)
.204
(.098)
.677
(•591)
.023
(.004)
.610
C512)
.555
^402}
.754
(.628)
.941
(•846)
.884
(•846)
.556
(•422)
.479
(.252)
.2303
(-120)
.101
(-017)
.906
(•881)
.160
(.063)
.609
(.436)
.664
(-547)
.099
(.027)
.191
(-106)
.049
(-012)
.17
142.53
.232
-60.68

Surprisingly, managers' attitudes toward environmental protection are strongly
negatively significantly associated with performance improvements with respect to
unregulated impacts. Although not directly comparable, as noted in the section
describing results for VEM, Nakamura, Takahashi, and Vertinsky (2001) found that
managers' with positive beliefs toward the environment were less likely to have
implemented a formal policy, and suggest that these managers could view
formalizing policies as unnecessary public relations efforts. The result for this
performance measure (EPU) may suggest a similar phenomenon. As noted earlier,
some companies publicize their environmental management successes, but they are
not necessarily representative of the majority of facilities in this study (Esty and
Winston, 2006).

The negative association between managers' attitudes toward environmental
protection (ATTENV) and improved performance with respect to unregulated impact
(EPU) could also indicate that managers who value environmental protection first
devote resources to overcompliance, which the strong positive association with
pollution prevention activities (P2) would suggest. Another possibility is that the
effects of normal business expansion are confounding findings. Several respondents
who reported on performance measures commented in the survey that their facility
had acquired additional assets, had expanded into larger quarters, sales had increased,
or operations had otherwise been impacted by growth that affected their performance.
This growth effect could partially account for the negative association for facilities
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with more than 250 employees (EMPH), which is significant at the 5% level with
the robust standard error. To the extent that the larger facilities expanded operations
or otherwise experienced growth, their performance may have been impacted.
Business expansions can impact performance regardless of managers' attitudes.

The other significant influence on improvements with respect to unregulated impacts
(EPU) is COMPET, indicating that facilities may be seeking competitive advantage
through reductions in unregulated impacts. COMPET is also significant at the 10%
level for overall environmental performance (EP) with the robust standard error, and
approaches significance with the jackknifed standard error. Across all three
estimations of environmental performance, the associations between COMPET and
performance are among the largest effects.

EIG, the importance of environmental interest groups, and EXEC, which indicates
that environmental issues are managed at the executive level, are positive and
significant with robust standard errors in the estimation for improvements in
unregulated impacts (EPU). The positive association for EXEC (albeit weaker than
most of the other significant associations) is interesting, given the negative
associations fox ATTENVand ATTREG, and could reflect that executives who are
responsible for environmental management may be implementing administrative or
operational cost saving measures or other efficiency measures that result in improved
environmental performance as a "side effect", rather than implementing a specific
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environmental performance improvement effort. For example, an executive could
implement energy-efficiency measures with the goal of reducing utility bills, and
achieve the associated environmental performance benefit as a "bonus". To the extent
that performance improvements are the result of business management decisions
unrelated to environmental management, manager's attitudes toward environmental
protection would not necessarily be related to environmental performance
improvements.

Other notable results include the negative and significant association of /JVF with EP
(significant at the 10% level with the robust standard error), and the negative and
significant result for multinational corporations (MQ for both EPR and EP (robust
standard error only). Multinational corporations may suffer from inertia and a lack of
flexibility to pursue beyond-compliance activities, they may be experiencing the
normal business growth that hinders improvements in impact levels, or they may
already be operating at an optimal performance level to meet the more stringent
regulations of other counties (e.g., EC member nations, Japan) in which they operate,
and have fewer opportunities for improvement than other facilities.
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Discussion
Primary intentions of this research are to take a first step toward defining the criteria
by which facilities can be identified as highly regulated, moderately regulated, or
lightly regulated, and to examine differences in motivations for environmental
management, environmental management practices, and environmental performance
among these groups. This research also explores the associations between managers'
attitudes toward environmental protection and toward regulation (assessed as
priorities with respect to various regulatory constraints) with other motivations for
environmental management, as well as environmental management and performance.

Based on the observations in this study, which comprise facilities of varying size in
six industrial sectors, highly regulated facilities are larger facilities operating in the
manufacturing sectors that are more likely to hold at least one permit, to hold an
individual permit, to hold permits for more than one environmental media, and to
generate hazardous wastes than other facilities. Lightly regulated facilities, on the
other hand, are smaller nonmanufacturers who hold few permits and that generate
very little hazardous wastes, and typically only at the conditionally exempt level.
Moderately regulated facilities are somewhere in the middle, comprising facilities
that are either smaller manufacturers or nonmanufacturers of varying sizes, that may
hold one or more general permits, but are not likely to hold an individual permit, that
hold permits predominantly for only one environmental medium, and that generate
hazardous wastes at the conditionally exempt level if at all.
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Differences in perceptions of several motivations for environmental management
among these groups are revealed in the exploratory portion of this research.
Additionally, some differences in environmental management, and, to a lesser extent,
performance, are also revealed in the examinations of hypothesized relationships.
Highly and moderately regulated facilities view customer and environmental interest
group motivations for environmental management as less important than do lightly
regulated facilities. Highly regulated facilities view investor pressures as less
important than do lightly regulated facilities.

Perhaps the most interesting result regarding regulatory group associations with nonregulatory motivations is that membership in the moderately and highly regulated
groups is negatively associated with the perception that competitive advantage is an
important motivator for environmental management. These results suggest that
facilities that face more stringent regulations perceive fewer opportunities to
differentiate their facilities or products based on environmental management
strategies relative to facilities that face fewer constraints. This finding is likely due to
the small size of the majority of the facilities in this study, most of which lack R&D
capacity to innovate beyond-compliance solutions that would provide advantage.
These facilities also may lack the resources to devote to voluntary activities, if
compliance costs and other restrictions divert resources away from voluntary efforts.
This finding also reflects, no doubt, the prescriptive nature of regulation captured in
this study.
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Findings suggest, therefore, that the current prescriptive regulatory system is not
providing many opportunities for voluntary environmental management, at least
among smaller, less innovative facilities. By extension, these results support the idea
that more flexible regulation may encourage more voluntary environmental
management, as recommended by the Porter Hypothesis described earlier. The Porter
Hypothesis posits that properly crafted regulation (taken here to refer to flexible,
performance-based regulations) offers opportunities for innovation. In addition,
theories suggesting that companies may seek competitive advantage through strategic
behavior with respect to regulation are characterized by an implicit assumption that
those companies view competitive advantage as important and feasible. This research
does not lend support to that implicit notion, given that more highly regulated
facilities view competitive advantage as a less important motivation for
environmental management than do lightly regulated facilities.

Regarding barriers, no significant differences are observed among facilities subject to
varying levels of regulation. However, the associations for the highly regulated group
and moderately regulated group, although not significant, were negative. This
suggests that facilities subject to more extensive regulation could be less likely to
view costs and time commitments as deterrents to environmental management than
lightly regulated facilities.
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The results for the hypothesized relationships between regulatory group membership
and environmental management and performance measures indicate no differences in
the number of practices implemented and programs participated in at facilities in
different regulatory groups. Differences are observed, however, in the intensity of
general practice implementation, with moderately and highly regulated facilities
exhibiting greater intensity of environmental practice implementation than lightly
regulated facilities. Highly regulated facilities also exhibit greater intensity of
pollution prevention activity than lightly regulated facilities.

Results for voluntary environmental management indicate that moderately and highly
regulated facilities engage in fewer voluntary activities than lightly regulated
facilities. In contrast, highly regulated facilities are more likely to have improved
environmental performance with respect to unregulated impacts (e.g., solid waste
generation and CO2 emissions) than lightly regulated facilities. Given that voluntary
activity in this study is primarily measured as participation in formal programs, these
results suggest that 1) moderately and highly regulated facilities perceive fewer
benefits to participation in formal programs than lightly regulated facilities, and 2)
that improvements in environmental performance are achieved outside of formal
program participation.

One possible implication of these findings is that voluntary programs do not offer
incentives that appeal to highly regulated firms. Many formal programs offer public
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recognition, such as use of a program logo on promotional materials. However,
moderately and highly regulated facilities view customer and environmental interest
group motivations for environmental management as less important than lightly
regulated facilities, so public recognition may not be providing sufficient incentives
for more highly regulated facilities to participate in programs in large numbers.

Another potential implication of the negative association between membership in the
highly or moderately regulated group and the number of voluntary activities is that
program participation may not offer sufficiently flexible solutions. While several
available voluntary programs offer regulatory relief from enforcement actions (e.g.,
the National Environmental Performance Track sponsored by the EPA), few
programs, if any, allow facilities to replace required technologies or processes with
unapproved alternatives. Facilities are still bound to comply with existing regulation,
even if some compliance costs are reduced through some forms of enforcement relief.
If program requirements are relatively inflexible or sufficiently burdensome, more
highly regulated facilities may view the costs of program participation as insufficient
to offset the benefits of participation.

Taken together, the findings in this research suggest that the most effective policies
intended to foster voluntary environmental management would offer a range of
solutions targeted to facilities subject to varying levels of regulation. Lightly
regulated facilities may respond to the opportunity to gain public recognition, while
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more heavily regulated facilities may be seeking more flexible options to meet

performance targets in the most cost-effective manner.

Regardless of specific motivation, findings in this study suggest a movement away
from prescriptive regulations and programs that specify particular processes or
practices. Instead, policy makers may find flexible, performance-based regulation and
flexible voluntary programs that offer technical and financial assistance would induce
greater voluntary activity.

In addition, policymakers could implement incentive structures for innovative
facilities to encourage those facilities to develop abatement technologies that are
more effective than current regulatory standards. With an incentive structure, the
innovative facility may be less concerned with gaining competitive advantage in a
way that places other facilities at a disadvantage (as suggested by several theories
presented earlier). Smaller, less innovative facilities are most likely to be placed at a
disadvantage if innovative facilities develop effective abatement technologies that
become new regulatory standards which the less innovative facilities must comply
with.

In practice, public-private partnerships that encourage innovative facilities to develop
effective, efficient environmental management technologies could provide
compensation to the innovating facility for use of the technologies, and provide
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technical and financial assistance to less innovative facilities to implement the
technologies. In addition, to the extent that regulatory agencies would induce
innovative facilities to transfer knowledge to less innovative facilities, the regulatory
system is well-positioned to serve as a primary mechanism for voluntary
environmental management and associated performance improvements. Regulatory
agencies can fulfill multiple roles in voluntary environmental management by
sponsoring programs, offering assistance, developing flexible, performance-based
regulations, and maintaining a credible threat of regulation should voluntary efforts
fail to achieve objectives. Other strategies that remove the market advantage that can
be obtained by some facilities while placing others at a disadvantage may exist, and
the findings in this study suggest that these strategies are worth investigating if policy
goals are to induce voluntary environmental management activity.

Regarding performance, findings in this study support the widely accepted view that
meaningful performance data is lacking (Esty and Winston, 2006). Mandatory
reporting requirements are needed, as are meaningful metrics and standardization
methodologies to allow comparisons of different impacts and different facilities.
Policies intended to foster environmental management need to include sound
methodologies for capturing and reporting performance data, and provide technical
and possibly financial assistance for facilities to comply with policy requirements.
Such policies could include forums for technology and knowledge exchange to
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facilitate learning among facilities and policymakers alike that transfer knowledge
from more resourceful, innovative facilities to other facilities.

The findings that highly regulated facilities are more likely to have improved
unregulated impacts, and that regulated facilities exhibit greater general
environmental practice and pollution prevention activity intensity support the
conventional wisdom that regulation has an important role in environmental
management. In addition, this finding suggests that performance benefits are
resulting primarily from spillover effects and economies of scale achieved through
managing regulated impacts, or preemptive strategies to avoid future regulation,
rather than through voluntary program participation. Examples of this effect could
include facilities installing systems that reduce wastewater effluent primarily by
reducing water use overall, or systems that reduce emissions which are also more
energy efficient than other systems.

Finally, further evidence of the importance of regulation to environmental
performance comes from a recent survey of business executives that supports the idea
that regulatory agencies will continue to play an important role in business
environmental management. According to this global survey of 1,254 executives by
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 40% of executives surveyed believe
additional regulation is necessary to effectively resolve environmental issues, while
an additional 50% feel that voluntary action is more effective than regulation, but that
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additional regulation may be required to manage some issues. However, while
respondents are open to more regulation, they expressed a preference for clear
guidance about expectations (Kielstra et al, 2008). The EIU study suggests that
policies that include regulation will not be opposed by business, but reinforces the
idea that flexible approaches and clear guidance and assistance are important.

Regarding management attitudes, findings in this research support the management
literature on the "CEO effect" (Marshall, Cordano, and Silverman, 2005; Cordano
and Frieze, 2000), indicting that managers' personal views are important to
environmental management. The explanatory power of models in this research are
very similar to the explanatory power of models in Nakamura, Takahashi, and
Vertinksy (2001), with models explaining from less than one-half to about 60% of
variation. These results therefore support the assertion of Nakamura, Takahashi, and
Vertinsky (2001) that utility maximization models provide greater explanatory power
than profit-maximization models in determining influences on environmental
management.

A literature review did not reveal any other studies assessing the relationship between
managers' attitudes toward regulation and environmental management and other
external motivations for environmental management. In the exploratory analysis
conducted here, both sets of attitudes are positively significantly associated with
views of each of the non-regulatory motivations assessed in this research: customer
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influences, environmental interest group pressures, investor and lender interests, and
competitive advantage. This research is silent as to the nature of the relationships
between these attitudes. It is unknown whether 1) managers feel that environmental
protection is important because stakeholders have expressed desires for
environmentally friendly products and services or reduced risk of environmental
damage; or 2) managers who value environmental protection support their positions
by seeking out those stakeholders with similar views. Many other potential
explanations for these relationships exist, but none are offered here, this research
reveals only the association between different attitudes and motivations to be
explored further.

The positive association between managers' attitudes toward regulation and other
stakeholders could suggest the presence of synergistic effects, where managers who
seek to appeal to stakeholders take regulatory obligations seriously, and ensure
compliance in order to maintain a positive image as a responsible corporate citizen.
In addition, those facilities with innovative capacity seeking to differentiate their
products or services in an effort to gain market share by exceeding compliance are
likely motivated by these external motivations that have been found to be significant
in many studies. Another possibility, among others, is that conscientious managers
view all stakeholders, regulators and others, as important to their facility's success.
As with the attitudes toward environmental protection, this research does not describe
the relationship, but does reveal associations to be explored further.
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The relationships between attitudes are potentially important to policymakers,

because the most effective policies may be those that appeal directly to facility
managers with environmental decision-making capacity. Policies that address
managers' concerns (e.g., desire for public recognition or competitive advantage),
and that are communicated a manner emphasizing the applicable benefits, are more
likely to be implemented thoroughly and effectively at facilities. The finding that
managers' attitudes toward environmental protection are associated with increased
environmental management practice intensity and that both sets of attitudes are
associated with increased pollution prevention activity support the importance of
manager involvement in policy and practice integration at facilities.

The negative association between management attitudes toward environmental
protection and performance improvements in unregulated impacts, coupled with the
strong positive association between attitudes toward environmental protection and
pollution prevention activities could indicate that managers emphasize
overcompliance with regulations before devoting resources to voluntary activities.
These findings support the idea that a successful scenario in one where policymakers
and regulators determine the environmental impacts that are the most important to
address, and establish enforceable limits and flexible options for managing those
impacts.

In summary, both regulatory constraints and mangers' attitudes toward these
constraints are important determinants of the importance of various external
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motivations for environmental management, practice intensity, and pollution
prevention activity intensity. Meanwhile, stringent regulatory constraints reduce
voluntary activity at facilities. These findings, taken together, suggest that flexible,
performance-based regulations and policies that provide a range of benefits targeted
to different groups of facilities may foster more voluntary environmental
management at facilities than is currently being achieved. Relationships between
environmental management and performance remain unclear in the absence of more
reliable performance data that can be compared across a range of facilities.
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Conclusions
This study provides evidence that regulatory constraints form a framework that is
associated with views of motivations for environmental management, environmental
management intensity, and to a lesser degree, some aspects of environmental
performance. The ability to identify similar groups of facilities based on regulatory
constraints could assist policymakers in targeting specific types of facilities. Based
on evidence presented here, facilities subject to differing levels of regulation view
various motivations for environmental management differently, suggesting that
policies should offer a range of solutions that appeal to different types of facilities.

Management attitudes toward regulation and environmental protection are also
significantly associated with facility views of external motivations for environmental
management, the intensity of pollution prevention activities and environmental
management practice intensity. These associations are among the strongest in this
research, indicating the importance of management attitudes to environmental
management strategy. The most effective policies will likely be those designed to
address managers' motivations and foster communication with motivated facility
managers to facilitate knowledge transfer and information exchange.

Finally, obtaining reliable environmental performance data remains a challenge.
Policies that establish comparable, meaningful metrics and that require information to
be made available to the public would greatly help in assessing policy effectiveness.
191

Limitations and Future Research
Clearly, managers' attitudes toward the environment and toward regulation are
important to environmental management. However, this research is silent as to the
factors that contribute to managers' attitudes. The evidence that management
attitudes are so important to environmental management is useful, but is only a first
step toward incorporating these attitudes into theoretical and empirical models of
facility behavior. Much is yet to be learned about factors that contribute to
management attitudes and how those factors enter into utility maximization
functions.

Equally important is the limited performance data. This study finds that facilities
subject to more regulation have more intensely implemented environmental
management and pollution prevention practices than lightly regulated facilities, but
there is limited evidence that regulatory group membership is associated with
improved environmental performance. Environmental management studies in general
are limited by a widespread lack of environmental performance data (Esty and
Winston, 2006), and this study shares that limitation. The performance variable used
in this study is a measure of the change in impacts over a single calendar year, which
is a short time frame to capture meaningful change. Responses also may depend on
subjective respondent judgment. Performance outcome information, provided in a
standardized format for comparability, would greatly benefit environmental
management research, and provide more informative findings to policymakers.
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In addition to the larger issue of a lack of performance data, another limitation is that
this study does not include complete information on all levels and types of regulation
that may affect a facility. Regulation was defined at the state and federal level in
order to avoid conflicting or confusing requirements across local regions. Information
on local regulations that affect various industries is difficult to obtain, and
jurisdictions are not always clear to a researcher seeking general information on local
regulations. Many facilities in this study are located in rural areas that were not
clearly under the jurisdiction of a particular municipality, and resources were not
available to pursue the local regulatory constraints that applied to each individual
facility. Therefore, local requirements were excluded from analysis, but these
requirements may have significant impacts on environmental management at
facilities.

Another limitation is that due to the industrial sectors that were included in this study,
insufficient data was available to compare prescriptive and performance-based
regulation. Only five facilities in this study held tradeable SO2 permits, which are
more commonly held in the utility sector and other industries not included in this
study. All other permits issued to facilities in this study were prescriptive in nature.
With this limitation, this study is only a first step in examining the intersection of
prescriptive regulation with voluntary behavior and parsing out the impacts that are
subject to regulation. This study is silent as to the effects of flexible regulation.
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This study also did not specifically ask respondents to indicate which environmental
practices were required by regulation and which they had implemented voluntarily.
Some practices, such as employee training, are required by regulations in one
industry, but not in other industries, and therefore, it was not possible to definitively
designate required efforts separately from voluntary efforts.

In addition, results suggest nonlinear relationships among facilities of various sizes.
The nature of these relationships is as yet unknown, and analyses assuming linear
relationships must be interpreted with caution.

Regarding regulatory group classification, facilities are classified into three
regulatory groups based on a subjective a priori decision. The moderately regulated
group exhibited some instability in replications of the cluster analysis, and a more
robust classification may be a two-group classification consisting of highly regulated
facilities and other facilities. Two groups would not reflect the gradient of regulatory
intensity that this research intended to capture, and therefore, a three-group
classification was chosen. Regulation is complex, and this research presents only a
first step toward defining groups of similar facilities based on the level of regulatory
constraint.

Finally, this study uses data collected in the state of Oregon, which has a reputation
as an environmentally conscientious region. Some of this reputation is likely due to
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positive perceptions of the City of Portland and its environs, which regularly receive
positive public recognition for progressive policy. Responses were received from
across the state, and not all regions of Oregon have the same reputation for
environmental friendliness as Portland (as well as Bend, Eugene, and some other
regions). Therefore, not all facilities in the study were expected to exhibit a particular
level of environmental activity. However, despite regional differences, the study
comprised a single state with a reputation for proactive environmental policy and a
particular style and level of management at the state level, and if this study were
replicated in another state, results may differ. Regulatory influences could be more
pronounced in a region with a less environmentally friendly reputation, where there
may be less voluntary activity.

Despite these limitations, this study does suggest criteria for classifying facilities
according to regulatory constraint, and does find some differences among these
facilities that may be useful for policymakers attempting to address the needs and
interests of a variety of facilities. In addition, this research demonstrates the
importance of management attitudes, and supports other findings that the CEO effect
is an important influence on business operations.

195

References
Alberini, Anna and K. Segerson. 2002. "Assessing voluntary programs to improve
environmental quality." Environmental and Resource Economics, 22(1-2): 157-184.
Albertson, Brandy. 2006. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality. Personal
communication. February 25,2006.
Allenby, Braden R.1999. Industrial ecology: Policy framework and implementation.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Amacher, Gregory S., E. Koskela, and M. Ollikainen. 2004. "Environmental quality
competition and eco-labeling." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 47(2):284-306.
American Hotel and Lodging Association. 2004. Lodging industry profile. New
York: American Hotel and Lodging Association.
Andrews, Richard NX., et al. 2001. "Environmental management systems: History,
theory and implementation research." In Regulating from the inside: Can
environmental management systems achieve policy goals! C. Coglianese and J. Nash,
editors. Washington, D.C.: RFF Press.
Anex, Robert. 2003. "Something New under the Sun? The Industrial Ecology of
Biobased Products". Journal of Industrial Ecology 3 (3/4): 1 -4.
Anton, Wilma Rose Q., Deltas, G., and Khanna, M., 2004. "Incentives for
environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48(1): 632-654.
Arimura, Toshi, A. Hibiki, and N. Johnstone. 2007. "An empirical study of
environmental R&D: What encourages facilities to be environmentally innovative?"
In Environmental policy and corporate behavior, Nick Johnstone, ed. Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
Arora, Seema and T. N. Cason. 1996. "Why do firms volunteer to exceed
environmental regulations: Understanding participation in EPA's 33/50 Program."
Land Economics 72(4): 413-432.
. 1995. "An experiment in voluntary environmental regulation: Participation
in EPA's 33/50 Program." Journal of Environmental Economics & Management
28(3): 271-287.
196

Arora, Seema and S. Gangopadhyay. 1995. "Toward a theoretical model of voluntary
overcompliance." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 28(3):289-309.
Baldwin, Robert and M. Cave. 1999. Understanding regulation: Theory, strategy,
and practice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Barker III, Vincent L. and G. C. Mueller. 2002. "CEO characteristics and firm R&D
spending." Management Science 48(6):782-801.
Baltzar, Kenneth. 2004. "Customers' willingness to pay for food quality—the case of
eggs." Food Economics l(2):78-90.
Bernhardt, Kevin J., J. C. Allen, and G. A. Helmers. 1996. "Using cluster analysis to
classify farms for conventional/alternative systems research." Review of Agricultural
Economics 18(4): 599-611.
Bj0rner, Thomas Bue, L. G. Hansen, and C. S. Russell. 2004. "Environmental
labeling and consumers' choice - an empirical analysis of the effect of the Nordic
Swan." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47(3):411-434.
Bodhanowicz, Paulina. 2003. A Study of Environmental Impacts, Environmental
Awareness and Pro-Ecological Initiatives in the Hotel Industry. Stockholm: KTH
Energy Technology.
Brieman, L., Friedman, J., Olshen, R. and Stone, C , 1984. Classification and
Regression Trees. Wadsworth, Pacific Grove, CA.
Briguglio, Lino. "Small island developing states and their economic vulnerabilities."
World Development 23(9): 1615:1632.
Bruner, Aaron G., R. E. Gullison, R. E. Rice, and G. A. B. da Fonesca. 2001.
"Effectiveness of parks in protecting tropical biodiversity." Science 291(5501): 125128.
Carpentier, Chantal Line, and D. E. Ervin. 2002. Business approaches to agrienvironmental management: Incentives, constraints and policy issues. Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Chan, Moon Fai and Y. L. Zang. 2007. "Nurses' perceived and actual level of
diabetes mellitus knowledge: Results of a cluster analysis." Journal of Clinical
Nursing 16(7b): 234-242.
Clark, L. A. and D. Watson. 1995. "Constructing validity: Basic issues in objective
scale development." Psychological Assessment 7(3):309-319.
197

Clason, D. L. and T. J. Dormody. 1994. "Analyzing data measured by individual
Likert-type items." Journal of Agricultural Education 35(4):31-35.
Cohen, Jacob, P. Cohen, S. G. West, and L. S. Aiken. 2003. Applied multiple
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences, third edition. London:
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates.
Cordano, Mark, and I. H. Frieze. 2000. "Pollution reduction preferences of U.S.
environmental managers: Applying Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior." The
Academy of Management Journal 43(4): 627-641.
Grassland, Craig and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. "How national systems differ in their
constraints on corporate executives: a study of CEO effects in three countries."
Strategic Management Journal 28(8):767-789.
Darnall, Nicole, G. Jolley, and B. Ytterhus. 1007. "Understanding the relationship
between a facility's environmental and financial performance." In Environmental
policy and corporate behavior, Nick Johnstone, ed. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, Inc.
Dasgupta, Susmita, H. Hettige, and D. Wheeler. 2000. "What improves
environmental compliance? Evidence from Mexican industry." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 39(1): 39-66.
Davies, Terry and David M. Konisky. 2000. Environmental Implications of the
Foodservice and Food Retail Industries. RFF Discussion Paper 00-11. Washington
D.C.: Resources for the Future.
Davis, Christopher P., A. A. Joroff, and W. L. Thomas. 2005. "Sustainability
develops within U.S. companies. . .gradually". Corporate Environmental Strategy:
International Journal for Sustainable Business 12(3&4):101-108.
Dias-Sardinha, Idalina and L. Reijnders. 2005. "Evaluating environmental and social
performance of large Portuguese companies: A balanced scorecard approach."
Business Strategy and the Environmentl4(2):73-91.
Dillman, Don A. 2000. Mail and Internet surveys: The Tailored Design Method,
Second Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Durbin, Robert. 1978. Theory building. New York: The Free Press, a division of
Macmillan Publishing Company.

198

Ervin, David, J. Wu, T. Wirkkala, M. Khanna, and C. Jones. 2008. " 'Voluntary'
business environmental management: Roles of regulation, market forces and
management values". Working paper. Portland, OR: Portland State University.
Esty, Daniel C. and A. S. Winston. 2006. Green to Gold: How smart companies use
environmental strategy to innovate, create value, and build competitive advantage.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
European Commission. 2003. "Enterprise and industry, SME definition". Available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/index_en.htm.
Accessed September 16, 2006.
Forsyth, Timothy. 1997. "Environmental responsibility and business regulation: The
case for sustainable tourism." The Geographic Journal 163(3):270-280.
Freeman, Jody and C. D. Kolstad. 2007. "Prescriptive environmental regulations
versus market-based incentives." In Moving to markets in environmental regulation:
Lessons from twenty years of experience, Jody Freeman and Charles D. Kolstad,
editors. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Friesen, Lana. 2003. "Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with
environmental regulations." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
46(l):72-85.
Frondel, Manuel, J. Horbach, and K. Renings. 2007. "End-of-pipe or cleaner
production? An empirical comparison of environmental innovation decisions across
OECD countries." In Environmental policy and corporate behavior, Nick Johnstone,
ed. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
Garson, G. David. 2008a. "Two-step cluster analysis", from Statnotes: Topics in
Multivariate Analysis. Available at
http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/statnote.htm. Accessed June 14,2008.
. 2008b. "Multiple regression", from Statnotes: Topics in Multivariate
Analysis. Available at http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/statnote.htm.
Accessed June 15, 2008.
Glazer, Amihai and E. Janeba. 2004. "Strategic investment by a regulated firm."
International Tax and Public Finance 11(2):123-132.
Goodall, Brian. 1995. "Environmental auditing: A tool for assessing the
environmental performance of tourism firms." The Geographic Journall61(l):29-37.

199

Greene, William. 1997. Econometric analysis, third edition. Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall
Hall, Teresa. 2006. Business decisions for voluntary environmental management:
Motivations, actions, and outcomes. Master's thesis, Oregon State University, May
31, 2006. Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University
Handfield, Robert, R. Sroufe, and S. Walton. 2005. "Integrating environmental
management and supply chain strategies." Business Strategy and the Environment
14(1):1-19.
Henriques, Irene and P. Sadorsky. 2007. "Environmental management systems and
practices: An international perspective." In Environmental policy and corporate
behavior, Nick Johnstone, ed. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
. 1996. "The determinants of an environmentally responsive firm: An
empirical approach." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
30(3):381-395.
Huette, Fred. 2007. Personal communication, October 1, 2007.
infoUSA. 2008. "Estimated sales." Available at http://www.infousa.com/. Accessed
June 27,2008.
Innes, R. and J. J. Bial. 2002. "Inducing innovation in the environmental technology
of oligopolistic firms." Journal of Industrial Economics 50(3):265-287.
Jacoby, J. and M. S. Matell. 1971. "Three-point Likert scales are good enough."
Journal of Marketing Research 8(4):495-500.
Johnson, Lauren K. 2002. "Do CEOs matter?" Intelligence. New developments,
research, and ideas in management. MIT Sloan Management Review Winter 2002:89.
Johnstone, Nick, et al. 2007a. "Public environmental policy and corporate behavior:
project background, overview of the data and summary results." In Environmental
policy and corporate behavior, Nick Johnstone, ed. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing, Inc.
. 2007b. "Many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip': Direct and indirect public
policy incentives to improve corporate environmental performance." In
Environmental policy and corporate behavior, Nick Johnstone, ed. Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
200

Jones, Cody. 2005. "An overview of environmental impacts, applicable regulations,
and available voluntary initiatives for six industry sectors." Working paper. Portland,
OR: Portland State University.
Jones, Cody. 2007. "Environmental management in selected Oregon manufacturing,
construction, accommodation, and transport sectors: A report on the survey and
data." Working paper. Portland, OR: Portland State University
. 2007. "Voluntary environmental program participation in selected Oregon
manufacturing, construction, accommodation, and transport sectors: Perceived
influences on participation and effects on effort and outcomes." Master of
Environmental Management project. Portland, OR: Portland State University.
Khanna, Madhu. 2001. "Nonmandatory approaches to environmental regulation: A
survey." Journal of Economic Surveys 15(3):291-324.
Khanna, Madhu, P. Koss, C. Jones and D. Ervin. 2007. "Motivations for voluntary
environmental management." Policy Studies Journal 35(4):751-772.
Khanna, Madhu and W. R. Q. Anton. 2002a. "Corporate environmental management:
Regulatory and market-based pressures." Land Economics 78(4):539-558.
. 2002b. "What is driving corporate environmentalism: Opportunity or
threat?" Corporate Environmental Strategy 9(4): 409-417.
Khanna, Madhu and L. Damon. 1999. "EPA's voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on
toxic releases and economic performance of firms." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 37(1): 1-25.
Kielstra, Paul, etal. 2008. "Doing good: Business and the sustainability challenge."
London: Economist Intelligence Unit
Koenker, R. W. and G. Bassett, Jr. 1978. "Regression quantiles." Econometrica
46(l):33-50.
. 1982. "Robust tests for heteroscedasticity based on regression quantiles."
Econometrica 50(1):43—61.
Laroche, Michael, J. Bergeron, and G. Barbaro-Forelo. 2001. "Targeting customers
who are wiling to pay more for environmentally friendly products." Journal of
Consumer Marketing! 8(6):503-520.

201

Lehman, D. and J. Hulbert. 1972. "Are three-point Likert scales always good
enough?" Journal of Marketing Research 9(4):444-446.
Loureiro, Maria. J. McCluskey, and R. C. Mittelhammer. 2002. "Will consumers pay
a premium for eco-labeled apples?" Journal of Consumer Affairs 36(2):203-219.
Lyon, Thomas P. and J. W. Maxwell. 2004. Corporate environmentalism and public
policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Magat, Wesley, A.J. Krupnick, and W. Harrington. 1986. Rules in the making: A
statistical analysis of regulatory agency behavior. Washington, D. C : Resources for
the Future.
Maloney, Michael T. and R.E. McCornick. 1982. "A positive theory of
environmental quality regulation." Journal of Law and Economics 25(1):99-123.
Marshall, R. Scott, M. Cordano, and M. Silverman. 2005. "Exploring individual and
institutional drivers of proactive environmentalism in the US wine industry."
Business Strategy and the Environment 14(2):92-109.
Mateo-Babiano, Iderlina and H. Ieda. 2005. "Theoretical discourse on sustainable
space design: Towards creating and sustaining effective sidewalks." Business
Strategy and the Environment\4(5):300-314.
Maxwell, John W., T. P. Lyon and S. Hackett. 2000. "Self-regulation and social
welfare: The political economy of corporate environmentalism." Journal of Law and
Economics 43(2):583-617.
McClelland, John D. and J. K. Horowitz. 1999. "The costs of water pollution
regulation in the pulp and paper industry." Land Economics 75(2): 220-232.
Meila, Marina and D. Heckerman. 2001. "An experimental comparison of several
clustering and initialization methods." Machine Learning 42(l-2):9-29.
Menard, Scott.2002. Applied logistic regression analysis, second edition.
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences No. 106.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Moon, Wanki, et al. 2002. "Willingness to pay for environmental practices:
Implications for eco-labeling. Land Economics, Vol. 78, No. \,pp 88-102
Moughalu, Michael, H. David Robinson, and John L. Glascock, 1990. "Hazardous
waste lawsuits, stockholder returns and deterrence." Southern Economic Journal
57(2):357-370.
202

Mousa, Gehan A. 2005. "The contribution of environmental initiatives to corporate
disclosure". Corporate Environmental Strategy: International Journal for
Sustainable Business 12(3&4): 129-140.
Murdock, Barbara Scott, C. Weissner, and K. Sexton. 2005. "Stakeholder
participation in voluntary environmental agreements: Analysis of 10 Project XL case
studies." Science, Technology and Human Values 30(2):223-250.
NAICS Association. 2005. "NAICS information: The history of NAICS." Available
at http://www.naics.com/info.htm. Accessed October 27, 2005.
Niles, John. 2003. "Trucks, traffic, and timely transport: A regional freight logistics
profile." Mineta Transportation Institute Report 02-04. San Jos£, CA: San Jose State
University.
Okazaki, Shintaro. 2006. "What do we know about mobile Internet adopters?
A cluster analysis." Information and Management 43(2): 127-141.
Oregon Revised Statutes. 2005. "Oregon Revised Statutes, 2005 Edition, Statute
657.665(3)." Available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/657.html. Accessed June 9,
2006.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2003.
"Pollution abatement and control expenditure in OECD countries. OECD report
ENV/EPOC/SE(2003)1." Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/57/470431 l.pdf. Accessed January 5,2007.
. 2008. "Main economic indicators: OECD business cycle analysis databse."
Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?rev=2. Accessed June 27, 2008.
Porter, Michael E. and C. van der Linde. 1995. "Toward a new conception of the
environment-competitiveness relationship." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4):
97-118.
Preuss, Lutz. 2005. "Rhetoric and reality of corporate greening: A view from the
supply chain management function." Business Strategy and the Environment 14(2):
110-122.
Reinhardt, Forest L. 2005. "Perspectives from the business literature." In
Environmental protection and the social responsibility of firms: Perspectives from
law, economics, and business. B. L. Hay, R. N. Stavins, and R. H. K. Vietor, editors.
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.

203

. 2000. Down to Earth: Applying business principles to environmental
management. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Rosenberg, Alejandro, and C. G. Turvey. 1991. "Identifying management profiles of
Ontario swine producers through cluster analysis." Review of Agricultural
Economics 13(2): 201-213.
Salop, S.C. and D.T. Scheffman. 1983. "Raising rivals' costs." The American
Economic Review 73 (2) 267-271.
Segerson, Kathleen and Thomas J. Miceli. 1998. "Voluntary environmental
agreements: Good or bad news for environmental protection?" in Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 36(2): 109-130.
Slater, Graham. 2005. Personal communication. May 16, 2005.
Stigler, George J. 1971. "The theory of economic regulation." The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3-21.
Tabachnick, Barbara and L. S. Fidell. 2001. Using multivariate statistics, fourth
edition. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Teisl, Mario F., B. Roe, and R. Hicks. 2002. "Can EcoLabels tune a market?
Evidence from dolphin safe labeling." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 43(3): 339-359.
The Nature Conservancy (TNC). 2008. "Our approach." Available at:
http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/?src=t2. Accessed June 27,2008.
Theodoridis, S. and K. Koutroumbas. 1999. Pattern recognition. New York:
Academic Press.
The Sierra Club (SC). 2008. "Inside Sierra Club." Available at:
http://www.sierraclub.org/inside/. Accessed June 27,2008.
Tola, Vincenzo et al. 2007. "Cluster analysis for portfolio optimization." Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 32(1): 235-258.
United Nations Development Programme(UNDP). 2008. "Human development
report 2007/2008 Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world."
Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/. Accessed June 27,2008.
United Nations Economic Programme (UNEP). 2008. "Environmental Vulnerability
Index." Available at http://www.vulnerabilityindex.net/. Accessed June 27, 2008.
204

U.S. Census Bureau (USCB). 2008. "2007 NAICS codes and titles". Available at

http://www.census.gov/naics/2007/naicod07.htm. Accessed June 15, 2008.
. 2003. "Statistics of U.S. business." Available at
http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/. Accessed December 29, 2006.
—
. 2001. "Census 2000." Available at
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html. Accessed April 17,2008.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1995a. "EPA Office of Compliance
Sector Notebook Project: Profile of the lumber and wood products industry.
EPA/310-R-95-006." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
.1995b. "EPA Office of Compliance Sector Notebook Project: Profile of the
electronics and computer industry. EPA/310-R-95-002." Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.
.1997. "EPA Office of Compliance Sector Notebook Project: Profile of the
ground transportation industry - trucking, railroad and pipeline. EPA/310-R-97-002."
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). 2006. Table of small business size
standards matched to North American Industry Classification System codes.
Available at:
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/serv_sstd_tablepdf.
pdf. Accessed December 29,2006.
Videras, Julio, and A. Alberini. 2000. "The appeal of voluntary environmental
programs: Which firms participate and why?" Contemporary Economic Policy
18(4):449-461.
Vogan, Christine R. 1996. "Pollution abatement and control expenditures, 1972-94."
Survey of Current Business 76(9):48-67.
World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our common future.
Oxford University Press: New York.
Zeng, S. X. et al. 2007. "Cluster analysis for studying industrial sustainability: An
empirical study in Shanghai." Journal of Cleaner Production 16(10): 1090-1097.

205

Appendix A: Oregon Business Environmental Management Survey
for Manufacturing Sectors

Section I. Facility Environmental Management

Ql. Are environmental issues a significant concern for your facility?
A facility is typically a single physical location at the address where this survey was
received or the location designated on the cover.
1 No (Skip to Question 3)
2 Yes

Q2. If yes, please list one or two of the most significant environmental concerns
for your facility.

Q3. Please indicate the extent each of the following factors has influenced
environmental management at your facility in the last 5 years. (Please check only
ONE box for each factor.)
No

Great Do Not

Influence
1 2
a. Customer desire for environmentally friendly
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Influence Know
3

4

5

D

products and services

1 2

3

4

5

D

for environmentally friendly products/services.... 1 2

3

4

5

D

b. Customer willingness to pay higher prices

c. Ability to earn public recognition and customer
goodwill with environmentally friendly actions .

.

1

2

3

4

5

D

d. Environmental interest groups' perception that
environmental protection is a critical issue

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

e. Preventing boycotts or other adverse actions
by environmental interest groups
f. Promoting an environmentally friendly image
to environmental interest groups

Q4. For your facility, please indicate the priority of each of the following factors
in encouraging environmental management in the last 5 years. (Please check only
ONE box for each factor).
No

Great Do Not

Priority

Priority Know

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

a. Satisfying investor (owner) desires to reduce
environmental risks and liabilities
b. Protecting or enhancing the value of the facility
or parent firm for investors (owners)
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c. Satisfying lenders' desires to reduce
environmental risks and liabilities.

1 2

3

d. Complying with current government
environmental regulations

1

2

3

1

2

3

e. Taking environmentally friendly actions to
reduce regulatory inspections and make it
easier to get environmental permits
f. Being better prepared for meeting
anticipated environmental regulations

1 2

3

g. Preempting future environmental
regulations by voluntarily reducing regulated
pollution beyond compliance levels
(for example, air particulate emissions)

1

2

3

1

2

3

h. Preempting future environmental regulations
by voluntarily reducing unregulated
impacts (for example, carbon dioxide)
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Q5. Please indicate the extent that each of the following factors has influenced
environmental management at your facility in the last 5 years. (Please check only
ONE box for each factor.)
No

Great Do Not

Influence

Influence Know

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

a. Investing in cleaner products and services
differentiates our products or our facility
b. Improving environmental performance
helps us keep up with competitors
c. Environmentally friendly actions result in
product or process innovations
d. Environmentally friendly actions can
reduce costs

e. Being environmentally responsible attracts quality
employees and reduces employee turnover
f. Being environmentally responsible improves
employee morale, motivation and productivity....
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Q6. Please indicate the percentage of your facility's annual revenue spent on
environmental management (for example, energy and water conservation,
recycling, pollution reduction, compliance inspections, audits, etc.) for the 2003
and 2004 calendar years. (Please check only ONE box for each year.)
Less

1%

than

up to up to up to up to up to

1%
2004 Calendar Year

1

2003 Calendar Year

1

2%

2%

3%

2

3

3%

5%
4

5%

10%

10% More
than

20% 20%

5

6

7
7

Q7. For your facility, please indicate the extent of your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements. (Please check only ONE box for each
statement.)
Strongly

Strongly Do Not

Disagree

Agree Know

1 2

3

4

5

D

a. Facility upper management believes it has a
moral responsibility to protect the environment

1

2

D

environment even if substantial costs are incurred .... 1

2

D

b. Facility upper management supports protecting the

c. Facility upper management believes that
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improvements in environmental performance
will improve long-term financial performance

1

2

3

4

5

D

1

2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

2

3

4

5

D

d. Facility upper management believes that
customers and other stakeholders care about
the environmental impacts of its products

e. Facility upper management believes that advances in
technology can solve environmental problems
while increasing profits at the same time
f. Facility upper management believes that the
facility should help conserve society's
limited natural resources

1

Q8. For your facility, please indicate the extent to which the following factors
are barriers to increasing the environmental friendliness of your processes,
products, and/or services. (Please check only ONE box for each factor.)
No

Large

Do Not

Barrier

Barrier

Know

1 2

3

4

5

D

a. High upfront investment expense

1

2

3

4

5

D

b. Availability of knowledgeable staff

1

2

3

4

5

D

c. High day-to-day costs

1

2

3

4

5

D

d. Significant upfront time commitment

1

2

3

4

5

D
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e. Uncertain future benefits

1

2

3

4

5

D

1

2

3

4

5

D

1

2

3

4

5

D

3

4

5

D

f. Risk of downtime or delivery interruptions
during implementation
g. Contributions to environmental performance
are not included in performance appraisals

h. Employees are not rewarded for contributions to
environmental performance

1 2

Section II. Facility Environmental Practices
Q9. Please indicate the types of employee involvement in environmental
management at your facility. {Check ALL types that apply.)
A. Dedicated environmental staff (For example, environmental, health, and safety
managers, compliance specialists, etc.)
Total number of full time equivalents (FTEs) in dedicated
environmental positions (Count an employee who works half time on
environmental management as 0.50 FTE, etc.)
B. Other staff with official environmental responsibilities (For example, production
managers with official responsibility for environmental audits)
C. Staff who participate in environmental management on a voluntary basis (For
example, employees who volunteer for environmental audits)
D. Environmental management is the responsibility of all employees
E. Other
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Q10. Who is primarily responsible for the majority of environmental decisions,
including which environmental practices to implement, at your facility? (Please
check only ONE box.)
1

Owner

2

President or CEO

3

Vice President
Title or Area of responsibility:

4

Director
Title or Area of responsibility:

5

Executive Committee

6

Plant Manager/Facility Manager

7

Environmental Heath and Safety Manager

8

Other Environmental Manager (compliance, sustainability, etc.)
Title or Area of responsibility:

9

Other (Please specify)

Q l l . For your facility, please indicate whether or not the following
environmentally friendly practices have been implemented, and if yes, the year
of implementation. (Please check only ONE box for each practice.)
No Yes Year Implemented

a. Well-defined environmental goals

1

b. Documented environmental policy

1 2
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2

c. Green purchasing policy

1 2

d. Environmental standards for suppliers

1 2

e. Environmental audits at regular intervals

1 2

f. Internal environmental standards

1 2

g. Cost accounting to identify environmental
problems and costs

1 2

h. Periodic publishing of environmental information in
reports made available to the public

1 2

i. Environmental training for employees

1 2

j . Compensation to employees for their contributions to
environmental performance

1 2

k. ISO 14001 certification

1 2

Q12. For your facility, please indicate the extent of your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements. (Please check only ONE box for each
statement.)
Strongly

Strongly Do Not

Disagree

Agree

Know

1 2

3

4

5

D

1 2

3

4

5

D

a. Our environmental goals guide operational
decisions
b. Environmental responsibility is emphasized
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through well-defined environmental policies
and procedures

1 2

c. Our environmental standards are more stringent
than mandatory requirements

1 2

d. We conduct environmental audits for our own
performance goals, not just for compliance

1 2

e. Employees receive incentives for contributions to
environmental performance

1 2

f. We use environmental cost accounting

1 2

g. We make continuous efforts to minimize
environmental impacts

1

2

h. We require our suppliers to pursue environmentally
friendly practices

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

i. Employees are conscious of the importance of
minimizing negative environmental impacts
j . An adequate amount of training in environmental
management is provided to all employees
k. Facility environmental achievements are given
prominent coverage in facility annual reports
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Q13. Does your facility participate in any voluntary programs designed to
improve environmental performance or construct projects according to
voluntary environmental standards? (For example, Climate Savers, ENERGY
STAR , the National Environmental Performance Track, the Oregon Natural Step
Network, Waste Wise, etc.)
INo
2 Yes Which programs:

Q14. For your facility, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with
the following statements. (Please check only ONE box for each statement.)
Strongly

Strongly Do Not

Disagree

Agree

1 2

Know

3

4

5

D

3

4

5

D

a. Pollution prevention is emphasized
to improve environmental performance

1

2

1

2

3 4

5

D

1

2

3 4

5

D

1

2

3 4

5

D

b. Efforts have been made to reduce spills and
leaks of environmental contaminants
c. We choose raw materials that minimize
environmental impacts
d. We have modified our production systems to
reduce waste and environmental impacts
e. We have modified our products to reduce
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environmental damage during production,
consumption, and disposal

1

3

4

5

D

1

3

4

5

D

f. We have increased recycling and reduced
landfilling of our solid waste

Section III. Facility Environmental Performance

Q15. For your facility, please indicate the level of compliance with regulatory
standards for any of the following that were regulated by a government agency
during the 2004 calendar year. (Please check only ONE box for each standard.)
Working

Do More
than

Not

Towards

Meet

Regulated

Meeting

Regulatory

Regulation at your

Regulation

Standards

Requires

Facility

1

2

3

4

a. Water pollution

1

2

3

4

b. Solid waste

1

2

3

4

c. Hazardous/toxic wastes

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

d. Hazardous air emissions
(for example, sulfur oxides, nitrogen
oxides, volatile organic compounds,
particulates)
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e. Other

1

(Please specify)

Q16. Please indicate the approximate amount of each of the following over the
2004 calendar year for your facility.
Amount
a. Waste water discharged

Million Gallons

b. Solid waste landfilled

Tons

c. Hazardous/toxic wastes generated

Tons

d. Hazardous air emissions released

Tons

e. Carbon dioxide emitted

Tons

f. Percentage of recyclable waste that was recycled ....

Percent

g. Electricity use

Kilowatts

h. Natural gas use

Therms

Q17. For your facility, please indicate the extent to which the following
measures of environmental performance have changed over the 2004 calendar
year. (Please check only ONE box for each measure.)
Do
Not
+>10% +4-10% +1-3% 0 -1-3% -4-10% ->10% Know

1
a. Waste water discharged.

... 1
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2

3

4
3

5
4

6
5

7

D
D

b. Solid waste landfilled

2

c. Hazardous/toxic wastes generated

2

d. Volatile organic compounds

4

5

4

5

2

4

5

D

e. Carbon dioxide emitted

2

4

5

D

f. Recycling of recyclable waste

2

4

5

D

g. Electricity use

2

4

5

i. Natural gas use

2

4

5

3

D
6

6

Comments:

Section IV. General Information

Q18. Is your facility owned by a parent company?
1 No (Skip to Question 21)
2 Yes

Q19. If yes to Q18, what is the name of the parent company, and where is it
located?
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D

D
D

Q20. If yes to Q18, please mark the extent of your agreement or disagreement
with the following statements. (Please check only ONE box for each statement.)
Strongly

Strongly Do Not

Disagree

Agree

1 2

3

4

5

Know
D

a. The parent company strongly encourages facility
participation in voluntary environmental programs.. . . 1 2 3 4 5

D

b. The parent company provides incentives and
assistance for environmentally friendly practices
and technologies

1

2

3

4

5

D

1

2

3

4

5

D

1

2

3

4

5

D

c. The parent company has an environmental
policy/standard that applies to all facilities
d. The parent company allows facilities to make
environmental investments needed to go beyond
compliance

Q21. Is your facility (or parent company) a multi-national corporation?
1

No

2

Yes
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Q22. Is your facility (or parent company) publicly traded or privately owned?
(Please check only ONE box.)
1

Publicly traded

2

Privately owned

3

Other (please specify)

Q23. Does your facility or parent company have its own Research &
Development department? (Please check ALL that apply.)
A. Yes, facility has a Research & Development department.
B. Yes, parent company has Research & Development department.
C. No, neither facility nor parent company has Research & Development
department.

Q24. Does your facility primarily produce a good/service sold directly to
customers in retail markets?
1

No

2

Yes

Q25. Approximately how many close competitors does your facility have?
Number of close competitors
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Q26. How many times was your facility inspected by an environmental agency
during 2004?
Number of times facility inspected in 2004

Q27. How many penalties, third-party lawsuits or other sanctions for
environmental management did your facility have during 2004?
Number of environmental penalties, other sanctions or third party lawsuits in 2004

Q28. What were the estimated annual total revenues of your facility during the
2004 calendar year?

(In million $)

Q29. What is the average age of facility upper management personnel (senior
managers/directors and above)? (Please check only ONE box.)
1

20-30 years old

2

31-40 years old

3

41-50 years old

4

51-60 years old

5

Over 61 years old
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Q30. We have asked you about a wide range of potential influences on
environmental management at your facility. Considering both motivations and
barriers, please list the three most important influences on your facility in
descending order of importance.
1.
2.
3.

Q31. No single questionnaire can adequately cover all points relevant to
environmental management by diverse Oregon firms. We welcome any
additional comments, or elaboration on the answers to any of the questions.
(Please note the question number if appropriate.)

Q32. If anyone else contributed to completing the survey, please list their
positions/titles:
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Q33. Finally, please let us know if you would like to see a report of the study
findings.
1 Yes, please email the website for the report.
Email address:

2 Yes, please send a hard copy.
Address (if different from the address this survey was sent to):

3 No, thanks.

Thank you very much for completing the survey!
Please return your completed questionnaire to:
Social & Economic Sciences Research Center
Washington State University
PO Box 641801
Pullman, WA 99164-1801
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